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What does it take for a positive epistemic status to obtain? I argue throughout my thesis that if a positive 
epistemic status obtains, this is not a brute fact. Instead, if for example a belief is justified, it is justified in virtue of some 
further condition(s) obtaining. A fundamental topic in epistemology is the question of what sorts of factors can be 
relevant to determining the positive epistemic status of belief. Epistemic Internalism holds that these factors must be 
“internal” (in a sense that needs to be specified). Epistemic Externalism is the denial of internalism. My thesis is an 
explanation and defense of an internalist theory of epistemic justification.
The central claim of my thesis is that something is “internal” in this sense only if it is, or can easily be, the object 
of the agent’s conscious awareness. By considering key cases, I show that without an awareness requirement on 
justification, the subject cannot avoid what I call the Subject’s Perspective Objection. In developing this objection I 
examine and respond to an argument against the awareness requirement which claims that such awareness either leads to 
a vicious regress of requiring higher order beliefs of increasing complexity (if any beliefs are to be justified), or else 
requiring such awareness is unmotivated. This regress is generated because it is assumed that the relevant kind of 
awareness must be doxastic. My solution invokes what I call ‘strong non-doxastic awareness’ that grounds non- 
inferential justification and thereby avoids this dilemma, while meeting the Subject’s Perspective Objection.
I also argue that external factors, such as the reliability (actual or conditional) of the mechanism supporting the 
belief, are not necessary for justification. I argue for this conclusion by comparing what constitutes justified belief in the 
actual world with one’s counterpart in a ‘demon world’. I argue that this intuition, correctly interpreted, counts in favour 
of internalism. As I explain, many philosophers moved by arguments presented by externalists about mental content deny 
that such a case is possible. In opposition I argue that the awareness requirement remains substantially unaffected, no 
matter which view of content turns out to be correct. What is key is that the two worlds are completely subjectively 
indistinguishable from each other for those who inhabit them in all the ways of which they are consciously aware.
If neither the obtaining of truth nor reliability is necessary for epistemic justification, what makes justification 
genuinely epistemic? In the final chapter I argue against recent work that assimilates justification with knowledge, as well 
as for a positive account of the truth connection. As to the former question, I defend the orthodoxy that they are distinct 
epistemic statuses; as to the latter, I argue that the connection between justification and truth is conceptual. That is, 
epistemic justification is epistemic because it turns on evidence; evidence is epistemic because it is conceptually linked 
with truth. Epistemic justification, therefore, is conceptually linked with the truth (via evidence), which is what makes it 
distinctively epistemic.
In short, this thesis is an explanation and defense of an internalist theory of epistemic justification. The central 
claim of the thesis is that something is “internal” in this sense only if it is, or can easily be, the object of the agent’s 
conscious awareness. I argue that conscious awareness is a necessary condition of epistemic justification obtaining, and 
that factors external to consciousness play no justificatory role.
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In t r o d u c t i o n :
This thesis concerns the nature of epistemic justification. But despite having tried 
to offer a well-explained, cogent position on certain aspects o f the nature of justification, 
one might well object to many of the remarks in this thesis as utterly question-begging. 
But such a complaint changes the topic from the one that I am addressing here. 
Obviously, the approach taken throughout this thesis will not convince those who are 
sceptical about whether our beliefs are (for the most part) justified, or think that in order 
to be justified we need to have a non-circular (and therefore, presumably a priori) 
demonstration that proves that we are justified in believing much of what we do. But 
again, that is to engage in a different debate, one outside the scope of this project, since I 
will be using what can be called ‘Particularism’ as a methodological constraint in 
exploring the nature of epistemic justification, as I will explain below.
A fundamental problem in epistemology is generated by the conjunction o f two 
questions: what do we know, and how do we decide, in a particular case, whether we 
know? As Chisholm puts the latter question, “what are the criteria o f knowing?” 
(Chisholm, 1966, p. 56) O f course, perhaps there will prove to be no such criteria. But a 
working hypothesis to be tested throughout this thesis is that we can formulate, at least 
partially, illuminating conditions for the instantiation o f certain epistemic properties.
Chisholm’s idea is that if we could tell what we know, we could go about trying 
to formulate the criteria of knowing. Similarly, if  we had such criteria, we could 
determine what, if anything, we know. A sceptical position is to deny that we have an 
answer to either o f these questions, so that we cannot know what, if  anything, we know,
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and we have no way of deciding in a particular case if we genuinely know it. But there 
are alternatives for non-sceptics.
Those who claim to have an intuitive idea of what we know, are called 
‘Particularists’, and they seek to answer the criteria question by giving an account of 
what all the intuitive particular cases of knowledge have in common that makes them 
instances o f knowledge, rather than something else. On the other hand, those who claim 
to have general criteria o f knowledge are sometimes called ‘Methodists’. They try to 
determine what (if anything), and to what extent, matches the criteria of knowledge that 
they propose. This sort o f problem is not unique to knowledge. I will be presupposing 
Particularism throughout as a methodological constraint on approaching the theory of 
epistemic justification. That is, given that 1 share an intuitive idea o f what we are 
justified in believing, I will seek to give an account of what all the intuitive particular 
cases o f justification have in common that make them instances of justification , rather 
than something else.
I hold that we are justified in believing all sorts o f things, e.g. I am justified in 
believing that there is a desk before me, that the room is now less than 50 degrees C., etc. 
This project presupposes that we are epistemically justified in believing most of what we 
take ourselves to be justified in believing. Given that we obviously are justified in 
believing many things, can we elucidate what it is to be justified? Part o f my answer to 
this question is expressed by arguing that the Awareness Requirement introduced in 
Chapter 2 is a necessary condition o f justification obtaining. Given this approach, it is no 
objection to my account to merely point out that it would not convince the sceptic or that 
it presupposes that we have justified beliefs. These things are true, but they are beside
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the point. Again, the question I will be addressing is that, given that we have justified 
beliefs, what can we say about the nature of justification?
I will argue, among other things, for the indispensability o f conscious awareness 
to epistemic justification. In effect I will be defending a version of what has been 
labelled, not particularly helpfully, ‘internalism’ in epistemology.1
The so-called internalism/externalism debate should be of interest in 
epistemology since it addresses one of the most fundamental questions in the discipline: 
what is the basic nature o f epistemic justification? The question o f what kinds o f factors 
can be relevant to determining the positive epistemic status o f belief seems to be about as 
central as a meta-epistemological question could be. One might think that it is only with 
firm grasp of meta-epistemology that one can properly approach questions o f applied 
epistemology, such as what, if  anything, are we justified in believing, and how is such 
justification possible? It is only once we know what we are looking for that we should 
start our search for it.
Obviously we are justified in believing lots o f different kinds o f propositions, and 
how we acquire these beliefs and their justification varies as well. Certain kinds o f
1 While there are obviously epistemologies in the history o f philosophy that can be classified as either 
‘internalist’ or ‘externalist’ in nature, the labels themselves were not used until relatively recently. David 
Armstrong (1973) introduced what he called ‘externalist’ theories o f knowledge as those that hold that 
knowledge is a natural or law-like connection between a subject’s true belief and the state o f affairs that 
make it true. This is what has become known as his ‘Thermometer Model o f K nowledge’.
However, since it is not clear what role, if any, epistemic justification  plays in Arm strong’s epistemology, 
it is not clear to what extent his concept o f the epistemically external meshes with the current debate 
between internalists and externalists who speak explicitly in terms o f justification. Therefore it was 
perhaps not until the exchange between Laurence Bonjour (1980) and Alvin Goldman (1980) who offered 
‘internalist’ and ‘externalist’ theories o f epistemic justification that these labels were first used in their 
current sense.
‘ For the distinction between meta- and applied epistemology, and the case for beginning our 
epistemological enquiry with the meta-epistemological, see Fumerton (1995) Chapter 1.
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beliefs, such as memory beliefs, or a priori beliefs, might be thought to pose special 
problems for the kind of internalism I go on to defend here.
For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the 
subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Here 
Alvin Goldman has objected with what he calls “the Problem of Forgotten Evidence”. 
(See Goldman 2001) The fact is that many beliefs are ones which were based on 
adequate grounds available to the subject at the time the belief was formed, but as time 
lapses, the grounds are often forgotten. As Goldman points out, how properly the belief 
was originally formed is irrelevant to many internalists. So, at this later time when the 
grounds are forgotten, the worry is that the would-be grounded belief is unjustified 
(which leads to scepticism) because the justifying grounds are no longer available to the 
subject, even upon introspection.
While the Problem of Forgotten Evidence and the justification o f memory beliefs, 
as well as a priori beliefs, beliefs based on testimony, etc. are interesting cases that a 
complete theory o f epistemic justification should ultimately address, I will not be able to 
address these problems in this thesis. Instead they must be left for further research. I will 
for the most part limit my scope to beliefs in contingent, empirical propositions about the 
external world based on sense perception.
The justification o f perceptual belief is a central case o f justification. 
Furthermore, it is acquiring justified belief that is the central case o f epistemic 
justification, not its mere retention. I place special emphasis on the acquisition o f belief, 
rather than its retention, because it is conceptually more fundamental: one cannot retain a 
belief unless one has acquired it; but one can acquire a belief but fail to retain it (perhaps
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because one has poor memory). In the future I intend to extend the account I develop 
here of the justification of perceptual belief to other potentially problematic areas. In each 
case I intend to offer a response that explains how the type of justification is possible that 
is neither externalist, nor concessive to the sceptic, in a way that is consistent with 
epistemic internalism and the awareness condition.3
But first, a concern. By requiring the capacity for conscious awareness as a 
necessary condition for being epistemically justified, will my account o f justification be 
too intellectually demanding, thereby barring most if  not all people from holding justified 
beliefs? People vary in intellects and abilities, and accordingly, people’s degree of 
justification for the very same belief will vary to reflect that. If a person’s ability allows 
him to recognize an a priori or evidential insight as my account requires, he can use it to 
justify a corresponding belief. Not being able to achieve maximal justification (as 
presumably no fallible epistemic agents, such as humans, can hope to achieve) does not 
mean that an agent cannot have a justified belief to any degree whatsoever. Since 
justification is almost universally thought to come in degrees, as I will explain in Chapter 
1, it is no objection to a theory if it allows that people o f varying levels of intellect are 
capable o f achieving different levels o f justification.
I think there is some credence to charges o f over-intellectualization if it is directed 
at a theory o f knowledge generally. If young children and some animals do indeed have 
knowledge (which I take to be an open question -  and not one to which the answer is 
obvious), over-intellectualization is something to be avoided. However, while over- 
intellectualization is by definition a bad thing, intellectualization simpliciter is not. It is
3 For examples o f internalist responses to the Problem o f Forgotten Evidence, see Bonjour (2001) and 
Feldman and Conee (2001). For an example o f an internalist theory o f a priori justification, see Bonjour 
(1998).
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true that understanding justification normatively, in terms o f conscious awareness, may 
require a capacity for critical self-reflection. Fortunately, these are just the kind of 
capacities normal adult humans have. We are intellectual beings, or as Aristotle would 
have it, rational animals. If young children or some animals lack the capacity for 
conscious awareness or critical reflection on what they believe, they cannot have justified 
beliefs.
But that is not to say that their beliefs are unjustified. To be unjustified is to have 
the capacity for rationality but to fall short o f meeting epistemic standards. If one lacks a 
capacity and accompanying standards, one cannot be faulted for not meeting them. For 
example, I lack the capacity for unaided flight. But it would be absurd to fault me for 
being unable to fly. It would be equally absurd to think that evaluations o f unaided flight 
even apply to me. Rather, children, animals and those who lack the capacity for critical 
self-reflection are a-justificational -  that is, the concept o f justification does not apply to 
them, making evaluations o f justified belief inapplicable. What I am considering here is 
the nature o f epistemic justification, and those individuals and their mental states of 
which it is a property.
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An Overview:
In Chapter 1 I address some preliminary issues and defend some fundamental 
distinctions concerning the nature of epistemic justification. For instance, I outline some 
of the basic features o f justification, distinguish doxastic from propositional justification 
and consider how best to understand the epistemic basing relation. Specifically, what 
role (if any) does causation play in properly basing a belief on a reason? I also consider 
the structure o f justification and argue for the existence o f immediate justification, that is, 
the justification that does not come from one’s justification to believe other propositions. 
In effect I defend Foundationalism against its rivals (e.g., Coherentism). In addition I 
also explore ways o f construing the internalism/ externalism distinction, and consider to 
what kinds o f epistemic evaluation the distinction applies. I conclude the chapter by 
outlining the egocentric or first person perspective and note the kinds of constraints that 
such a perspective puts on an adequate theory of epistemic justification.
In Chapter 2 I motivate the need for awareness as a necessary condition of 
epistemic justification obtaining. I capture the kind of awareness justification requires 
with the so-called Awareness Requirement, which is the hallmark o f the kind of 
internalism I am defending. The condition can be stated as follows:
A w a ren ess  R eq u irem en t:
S ’s is ju s tif ie d  in believ in g  tha t p  only if
i) T here  is som eth ing , X, that con tribu tes to the ju s tif ic a tio n  o f  S ’s b e liev ing  tha t p \ 
and
ii) F or all X that con tribu tes, S is aw are (o r po ten tia lly  aw are) o f  X.
14
I argue for this requirement by drawing attention to our considered judgements 
about eases. I consider two kinds of cases: first, I clarify and draw out the implications of 
eases of clairvoyance and other cases of unusual but reliable cognitive faculties. 
Secondly, I show that even many of those who claim to reject such awareness 
requirements implicitly appeal to them to motivate their own accounts of justification. 
By considering the arguments for “Mentalism”, I show that, unless an awareness 
requirement is presupposed, the cases adduced by Mentalists are o f no intuitive force. In 
turn, by considering just these cases I aim to establish that the awareness requirement is 
necessary for justification.
In the latter half of chapter 2 I provide an account o f the nature of this awareness. 
In doing so I examine and respond to an argument against the awareness requirement that 
we might call Bergmann’s Dilemma. My solution invokes what I call ‘non-doxastic 
strong awareness’ in a way that avoids the regresses that Bergmann advances. The 
overall aim o f Chapter 2 is to establish that factors external to the subject’s consciousness 
(such as the reliability of the process that gives rise to the belief in question) are not 
sufficient for justification. Awareness is required.
In Chapter 3 I consider whether external factors are nevertheless necessary for 
justification to obtain. I argue that they are not. This is done by considering the case of 
the New Evil Demon. After explaining what this case is, I explain how it supports 
Fallibilism, the Awareness Requirement, as well as the claim that the actual reliability of 
the belief-forming mechanism used in a world is not necessary for epistemic justification 
to obtain. I then defend this position against recent influential arguments advanced by 
Timothy Williamson and John McDowell, respectively.
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Some connection to truth is what makes a given thing epistemic. In Chapter 4 I 
investigate proposals that conceive of the relation between justified belief and truth as 
one o f truth-conduciveness. I argue that, given internalism about justification, either in 
the sense I defend in Chapter 2 involving the Awareness Requirement, or in a weaker 
sense that Christopher Peacocke endorses, the truth-relation cannot be characterized in 
terms o f truth-conduciveness or reliability. This is not just to reiterate a conclusion of 
Chapter 3 that justification need not be actually truth-conducive. I argue further that the 
truth-connection cannot even be one of truth-conduciveness in a conditional mode. 
Having dispatched truth-conducive accounts of the truth-connection, I am in a position to 
develop a positive account o f the truth-connection in Chapter 5.
Epistemic justification is different from other kinds o f justification. Moral, 
aesthetic and pragmatic justification (assuming there are such things), seem to relate 
essentially to goodness, beauty and usefulness, respectively. What individuates epistemic 
justification from the other types is some connection to truth. So far we have seen what 
this connection is not: in Chapter 3 I argued that justification need not be actually truth- 
conducive. In Chapter 4 I argue further that the truth-connection cannot even be one of 
truth-conduciveness in a conditional mode.
In Chapter 5 I argue against recent work that assimilates justification to 
knowledge, as well as for a positive account o f the truth connection. As to the former 
question, I defend the orthodoxy that they are distinct epistemic statuses; as to the latter, I 
argue that the connection between justification and truth is conceptual. That is, epistemic 
justification is epistemic because it turns on evidence; evidence is epistemic because it is 
conceptually linked with truth. Epistemic justification, therefore, is conceptually linked
16
with the truth (via evidence), which is what makes it distinctively epistemic. This 
account of the truth-connection is substantial enough to ensure that the kind of 
justification we are concerned with is genuinely epistemic, while still being consistent 
with the kind of epistemic Internalism I am advocating.
In short, this thesis is an explanation and defense o f an internalist theory of 
epistemic justification. The central claim of the thesis is that something is “internal” in 
this sense only if it is, or can easily be, the object o f the agent’s conscious awareness. I 
argue that conscious awareness is a necessary condition o f epistemic justification 
obtaining, and that factors external to consciousness play no justificatory role.
17
C h a p t e r  O n e
P r e l i m i n a r i e s : O n  T h e  n a t u r e  o f  E p i s t e m i c  J u s t i f i c a t i o n
1.1. What Kinds of Epistemic Evaluation Does the Internalism / Externalism 
Distinction Apply To?
Epistemic ascriptions are a familiar part of our daily lives. We say that a subject 
knows that /?, or is not justified  in believing that p, or is rational in believing that p. What 
these cases all have in common is that we are evaluating a person’s belief from what we 
might call the epistemic perspective. We are judging that a certain epistemic property is 
present. More will be said on what the epistemic perspective is, but roughly, I will argue 
that it is one that concerns truth, rather than beauty, moral goodness, usefulness, etc. To 
credit a belief with a positive epistemic status is to evaluate that belief as an epistemic 
good.
But what does it take for positive epistemic status to obtain? I shall argue in this 
thesis that if  positive epistemic obtains, this is not a brute fact. Instead, if  a belief is, for 
example, justified, it is justified in virtue o f some further condition(s) obtaining. A 
fundamental topic in epistemology, the one that will be the subject of this thesis, is the 
question o f what sorts o f factors can be relevant to determining the positive epistemic 
status of belief. What has been called epistemic internalism holds, as the label suggests, 
that all the relevant factors must (in a sense that needs to be specified) be “internal”. 
Epistemic externalism is the denial o f internalism. A central claim o f this thesis will be 
that “internal” in this sense is to be understood as those things that are, or easily can be,
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available to the agent’s conscious awareness. So the relevant sense of ‘internal’ here will 
mean internal to the subject’s first person perspective, or point o f view. I will argue that 
such awareness is a necessary condition for certain positive epistemic statuses obtaining, 
specifically, epistemic justification.
While developing and defending an internalist account o f epistemic justification 
will be my primary focus in this work, in principle the internalism/externalism distinction 
can be applied to any epistemically normative status of belief. This point seems to be 
sometimes overlooked. Simply because, say, knowledge is external, since truth is a 
necessary condition and it is uncontroversially on all accounts an external property, it 
does not follow that the concepts that it breaks down into, if  any, cannot be internalist. 
Similarly, there may be kinds o f epistemic evaluation that are internalist but may not be 
necessary conditions for knowledge, e.g. “Foley-Rationality”, or epistemic 
blamelessness/responsibility, or reasonableness.4 This is worth noting because it may 
turn out that certain kinds o f internalism or externalism may hold for some epistemic 
concepts, but not for all, and so generalizations across epistemology should be made with 
great care. Despite the plurality of concepts o f epistemic evaluation, however, the most 
widely discussed in the internalism/externalism debate concerns epistemic justification 
and its nature.
It is often assumed that justification is a necessary condition for knowledge, and 
before the Gettier cases o f 1963, many thought that justification was sufficient to make a
4 “Foley-Rationality” is an account o f epistemic rationality advanced by Richard Foley. See Foley (1987) 
and (1993) for details.
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true belief knowledge.5 Following Foley, however, I am not going to assume from the 
outset that justification is a necessary condition for knowledge, let alone even related to it 
in a straightforward way. (Foley, 2005) Following Plantinga, I will call that concept (the 
one that essentially has to do with knowledge in that it marks the difference between true 
belief and knowledge) Warrant. (Plantinga, 1993) This o f course assumes that there is 
such a notion.6 If there is not, this will obviously pose problems for those seeking a 
reductive analysis o f knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. My 
focus on justification  as an epistemic evaluation in its own right, however, will remain 
unaffected regardless o f what, if  anything, amounts to Warrant.
Using this terminology, justification can be (and has been) offered as a theory of 
Warrant, but it need not be. I aim to elucidate aspects o f the theory o f justification, 
drawing connections to knowledge if and only if they arise, rather than focusing primarily 
on knowledge, and trying to show that it necessarily must be fundamentally understood in 
terms o f justification. In other words, I shall remain agnostic respecting the relationship,
5 This seems to be the best explanation for the relatively little said against the Tripartite Analysis o f 
Knowledge (JTB) before G ettier’s counterexamples to the sufficiency o f the analysis, compared to the 
onslaught o f rival analyses that followed. For a survey o f these attempts see Shope (1983).
There is also a different reading o f that history that seems to have been in currency in Oxford. According 
to some who were in Oxford at the time, it is not that they thought the Tripartite analysis was correct, but 
that they did not think it worthwhile publishing an article showing it was wrong, and so ignored it in 
silence.
6 Some challenge this presupposition. Richard Swinburne, for example, expresses skepticism about the 
entire project o f attempting to provide an analysis o f Warrant. He argues in the spirit o f Wittgenstein that 
there may not be any necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge since it is too imprecise a concept. 
(Swinburne, 1995, p. 417) The suggestion is that there may be no one thing that when added to true belief 
turns it into knowledge. Instead, our concept o f knowledge gets its meaning through correct and consistent 
application to instances o f knowledge, though it is not specifiable in terms o f exact criteria. Swinburne 
suggests that his claim has good inductive support since no acceptable list o f necessary and sufficient 
conditions that analyses what Warrant is have been produced. (Swinburne, 1995, p. 419) Still, it obviously 
does not follow from the fact that there has not been a unanimously accepted analysis o f Warrant thus far 
that one is not correct, or that a correct analysis cannot be produced.
Timothy Williamson also argues knowledge is not true belief plus some third thing. Instead, he also 
argues the thesis that our concept o f knowledge is unanalysable in terms o f necessary and sufficient 
conditions. In fact, according to Williamson, knowledge is sui generis mental state. For details see 
Williamson (2000).
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if any, between justification and knowledge. Otherwise, there is a risk of giving a non­
neutral account o f justification that builds in internalist/externalist elements.
Before analyzing what it would mean to say that justification is “internal”, it is 
necessary to determine how epistemologists tend to characterize the basic features of 
justification.
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1.2. Basic Features of Justification:
In a paper on justification, “Concepts o f Epistemic Justification”, William Alston 
identifies four features common to justification: the first is that justification applies to 
beliefs. (Alston, 1989a, p. 83) It is true that beliefs have traditionally been the 
propositional attitude of choice as far as epistemic justification is concerned. Perhaps this 
has been because belief is held to be the only propositional attitude that is a necessary 
condition for knowledge. But once we leave questions o f knowledge aside, and focus on 
the theory o f epistemic justification, it seems that limiting the application o f justification 
to beliefs is unduly restrictive. Instead, we should hold that justification applies to our 
epistemic attitudes, o f which belief is just one. Other attitudes such as disbelief7 or 
suspending belief are also subject to justification. (Feldman, 2002, p. 368)
The second feature o f justification is that it is an evaluative concept, as opposed to 
a merely “factual” or descriptive concept. (Alston, 1989a, p. 83) Alston’s use of 
“evaluative” seems to be what might also be described as a normative concept. As 
Alston puts it, to say that one is justified in believing that /?, “is to accord S ’s believing 
with a positive evaluative status.” (Ibid.) Being justified, therefore, is an epistemifc good.
A third and more elusive aspect of justification that I alluded to earlier is, as 
Alston says, “to do with a specifically epistemic dimension o f evaluation.” (Ibid.) The 
use of the qualifier “epistemic” is needed to individuate epistemic justification from other 
sorts, such as moral, aesthetic, or pragmatic justification. The way Alston defines what is 
uniquely epistemic is in terms of what he thinks o f as the epistemic goal. According to
7 This o f course assumes that besides believing that p , and believing that ~p, there is the distinct attitude o f 
disbelieving that p. I am not committing m yself to the existence o f  such an attitude as Feldman does, but 
rather to the claim that if there is such a state, it is an epistemic altitude , and as such, epistemic justification 
is a potential property o f it.
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him, that is “the aim [of] maximizing truth and minimizing falsity in a large body of 
beliefs.” (Ibid.) Alston admits that this is only a rough formulation and needs 
refinement.
However, a problem with this kind of goal that requires one to maximise two 
variables at once is that one tends to end up with a certain kind of undecideability. For 
example, which set o f beliefs best meets Alston’s goal: q: a set of 10 true beliefs and 1 
false belief; or m : a set of 20 true beliefs and 2 false beliefs, q contains fewer false 
beliefs, but m contains more truths. Which set maximizes truth and minimizes falsehood, 
and thus meets the proposed epistemic goal? It does not seem that one can say. 
Therefore, a single goal to maximize would perhaps be better, e.g. for each belief that one 
holds, believe it only if it is true. At any rate, I agree with Alston that some connection to 
truth is what makes a given thing epistemic. I will address this issue o f the truth- 
connection in chapters 4 and 5. For the moment, however, I suggest we leave open what 
exactly the truth connection is, to avoid any stipulations that will prejudice substantive 
issues in the internalism/externalism debate.
The final feature o f justification Alston notes is that justification comes in 
degrees. (Alston, 1989a, p. 84) This means that one can have more or less justification 
for a given proposition. For example, suppose I observe that the sun rises one morning, 
thereby giving me some justification for thinking it true that the sun rises every morning. 
Depending on the conditions under which I observe the sunrise, inter alia , my belief that 
the sun rises in the morning will have some prima facie  justification. Presumably, the 
more times I see the sun rise in the morning, the stronger my justification for my general 
belief that the sun rises every morning. This seems to show that justification comes in
23
degrees. Still, that being so, for simplicity I will follow Alston in treating justification as 
an all-or-nothing matter unless otherwise noted.
Similarly, some philosophers speak of belief as coming in degrees. Some also
o
speak o f the degree of credence to which a proposition is held. It is unclear if credence 
and belief really are the same cognitive attitude.9 But if  they are, or if belief does indeed 
come in degrees, for simplicity, I will treat belief as an all-or-nothing matter. Nothing I 
go to argue throughout this thesis turns on whether or not belief is gradable.
I think that these four features are all that can be said neutrally to characterize 
justification. Others disagree, holding that justification is essentially connected to 
knowledge, or presupposes particular substantive connections between justification and 
truth.
For example, James Pryor in attempting to “neutrally” characterize epistemic 
justification, writes, “I say that you have justification to believe p  iff you are in a position 
where it would be epistemically appropriate for you to believe /?.” (Pryor, 2005, p. 181) 
So far so good — this is just affirming Alston’s second feature o f justification, namely, 
that justification is a normative status, an epistemic good. In elaborating on what Pryor 
means by “epistemically appropriate”, he continues, “a position where p  is epistemically 
likely for you to be true.” (Ibid.) What does “epistemically likely for you to be true 
mean”? Pryor does not say. If he means an objective probability o f being true, his basic 
account of justification already presupposes a form of externalism. If he means a 
subjective, epistemic conception o f likelihood, he may already be incorporating 
internalist elements. Accordingly, in the aim o f presupposing as little as possible, all
8 See for example Kaplan (1996).
9 See Smithies (manuscript) for a defense o f the claim that beliefs are psychologically real, but are not 
reducible to states o f confidence.
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should agree justification is a matter of “epistemic appropriateness” having the four 
features Alston mentions, but nothing more can be said that does not bias the debate, 
including tying justification essentially to knowledge or to particular conceptions of 
likeliness or truth-conduciveness. So, with a rough characterization of what constitutes 
justification, we are getting closer to being able to ask what it would mean to be 
internalist about justification.
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1.3. Doxastic v. Propositional Justification and The Basing Relation:
Doxastic v. Propositional Justification:
It is important to note that not all epistemologists cast their theory of justification 
in terms o f justified belief (doxastic justification). Sometimes their concern is with, as 
Pryor puts it, “whether you have justification for believing certain propositions-  
regardless of whether you actually do believe those propositions.” (emphasis in original) 
(Pryor, 2001, p. 104) I shall call this kind o f justification propositional justification. 
Richard Feldman, on the other hand, draws the contrast in terms of “being justified in 
believing the proposition (since she has good reasons) but that she does not believe it 
justifiably (since she bases her belief on something other than good reasons).10 
(Feldman, 2005, p. 274). Expressing Feldman’s distinction in our terms, he is saying that 
when one has good reasons one’s belief enjoys propositional justification, but one’s 
belief not need be doxastically justified since one may not believe it fo r  the right reasons. 
Typically it is held that the so-called ‘basing relation’ marks the difference between a 
propositionally justified belief (if it is), and a doxastically justified belief, as I will 
explain below.
As many issues concerning the nature of propositional and doxastic justification 
should be left as open questions for the time being, such as for example, which of 
propositional or doxastic justification is more fundamental, in order to again avoid 
stipulating a substantive issue in the intemalism / extemalism debate. Also, the 
possibility that the fundamental natures of the two types of justification are quite different 
should be left open. For example, one might think o f propositional justification in
10 See Feldman, R. and Conee, E., (2004) for a discussion o f “well-foundedness” as a way of characterizing 
this distinction.
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objective terms o f logical or evidential relation, but might think of doxastic justification 
in subjective", responsiblist12, or deontological terms13 (not that these evaluations are 
equivalent). Either way, when specifying and evaluating different forms of 
intemalism/externalism, it is important to make explicit whether we are evaluating 
justification for propositions relative to a person, or beliefs that a person actually holds.
11 Richard Foley is someone who thinks of epistemic rationality subjectively. While epistemic justification 
and epistemic rationality may be different properties, one could propose a theory o f epistemic justification 
along the subjective lines that Foley does. To get an idea for what such a theory might look like, consider 
Foley’s characteristic description:
It is egocentrically rational for you to believe a proposition only if you would 
think on deep reflection that believing it is part o f what is involved in your having 
an accurate and comprehensive belief system. Your belief must be able to stand 
up to your own critical reflection. It must meet your own deep standards and in 
this sense be invulnerable to criticism. (Foley, 1993, p. 96)
Jose Zalabardo conceives o f epistemic rationality in a similar way, though also incorporating 
elements o f epistemic responsibility. Zalabardo defines epistemic rationality as follows:
ER2* If a subject has done her best by her lights to determine the truth value o f a 
proposition p , then from the point o f view o f her conception o f her epistemic situation, 
it is epistemically rational and responsible to believe that p  just in case she believes 
that p.  (Zalabardo, 2006, p. 24)
12 Laurence Bonjour is a philosopher who closely links epistemic justification and epistemic responsibility. 
In fact, given what he says, he may even think o f these notions as equivalent. Bonjour writes: “My 
contention here is that the idea o f avoiding such irresponsibility [by accepting a belief in the absence of 
good reasons for thinking it true], o f being epistemically responsible in one’s believings, is the core o f the 
notion o f epistemic justification.” (Bonjour, 1985, p. 8)
13 To say a belief is deontologically justified is not to say that the subject was obligated to believe that p  
(although that may also be the case), but that she was permitted to so believe, because so believing did not 
violate any epistemic duties and obligations. A duty is understood as an obligation or requirement. Richard 
Feldman suggests that an epistemic duty, specifically, is what is required for epistemic success. He claims 
that epistemic success is a matter o f achieving epistemic goals. (Feldman, 2002, p. 376-7) What people 
take to be the epistemic goal varies, but standard candidates include the “truth-goal” (the goal o f now 
maximizing truth and minimizing falsity in a large and important body o f beliefs), or the “knowledge- 
goal” , among others. So tying it altogether, Alston summarized statement o f the deontological conception 
of justification is thus: “S is J-deont. in believing that p  iff in believing that p  is not violating any epistemic 
obligations.” (Alston, 1989b, p. 87)
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The Basing Relation:
The term ‘basing relation’ is a philosopher’s term o f art. However, our ordinary 
ways of speaking are sensitive to the distinction between basing a belief on a reason, and 
merely having the reason, but in no way ‘connecting’ the relevant belief with it. The 
epistemic basing relation is the relation that holds between a reason, or one’s grounds, 
and one’s belief when the belief is held fo r  that reason. This contrasts with holding a 
belief and merely having a reason to believe it. Only in the former case is there a proper 
connection holding between a reason and a belief.
The basing relation is important to many areas in epistemology, particularly in 
regard to theories o f epistemic justification that maintain that part of being justified is a 
question of believing for the right kind of reason, as opposed to merely having the reason 
in question. Advocates of doxastic justification will typically hold that the basing 
relation is necessary for such justification obtaining. For example, I might believe there 
is a conference this Friday. I might also have good reason to believe this having seen the 
date published on the normally highly reliable School o f Advanced Studies website. 
Merely being in possession of this reason is not sufficient, however, to ensure that my 
belief is doxastically justified. I might believe the conference is on Friday because it is a 
full moon, and would have believed that the conference is on Friday whether or not I saw 
the website. It is only if I hold my belief because of, or in light of, my good reason - as 
we might say -- that the belief is, all else equal, doxastically justified.
The basing relation is necessary, but not sufficient, for epistemic doxastic 
justification.14 It is not sufficient because the basing relation simply concerns the manner
14 This o f course presupposes the falsity o f the most extreme versions o f epistemic externalism, including 
what we might call ‘mad-dog externalism’, which is understood here as the view that the subject’s
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in which a belief ought to relate to a reason -  it says nothing of what counts as a good  
reason, or for that matter, what a reason is. Furthermore, a properly based belief might 
still be unjustified, all things considered, if there remain undefeated defeaters. That is to 
say, if there are things (beliefs/facts/propositions, depending on one’s view) that 
undermine or rebut one’s justification that cannot themselves be undermined or rebutted 
by other considerations. In such a case one’s belief is not justified (and perhaps is 
unjustified) due to the presence of undefeated defeaters.15 Nevertheless, it is clear that 
the basing relation is at least necessary for doxastic epistemic justification.
There are two main construals o f the basing relation. The first, and perhaps most 
common, are causal theories.16 Most generally, these maintain that a belief is based on a
1 7reason only if  the reason suitably causes the belief. A causal theory o f the basing 
relation is perhaps the default view since it requires the least amount of cognitive 
sophistication on the agent’s part, thus allowing it be applicable to the widest segment of 
epistemic beings. No higher-order concepts or cognitive abilities are presupposed. But 
due to two types o f putative counter-examples to be discussed below, doxastic theories 
were developed as the rival account o f the basing relation.
perspective is justificationally irrelevant, and that factors external to it, e.g. the reliability o f the process that 
gave rise to the belief in question, are necessary and sufficient for epistemic justification to obtain. On 
such accounts, reasons (traditionally construed) play no role in epistemology.
Reasons here are being understood broadly as those things which justify belief. Therefore, reasons might 
include belief states, as in the case o f inferential justification, or for example, perceptual experiences, in the 
case o f non-inferential justification. The claim that the basing relation is necessary for epistemic 
justification to obtain, therefore, should be palatable to Foundationalists, Coherentists, and Infinitists alike. 
More on how to best formulate these views below.
15 See 2.1. for a fuller discussion o f defeaters.
16 See for example the account proposed in Moser (1989).
17 If one assumes that reasons are propositions, and propositions are abstract entities, it may seem odd to 
think o f abstract entities as able to cause anything at all. Accordingly, throughout this thesis I will follow 
Robert Audi in interpreting “reason” in the locution, “a reason causes the belief that p '\  as what he calls a 
“reason state” . A reason state is a causally efficacious mental state whose content is the proposition that 
functions as one’s reason to believe that p. So to say a reason r causes a belief that p , is shorthand for 
saying that it is one’s believing the reason r that is the cause o f one’s belief that p. See Audi, (1993a), p. 
234-5.
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Doxastic theories require that the agent holds a meta-belief with the content such 
that the support relation is a good one that holds between a reason and belief. A pure 
doxastic theory, as I will call it, maintains that such a doxastic condition is sufficient for 
proper basing. A hybrid theory, as I will call it, maintains that such a doxastic condition 
is necessary for proper basing, in addition to a causal condition. Advocates of doxastic 
theories, such as Robert Audi, argue that such a meta-belief is required to ensure that 
belief is guided by the reason, not that the belief is a mere effect of the reason. (Audi 
1993a) Presumably the reason why the content o f the meta-belief must include the notion 
o f a good  support relation is that it is hard to see how one could rationally base a belief 
on something if  one did not at least take the one to be good grounds for the other. If one 
believed the reason was a bad one, one should not hold the belief that would be based on 
it. If one had no meta-belief whatsoever about the support relation between ground and 
belief, it is hard to see a sense in which the belief could be guided  by the reason, which is 
the chief concern of those who propose such theories.
As Keith Allen Korcz discusses in “Recent Work on the Basing Relation” (Korcz, 
1997), a doxastic theory needs to overcome many potential problems. For example, he 
argues that if  a reason is not another belief but merely a perceptual state, is it necessary 
that the subject have a meta-belief that a support relation obtains between the reason and 
the belief? One might think that this seems like an unrealistically stringent requirement. 
How could the subject believe, in a non-circular way, not only that his belief is based on 
a given reason, but also that the support is genuine? The worry seems in part to concern 
the possibility of a kind of non-inferential justification that would be needed to ensure 
that the belief is justified in a non-circular way that does not lead to vicious regress.
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However, I do not see a problem here regarding the kind o f justification that would be 
needed. My proposed elucidation of the Awareness Requirement below and the kind of 
non-inferential justification it contributes to can be applied here, mutadis mutandis. (See 
chapter 2)
Also, one might worry that many, if not most, individuals lack the epistemic 
concepts required to form the relevant meta-beliefs. Further, it is not obvious that a 
reason which grounds a belief will always be the same reason a subject would appeal to if 
asked why he believes something. While one might plausibly have privileged access to 
one’s reasons, it is a much stronger thesis that one’s reasons are always transparent to the 
subject, as well as claims that one is infallible about the basis o f a given belief, which are 
claims the advocate o f the doxastic theory might make.
That is not to say that these potential difficulties are necessarily insurmountable, 
but is a doxastic account o f the basing relation motivated? This depends upon whether 
causal theories are really subject to the two standard objections commonly made against 
them. Accordingly, I shall examine the objections to a causal account of the basing 
relation and find them wanting. At best, the arguments establish that a purely  causal 
account o f the basing relation is incorrect. They fail to show that the basing relation is 
not, at least in part, a causal matter. Since these objections fail, the doxastic theory is 
unmotivated, at least via these considerations. If  a theory that includes causal elements is 
broadly correct, the onus shifts back to the causal theorist to spell out the details of how 
such a theory can elucidate the basing relation.
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A Causal Theory o f the Basing Relation:
In a survey article, Korcz cites Paul Moser as an advocate of a causal theory of 
the basing relation. (Korcz, 1997) In fact, given what Moser says, this seems to be an 
incorrect classification o f his theory, as I will explain below. According to Korcz, Moser 
holds that:
S ’s be liev in g  or assen ting  to p  is based  on his ju s tify in g  
p ro p o sitio n a l reason  q = df. S ’s b e liev ing  o r assen ting  to p  is 
ca u sa lly  su s ta in e d  in a non-dev ian t m anner by his b e liev ing  or 
a ssen tin g  to q , and by h is associa ting  p  to q. (K orcz, 1997, p. 2)
(em phasis  added)
Moser’s account is construed in terms of what it takes for one belief to be based on 
another. While he does distinguish between non-propositional reasons and propositional 
reasons, for simplicity and clarity of exposition I shall focus only propositional reasons 
throughout the rest o f this discussion.
Korcz takes issue with the second conjunct in M oser’s account, i.e. that the 
subject must in some way associate belief p  with its supporting reason q , or at least be 
disposed to. This requirement reveals that Moser does not hold that causation alone is 
sufficient for basing. Accordingly, it is at best misleading and at worst false to claim that 
he is an advocate o f a causal theory o f the basing relation. I will call a causal theory of 
the basing relation one that holds that a causal relation is sufficient for basing. Given this 
distinction, it seems Moser is an advocate of what I will call a hybrid-causal view of the 
basing relation, e.g. this is the view that causation alone is insufficient for basing, but 
necessarily requires further conditions to be met, for example an appreciation o f the 
evidential connection between a belief and the grounds it is based on. O f course it is an 
open question o f what such ‘appreciation’ consists.
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Korcz objects to Moser’s view on the grounds that someone might come to 
believe something on the basis of a reason without realizing that one supported the other. 
For example, Korcz argues that it seems possible that one could genuinely base a belief 
on subliminal advertising. (Korcz, 1997, p. 2) In virtue o f the reason being subliminal, 
one would never be able to appreciate the support relation, and therefore could not 
associate the belief with a reason. Still, the belief is no less based on a reason. Or so 
Korcz argues. The opponent o f the causal view can concede that it is possible that a 
belief could be caused  by a subliminal reason. The question is if this is enough for it be 
based on that reason in a way that is epistemically relevant, e.g. could such a subliminal 
reason contribute towards the justification  o f the belief that is caused by it? I maintain 
that it cannot, because such a belief would be subject to what I will call the Subject’s 
Perspective Objection (SPO) (see chapter 2 for elaboration).
However, even if Korcz’s criticism is sound, it counts only against M oser’s 
formulation of the basing relation and others that include an ‘association’ requirement. 
That says nothing against causal and hybrid-causal theories o f the basing relation in 
general. In what follows, for brevity I will focus on pure, rather than hybrid, accounts of 
the basing relation unless I indicate otherwise. If causation is not necessary for basing to 
obtain, this will obviously count against both pure and hybrid causal accounts of the 
basing relation. Accordingly, I will now turn to what are taken to be the two standard 
objections to theories that include causation as an essential element o f basing.
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Deviant Causal Chains and the Case of the Gypsv-Lawyer:
The first counterexample offered is called the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains.
It is essential to a causal account of the basing relation that the belief be causally
sustained by the reason. The problem highlights that not just any kind o f causal chain
will be sufficient for a belief to be based on a reason. Korcz directs the reader to an
example Alvin Plantinga gives of a deviant causal chain. In a footnote, Plantinga writes,
Suddenly seeing Sylvia, I form the b e lie f that I see her; as a 
result I becom e rattled and drop my cup o f  tea, scalding my leg.
I then form the b e lie f that my leg hurts; but though the former 
b e lie f  is a (part) cause o f  the latter, it is not the case that I accept 
the latter on the evidential basis o f  the former. (Plantinga, 1993, 
p. 69)
Note of course that advocates of a causal theory never held (or should not have held) that 
just any causal relation between beliefs is sufficient for one to be based on the other. 
Recall for instance that Moser explicitly works into his basing condition that one belief 
must causally sustain the other in a non-deviant manner. How a causal theorist might 
respond to this challenge will be revisited later.
The second type of counter-example to causal theories o f the basing relation have 
been called “Gypsy-Lawyer” counterexamples.18 Where the problem of deviant chains 
tries to establish that the causal condition is insufficient for basing, Gypsy-Lawyer cases 
purport to show that a causal condition is not even necessary for the basing relation to 
obtain.19 There have been two broad types of responses to Lehrer’s example: to either
18 Keith Lehrer first proposed the Gypsy-Lawyer counterexample in Lehrer (1971). This counterexample 
runs throughout his work, however. See for example Lehrer (1974), Lehrer (1990) and Lehrer (2000).
19 While Lehrer him self presents his case as a counterexample to whether a belief based on a reason needs 
to be explained  by that reason, all o f the authors 1 cite here who endorse the counterexample understand the 
kind o f explanation in question as causal. So regardless o f what Lehrer him self originally intended, gypsy- 
lawyer style counterexamples have been standardly taken to count against the necessity o f causation to the 
epistemic basing relation.
34
accept it as genuine, and to modify one’s theory to respect it“ ; or to reject it out of hand, 
without giving a clear account of what is wrong with the counterexample. For example, 
in response to the case, Alvin Goldman, writes: "I find this example unconvincing. To 
the extent that I clearly imagine that the lawyer fixes his belief solely as a result o f the 
cards, it seems intuitively wrong to say that he knows —  or has a justified b e lie f—  that 
his client is innocent." (Goldman 1979, p. 22, n. 8)
I will argue below that so-called Gypsy-Lawyer counterexamples do not count 
against theories o f the basing relation that include a causal element, since such 
counterexamples are incoherent as presented. I will be explicit about both what is wrong 
with the examples, as well as why people have been mistakenly taken in by them.
Since the example is quite complicated and much depends on the details, I will 
quote the key elements verbatim from Keith Lehrer’s original presentation of the counter­
example. Lehrer explains the structure o f his example as follows:
In my exam ple a man com es to believe som ething and continues 
to believe it because o f  groundless superstition. A s a result o f  
having the belief, he uncovers reasons for the b e lie f that give  
him know ledge. But these reasons do not potentially explain his 
belief, because he would not hold the b e lie f for those reasons if  
he were to becom e doubtful o f  his superstitious reasons for 
belief. (Lehrer, 1971, p. 311)
Lehrer presents the case o f a gypsy lawyer who is defending his client on charges 
of eight brutal murders. There is overwhelming evidence against the client for the first 
seven murders and all, including the lawyer, believe the accused is guilty as charged o f 
committing all eight. The lawyer, seeking guidance, turns to his tarot cards and will 
believe what they tell him unquestioningly. The cards, unbeknownst to the lawyer, are in
20 For example, Swain (1979), (1981), (1985); Tolliver (1982); Korcz (2000) have all accepted the Gypsy- 
Lawyer counterexamples as genuine.
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fact utterly unreliable. The cards tell the lawyer that his client is innocent of the eighth 
murder.
Realizing he needs something less controversial to offer in court than the say-so
o f the tarot cards, he re-examines the evidence and finds a complicated line of reasoning
which in fact deductively proves his client is innocent of the eighth crime. Lehrer claims
that this line of reasoning gives the lawyer knowledge o f his client’s innocence, and in
fact the lawyer claims that it is this reasoning that gives him knowledge. (Lehrer, p. 312)
Lehrer goes on to say that no one else is convinced by the sound but highly complicated
reasoning because it is so complicated and subtle, combined with powerful emotional
factors that surround the case. In fact,
and this is the crucial point, i f  it were not for his unshakeable 
faith in the cards, the lawyer h im self would be sw ayed by those 
em otional factors and would doubt that his client was innocent o f  
that eighth murder. It is only because o f  his faith in the cards 
that the reasoning gives him know ledge. (Ibid.)
Lehrer concludes that,
Therefore, the reasoning that g ives him know ledge does not even  
potentially explain his b e lie f  that his client is innocent o f  the 
eighth crime. It in no way supports or reinforces his belief, but it 
does g ive him know ledge. (Ibid.)
From examples like this, the opponent of causal analyses o f the basing relation 
concludes that what causes the gypsy’s belief that his client is innocent o f the crime is the 
cards, but the justificatory basis o f his belief is the complicated line of reasoning. In 
short, they hold that a reason causing a belief is not necessary for the belief to be based 
on that reason.
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Discussion:
In this section I will argue that the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains does not 
count against causal theories of the basing relation, and neither do the Gypsy-Lawyer 
counterexamples since they are incoherent as presented.
Recall that the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains attempts to undermine the 
sufficiency o f a causal theory of the basing relation. As I alluded to in the exegesis 
above, no one thought (or ought to think) that just any kind of causal chain is sufficient 
for the basing relation to obtain. As Moser stresses, the causal chain must be “non-
deviant”. What non-deviance consists of, however, is obviously a hugely difficult and
2 1possibly unsolvable problem. I will attempt no analysis of non-deviant causation here. 
But from a lack o f analysis of non-deviance (or at least unanimous agreement of what 
non-deviance consists of), it does not follow that a causal condition of the basing relation 
is insufficient. Compare this with analyses o f what it is for one event to cause another. 
No successful analysis of causation has been provided (or none that is widely agreed 
upon). From this it does not follow that events do not cause one another, or that one 
event is never sufficient to cause another, only that we have no reductive analysis of the 
relation.
The lesson to take from the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains, I suggest, points 
to a general problem about the analysis of causation, not specifically against causal 
accounts o f the basing relation. At most, what the problem of deviant causal chains 
shows is purely  causal theories of the basing relation are inadequate. I submit that the 
reason that Moser and others introduce a condition that requires that the subject
21 That is, the problem may have no solution, if by ‘solution’ one is seeking a reductive analysis in terms o f 
necessary and sufficient conditions o f what it is for one thing to cause another.
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appreciate the relation between ground and belief (e.g. by having a further meta-belief, or
through conscious awareness) is precisely to rule out cases o f deviant causation. But that
is not to say that causation does not play an essential role in proper basing.
As for Gypsy-Lawyer counterexamples, I find they are incoherent as presented,
and hence do not show that a causal element is not necessary for the basing relation to
obtain. The conjunction of the following three propositions cannot be true:
R ecognition: “The lawyer recogn izes  that the com plicated line o f  reasoning show s that his client 
his innocent, but the com plicated line o f  reasoning cannot cause the lawyer to believe that his 
client is innocent due to the em otional factors surrounding the case.” (Korcz, 1997, p. 3) 
(em phasis added) Further, the line o f  reasoning is the so le basis o f  the justification for his b e lie f  
that his client is innocent.
C ards: The law yer’s b e lie f  is causally explained by the tarot cards alone 
Rational: The law yer is rational (narrowly construed)22
I contend that this triad is inconsistent, and thus consistency requires denying one 
or more o f the propositions. That is, if  Recognition is true, either Cards or Rational has 
to be false, and similarly for other possible combinations. However, in that case we 
would not have a Gypsy-Lawyer counterexample. It seems that for such a 
counterexample to go through, the three propositions must be compossible. But they are 
not.
Lehrer does not explicitly state Rational, but since he does not say anything about 
the lawyer’s rationality one way or the other, one can only charitably assume the default
22 Following Thomas Scanlon, here I will construe rationality narrowly. That is to say, a person is rational 
when their attitudes conform to their own judgments about what reasons are present. So, for example, a 
person is irrational in this sense if he continues to believe something even though he judges there to be 
good reason to reject it. See Scanlon (2000), p.25. In such as case the person believes “contrary to the 
person’s own reason”. (Ibid.) In such a case the person recognizes something as a reason but fails to be 
affected by it in one o f the relevant ways, e.g. adopting or ceasing to have the attitude. In construing 
rationality in this narrow sense I am not claiming that this is the only sense o f rationality there is, I am just 
committing m yself to the claim that there is at least this sense o f rationality.
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view that the lawyer is rational (in at least this narrow sense). This is not undermined by 
the fact that the lawyer is a devout believer in tarot cards, since this narrow sense of 
rationality only requires consistency between attitudes the subject has and their 
judgements about what reasons are present. A subject can be rational in this narrow 
sense while being manifestly irrational in other senses. This narrow sense of rationality 
says nothing about what judgements the subject should  make about the reasons, or what 
good reasons consist of. As such, it is a fairly undemanding condition, and so can be 
unproblematically assumed in this context.
So if it is the case that the lawyer is rational (narrowly construed), and the 
lawyer’s belief is genuinely caused by his tarot card belief, Recognition must be false, 
since it is hard to see how he can recognize or otherwise appreciate that a consideration 
counts in favour o f something, and yet rationally fail to believe it. If Recognition and 
Rational are both true, then Cards is strictly false, but perhaps he believes on the basis of 
both Recognition and Cards* (Cards* might be something like: the lawyer’s belief is at 
least partly causally explained by the tarot cards.) But again, this would not be a Gypsy- 
Lawyer counterexample since such examples purport to show that causation is not 
necessary whatsoever to basing. If Rational is false, then it becomes very difficult to 
judge what belief justifies what since the agent’s beliefs are not sensitive to 
considerations that he takes to count for or against them.
The reason to think Recognition is false is because it is unclear what recognizing 
that a reason shows a conclusion is true amounts to, short o f believing the conclusion on 
the basis of the reason (or, if the recognition is non-doxastic, it will necessarily dispose a 
rational agent to believe the conclusion on the basis o f the reason). It does not seem
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rationally possible to believe (or otherwise recognize) that something is sufficient 
evidence for something else, believe that evidence, and then not believe (or be disposed 
to believe) the supported belief.23
To think otherwise leads to paradoxical results, such as those that arise in M oore’s 
Paradox, e.g. “It’s raining but I don’t believe it.” If, by asserting that it is raining, one is 
representing oneself as believing that it is raining, it is quite odd in the next breath to 
deny that one believes it. If the lawyer, in fact genuinely recognizes that the reasoning 
proves the innocence of his client (rather than merely saying he recognizes it, without 
doing so), he ipso facto  believes his client is innocent. In that case it is reasonable to 
assume he believes on the basis of the complicated reasoning. That is, it is his belief 
about the complicated line o f reasoning that at least partly causes his belief that his client 
is innocent. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how he could still be a rational believer.
If  Cards and Rational are true and Recognition is false, how can we explain why 
those like Lehrer mistakenly conclude that the lawyer does base his belief on the 
complicated line o f reasoning, even though it does not causally explain why he holds the 
belief? I think a reason why they might be misled is because they conflate basing a belief 
on a reason, and potentially basing a belief on a reason. This is analogous to the 
distinction between a belief being justified (doxastic justification) and merely its 
propositional content being justified for a person (propositional justification). If a belief 
is propositionally justified, then it is a candidate for being doxastically justified in the 
sense that the right logical relations hold between the relevant propositional contents.
23 Cf. Shah (2003) on the ‘transparency o f truth’; that is, the phenomenon o f why when deciding to believe 
that p, one only has to determine whether p  is true -  there is no gap between them. Instead, the former 
question collapses into the latter.
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When a belief is doxastically justified, however, the subject has made the relevant 
connections between the propositions, i.e. the belief is based on its grounds.
Similarly, in the case of the complicated line of reasoning, the lawyer’s belief can 
potentially be based on the reasoning since it is information that he has available to him. 
Perhaps then he is propositionally justified in believing his client is innocent of the eighth 
crime. It is only when he accesses this information and comes to accept it by believing it 
on that basis, however, that his belief is doxastically justified.
Lehrer and Korcz’s discussion of the case o f the Gypsy-Lawyer gets further 
muddled by talk of epistemic notions like justification and knowledge. Some discussion 
revolves around whether the lawyer is justified on the basis o f the reasoning or the cards, 
or if he knows his client is innocent. This talk o f justification and knowledge are 
potentially misleading. It is imperative to keep clear the distinction between 
propositional and doxastic justification since no one disputes that i f  the lawyer bases his 
belief on the cards, he is unwarranted (i.e. due to their unreliability, he lacks Warrant, 
understood here as that which is required to convert true belief into knowledge), even 
though the cards may provide propositional justification. Likewise, no one should 
dispute that if  the lawyer bases his belief on the reasoning, his belief will enjoy doxastic 
justification (and possibly Warrant, assuming, again, that there is such a thing). The real 
question is whether someone can base a belief on another if  the latter does not, at least in 
part, causally sustain the former. There is no problem about basing belief on bad reasons. 
The question is about the basing relation simpliciter.
Someone might object with the following kind o f putative counterexample. 
Suppose a subject believes that p  for a perfectly good reason q. The subject believes that
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p  on the basis of reason q. Sometime later, the subject acquires the additional reason r. 
Intuitively, r  is a reason for /;, but r did not cause since p  was already held and the 
belief was not modified in any way when the subject acquired the additional reason. If 
this is correct, does this show that reason r  has not caused anything in relation to the 
belief that p i  And if we can say that the subject has acquired this reason, and his belief is 
based on it since it justifies his belief, does this not show that causation is not necessary 
for the basing relation after all?
In reply to this possible case, it is true that the subject believes that p  on the basis 
o f reason q , and then acquires the additional reason r. It is also correct that intuitively r is 
a reason for p , but r did not cause p , at least in the sense of initially causing p, since p  was 
already held. Despite all this, r causally sustains p. It is just that the subject’s belief is 
justificationally overdetermined, so to speak, in the sense that the subject has two or more 
reasons that are individually sufficient for the justification o f what is believed. But r 
causally sustains p  nevertheless. Plausibly, if the subject lost his reason q (he forgot it, 
say), he would still justifiably believe that p  on the basis o f r. And if the subject lost r (he 
forgot it, say), if  rational, he would drop his belief that p. A subject’s reason does not 
need to be the initial cause of what is believed for proper basing to take place, but a 
causal connection of some sort necessary, e.g. a reason that causally sustains the belief. 
The epistemic basing relation is, at least in part, causal.
By analogy, consider the fact that I am alive. The (a) reason for my existence is 
my parents. An additional reason for my continued existence is the proper functioning of 
my lungs. Intuitively, the proper functioning of my lungs is a reason for my continued 
existence even though their operation was not the initial cause o f me, since presumably I
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was already alive before I developed lungs in utero. Nevertheless, my lungs causally 
sustain my existence. If I lost my parents, I would still be alive, but the reason would be 
(in part) due to the proper functioning of my lungs. In turn, if my lungs failed, I would 
die (assuming no one intervened), which supports the claim that they (at least in part) 
causally sustain my life. The relation here is at least in part causal, and this is not 
undermined by the fact that there can be genuine reasons for my continued existence that 
enter into the explanation downstream from my genesis. As we saw, similarly in the case 
o f reasons for belief.
In short, if the lawyer’s belief that his client is innocent is based on the 
complicated line o f reasoning as Recognition contends and he is rational, the relation 
between his belief about the complicated line of reasoning and his belief about his 
client’s innocence must be in part causal. In that case the belief about his client is caused 
by both the reasoning and the cards, or if the causal chain leading from the cards to the 
belief is deviant, then on the complicated reasoning alone. Either way, the lawyer’s 
belief his client is innocent o f the eighth crime is (at least in part) causally sustained, and 
therefore a candidate for being based, on his reason(s).
This discussion has primarily considered objections to a causal theory o f the 
epistemic basing relation. That theory tends to be taken as the default view because it is 
the least intellectually demanding account o f the basing relation, requiring no higher- 
order cognitive abilities such as the ability to form meta-beliefs about one’s grounds. As 
such, the theory is aimed at the widest segment o f cognizers. Also, and perhaps most 
fundamentally, if something is a reason for someone’s belief, it just seems that the most 
obvious suggestion is that there is some kind of causal link between them. We are
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assigning the reason an explanatory role, and causation seems to be the most obvious 
candidate to, at least in part, fill that role.24 These considerations are not conclusive, but 
they do justify a (defeasible) presumption in favour o f a broadly causal theory of proper 
basing. Therefore, the aim was to disarm objections to the default view, leaving more 
complicated rival theories unmotivated.
To that end, it was shown that the deviant causal chains problem is no objection in 
itself to the sufficiency of a causal account of the basing relation. However, for reasons 
that I will explain in the next chapter to do with the subject’s perspective, a purely causal 
theory is the incorrect one. Such considerations count in favour of a hybrid-causal theory 
of the basing relation that requires the subject’s conscious awareness of the relation 
between his grounds and his belief. This will not be a doxastic theory of the basing 
relation, since 1 will argue that there are forms of non-doxastic awareness that can play 
the same role a meta-belief is supposed to in doxastic theories. Such an approach will 
share the benefits of a doxastic approach (like Audi’s), without sharing its pitfalls (such 
as vicious regresses, etc.) Deviant causal chains merely highlight a concern relevant to 
causation generally, not a problem unique to the basing relation. As in the case of 
causation generally, deviant causation counts not against causation itself, but only against 
our current analyses of it, or perhaps against the possibility o f giving a reductive analysis 
o f causation at all.
It was then shown that Gypsy-Lawyer counterexamples do not challenge the 
necessity o f a causal element o f the basing relation because the counter-examples are 
incoherent as presented. Assuming the lawyer is rational (in the narrow sense), he cannot
24 Cf. Davidson (1963).
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fail to base his belief on a reason he accepts as sufficient for its truth. The relation here 
is, at least in part, causal.
With objections to the basing relation that incorporate causation dispensed with, 
the task of advocating such theories is to spell out the details o f such an account, keeping 
in mind the issue of deviant causation. The initial minimal necessary assumption, 
however, is that for a belief p  to be based on a reason r, r  must non-deviantly causally 
sustain p.
With a discussion of the basing relation in place, we are now in a position to 
explore ways o f construing the internalism/externalism distinction.
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1.4. Some Ways of Construing the Internalism/Externalism Distinction:
Typically, epistemic internalism/externalism is specified relative to the grounds or
2 ^to the justificatory status of a belief that the subject holds. In the former case, one 
might insist that for a belief to be justified one must have awareness of the mere existence 
of one’s grounds. Following something of a convention established by Jim Pryor, I will 
call this Simple Internalism. Jim Pryor defines Simple Intemalism as the view whereby 
“whether one is justified in believing p  supervenes on facts which one is in a position to 
know about by reflection alone.” (Pryor, 2001, p. 104) On this view, in order for a fact 
to contribute to justification, its presence must be accessible to the agent.26
In the latter case, one might insist that for a belief to be justified one must be 
aware of the fact that one is justified. Again following Pryor, I will call this Access 
Internalism. An access internalist maintains that “one always has ‘special access’ to one’s 
justificatory status.” (Pryor, 2001, p. 105) “Special access” here is understood as a 
priori ways of coming to know. So, unlike Simple Intemalism that only requires access 
to the presence o f one’s grounds, or Inferential Internalism  that only requires access to 
reasons to think one’s non-basic beliefs are well supported, Access Intemalism makes the 
strong requirement that all o f one’s beliefs, basic and non-basic alike, are such that not
2 7only are one’s grounds accessible, but also the fact that the grounds are adequate.
25 See Alston (1989e) for a survey o f ways o f construing the intemalism / externalism distinction.
26 William Alston defends a paradigm case o f a Simple Intemalism. In “An Internalist Externalism” he 
defends the view that in order to be justified, there must be a kind o f cognitive access to the ground o f the 
belief. (Alston, 1989c, p. 237-239) On the other hand, he argues that the adequacy o f the ground, ie. its 
truth-conduciveness, is an external fact that the subject need not be able to access. (Ibid., p. 239-244) As 
Alston summarizes in the conclusion o f that paper, “I have given reasons for placing a (rather weak) A1 
[access internalist] constraint on something’s being a ground that could justify a belief, but 1 have resisted 
attempts to put any internalist constraint on what constitutes the adequacy o f the ground.” (Ibid., p. 244) 
Hence an internalist externalism.
27 For a defense o f inferential intemalism, see Fumerton (1995), ch. 3.
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That is, on one understanding of Access Internalism, for any justified belief p , the 
subject must be able to tell upon reflection alone that the belief is justified. An advocate 
o f this kind of Access Intemalism might embrace a “JJ Principle”, which says that if one 
has a justified belief then one must have justification to believe that one is justified,
which is similar to the “KK Principle”, but cast in terms o f justification instead of
28knowledge. (Ibid.) For example, take this characteristic expression of access 
internalism from Chisholm about what the subject can determine about his own doxastic 
state a priori:
M erely by reflecting upon his own conscious state, he can 
formulate a set o f  epistem ic principles that w ill enable him to 
find out, with respect to any possib le b e lie f that he has, whether 
he is ju s tif ie d  in having that belief. The epistem ic principles that 
he formulates are principles that one may com e upon and apply 
m erely by sitting in on e’s armchair, so to speak, and without 
calling for any outside assistance. In a word, one need consider 
only o n e’s own state o f  mind. (Chisholm , 1989, p. 76)
When considering the kind of “special access” that might be required here for an 
internalist theory of justification, it is worth noting that it need  not be construed so 
narrowly as to include only introspection as Chisholm suggests. I think that the 
internalist’s insistence on introspection has resulted in focusing on cases of memory 
and/or inferential justification. It is presumably myopia that has led to overlooking 
central cases o f justified believing such as having beliefs about what one is presently 
experiencing through sense perception. In that case one does not introspect the world 
around one but rather one consciously experiences it. What is notable here is that the 
internalist should maintain that for every occurrent justified perceptual belief about one’s 
external environment at time t, there must be at least one conscious sense experience at t.
28 For classic expressions o f access intemalism, see Bonjour (1985) and Chisholm (1989).
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That is not to say that there must be a one-to-one correspondence of occurrent beliefs to 
perceptual states -  there may be an indefinitely many beliefs that can be justified by a 
given experience. What is common to perception and introspection that the internalist is 
moved by is awareness, which I will capture in the Awareness Requirement on 
justification below (see Chapter 2).
In sum it is not that there is anything particularly cogent for the internalist about 
introspection per se. What is justificationally important about introspection is that it is 
our way of becoming consciously aware o f the contents o f our minds, just as perception 
is our way of becoming consciously aware o f the world.
Besides grounds and adequacy of those grounds, we can now see that there is a 
third element that is relevant to doxastic justification on which internalists/externalists 
can take a stand -  that is, the basing relation. (Swinburne, 2001, p. 11) Is the fact that a 
belief is based on a reason something that the subject must be aware of, as a doxastic 
theory typically holds, or be “internal” in some other sense, e.g. must the subject be ‘non- 
doxastically’ aware of an evidential fit between a belief and the reason it is based on? Or 
can the mere fact that proper basing occurs be an external fact as advocates of purely
70causal accounts of the basing relation suggest? I will argue that it is a necessary 
condition of a belief being based on a ground in a way that can yield doxastic epistemic 
justification that the subject meets various awareness requirements, although I maintain 
that there are non-doxastic forms of awareness, viz., that there are forms o f conscious 
awareness without belief. (See Chapter 2)
29 Recall that this is the view that causation alone is sufficient for basing, and therefore further conditions 
need not be met, such as an appreciation o f the evidential connection between a belief and the grounds it is 
based on.
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It should be clear, however, that the stance one takes on the basing relation will 
shape how internalist/externalist one’s theory o f epistemic justification will be. In 
principle, a theory o f justification could blend internalism/externalism in regard to any of 
the three elements o f grounds, adequacy of the grounds, or the basing relation.
In summary, so far by epistemic intemalism we have meant that what is 
justificationally relevant must be, or easily can be, the object of conscious awareness. But 
besides emphasizing the justificatory role of the conscious awareness, the other main way 
of construing the ‘internal’ of epistemic internalism is the ‘Mentalist’s’ construal of the 
‘internal’ as supervening upon one’s intrinsic physical states. In chapter 2 I will offer a 
full discussion, and ultimately reject, Mentalism as its proponents formulate it.
But even among those who stress the epistemic significance of conscious 
awareness, we have seen diverging answers as to what kinds o f things are taken to be 
justificationally relevant by different theorists:
i) Grounds: Simple Internalism  is being understood as the view that whether 
one is justified in believing that p  supervenes on facts which one is in a 
position to be consciously aware of. In this view, in order for a fact to 
contribute to justification, its presence must be accessible to the agent.
ii) Adequacy o f Grounds: Access Internalism , by contrast, maintains that one 
always has ‘special access’ to one’s justificatory status. So unlike simple 
intemalism which only requires access to the mere presence of one’s 
grounds, access intemalism makes the strong requirement that all o f one’s 
beliefs, basic and non-basic alike, are such that not only are one’s grounds 
accessible, but also that the grounds are adequate. That is, for any
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justified beliefp , the subject must be able to tell upon refection alone that 
the belief is justified.
iii) Adequacy o f Grounds, Redux: Inferential internalism  was introduced as a 
sub-species of Access Internalism in that it only requires access to reasons 
to think one’s non-basie beliefs are well supported. In section 1.5. below I 
will elaborate on the distinction between basic and non-basie beliefs and 
defend the view that many of our basic beliefs are justified.
iv) The Basing Relation: Is the fact that a belief is evidentially related to a 
reason something that the subject must be aware o f if  one is to be based on 
the other, as for example a doxastic theory of the basing relation typically 
holds? A theory that answers this question affirmatively as a necessary 
condition of epistemic justification obtaining is ‘internalist’ in another 
distinct sense.
The basing relation is not superfluous since it distinguishes two different kinds of 
epistemic justification, even among theories that embrace awareness requirements. One 
might have thought that if  justification depends on being based on a ground, then given 
an awareness requirement, how can one know that one has a justified belief without 
knowing what the ground is? But this is to focus only on doxastic justification. 
Propositional justification obtains merely if the subject has reason to believe the 
proposition in question, independently of the question o f whether the subject holds the 
relevant belief, or whether the subject bases the belief he does hold on the relevant 
ground.
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Having explored different ways o f construing the internalism/externalism 
distinction, and before defending my preferred version o f internalism in chapter 2, I will 
conclude my preliminary exploration of the basic features o f epistemic justification by 
addressing the question of the structure o f epistemic justification.
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1.5. The Structure of Justification and the Existence of Immediate Justification:
This section will explore what immediate justification is, as well as if we have 
any. After concluding that putative examples of immediate justification prima facie  
support the existence of immediate justification, I will consider the primary argument 
against it. Discovering what is wrong with the argument against immediate justification 
draws attention to important constraints on an adequate theory o f epistemic justification 
(including an internalist theory of epistemic justification).
On Immediacy:
With a rough understanding of what justification is, by having considered among 
other things its four basic features as well as doxastic v. propositional justification and 
the basing relation, it is necessary to turn to the question o f whether it can be had 
immediately. Pryor defines immediate justification as follows: “When your justification 
to believe p  does not come from your justification to believe other propositions, I will call 
it i m m e d i a t e (Pryor, 2005, p. 183) By contrast, “When your justification to believe p  
comes in part from your having justification to believe other, supporting propositions, I 
will say that those latter propositions mediate your justification to believe /?.” (Ibid.) 
This distinction is also known as the one between basic and non-basic beliefs as well as 
the one between non-inferential and inferential beliefs. As these labels are equivalent to 
the immediate/mediate distinction, they could be used interchangeably.
However, I think that the label “inferential/non-inferential” justification should be 
avoided since it is apt to mislead. By putting the distinction in terms of inference, 
however, one might wrongly think that the issue is the psychological process of how the
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belief was formed. Usually inference is considered to be the process o f passing from 
belief in the premises o f an argument to belief in another premise, or a transition from 
premise to conclusion. The mediate/immediate justification distinction, on the other hand, 
concerns the kind o f justificatory support relations that obtain between beliefs and 
different kinds of grounds, not the psychological process o f how the subject formed the 
belief in question. To further clarify what is what is at issue, Pryor gives as an example 
of a proposition that is justified immediately, “(Gauge) The gas gauge reads ‘E ’”, based 
upon one’s experience of looking at one’s petrol gauge. (Pryor, 2005, p. 182) A 
mediately justified proposition, on the other hand, is “(Gas) Your car is out of gas”, 
which gets its justification from Gauge and other justified propositions one holds. (Ibid.)
Pryor’s focus on one’s justification to believe rather than on whether one is 
actually justified is brought out in a comment he makes about the case of (Gas) and 
(Gauge) above. He says, “it is not important for our purposes whether you actually do 
believe (Gauge) or (Gas). Given your evidence, you ought to believe them.” (Pryor, 
2005, p. 182) But perhaps this latter claim is too strong in emphasizing that the subject 
ought to believe the propositions. Nevertheless, surely one would be justified in 
believing them, were one to form them on one’s available evidence. One need not make 
the stronger claim that Pryor does to make this claim about what one is justified in 
believing. So whether or not Pryor is correct about what the subject ought to believe in 
this case, the emphasis is on having reasons to believe the conclusion, whether or not the 
subject actually holds the belief. What is crucial here is the idea of justificational 
immediacy.
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It is important to note what kind of independence immediate justification is 
supposed to embody. As Pryor understands immediate justification, it is a property of a 
belief that is justijicationally independent of other beliefs, that is, a belief is immediately 
justified if it does not derive its justification from standing in relation to other beliefs. 
Although it is important to distinguish, as I do below, between justification coming from 
the justification of other beliefs and justification coming from beliefs whether they are 
justified or not (if such a case is possible). However, it is perfectly compatible with a 
belief being justificationally basic that it is necessary one have other beliefs or concepts 
in order to form  the basic belief in question. (Pryor, 2005, p. 183)
This point parallels one made in debates about the a priori. There the idea is that 
a belief is a priori if  its justification  is independent of sense experience, even if the 
concepts and other beliefs required to form the belief are learned through sense 
experience. For example, one may learn the concepts of ‘bachelor’, ‘marriage’ and ‘m an’ 
through experience, but one’s belief that bachelors are unmarried men is justified  a priori 
(presumably it is one’s conceptual understanding, or some other non-empirical source, 
that is the source o f one’s justification).
A final point to help clarify a possible objection about how to understand 
immediate justification: in the case of mediately justified beliefs, the grounds are other 
beliefs. In the case o f immediately justified beliefs, the grounds are usually something 
other than beliefs, e.g. experiences of certain kinds. Exceptions to this are beliefs about 
our own beliefs. Take the belief that Freddy is Canadian.30 I can then reflect on my 
belief and form the further belief, that I  believe that Freddy is Canadian. In this case it is 
a belief with another belief embedded in it, namely the belief that Freddy is Canadian. It
30 Italicized words will be used to designate the propositional content expressed by those words.
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does not seem possible for me to think I believe that I believe that Freddy is Canadian 
without believing that Freddy is Canadian. That is, the latter belief is required in order to 
form the former.
Assuming that my belief that I  believe that Freddy is Canadian is justified, one 
might ask, is it justified mediately or immediately? Given the clarifications 1 made 
above, it should be clear that it is immediately justified. That is, my justification  for my 
belief that I believe that Freddy is Canadian does not derive from my belief that Freddy 
is Canadian. I might be entirely unjustified in believing that Freddy is Canadian. I might 
have no reason to think that he is Canadian, compounded by the fact that I know he was 
bom and raised in Yorkshire, speaks with a thick Yorkshire accent, has no Canadian 
relatives that I have ever met, and as far as I know has never so much as even visited 
Canada.
O f course all o f this is not incompatible with his actually being Canadian (perhaps 
he married a Canadian and became a naturalized citizen). But if I have no positive reason 
to believe that he is Canadian and have strong evidence that he is English, my belief that 
he is Canadian is quite unjustified. But this need not stop me from believing it (if only it 
did!) My belief that I  believe that Freddy is Canadian could be justified, even if my 
belief that he is Canadian is not. This shows that the justification for my belief about my 
belief is not derived  from any other beliefs, since here a belief that is needed in order to 
form this belief is not itself justified, and so has no justification to give. Therefore, 
beliefs about beliefs can be immediately justified.
What this shows is that the category of immediate justification is heterogeneous. 
One might believe that there is a cat in front of one since one at least seems to see a cat.
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This is a case of immediate justification, since what justifies one’s belief is not another 
belief, but rather a perceptual experience of a certain kind. But what justifies one’s 
beliefs about one’s beliefs, whatever that is, is not like the perceptual belief case. So, 
somewhat oddly, the category of immediate justification must be negatively defined.
It is important to note that what is at issue here for justification for beliefs about 
beliefs is not that they are psychologically spontaneous. When entertained, we tend to 
assent to their truth immediately, but only in the sense o f spontaneously, without 
reflection. The issue here concerns the structure and kinds o f grounds that comprise the 
justificatory support relations, not the psychological process whereby individual beliefs 
are formed, e.g. if  they are formed spontaneously, after conscious inference, etc.
Is There Immediate Justification?:
As I understand immediate justification, a belief is mediately justified if its 
justification depends on having at least one other belief, whereas a belief is immediately 
justified if its justification does not derive from standing in relation to any other belief. 
The traditional argument for this position has been an argument from elimination. In 
such an argument, advocates o f Foundationalism argue that all other possibilities lead to 
sceptical conclusions or objectionably circular reasoning, and that only their view gives 
the correct account o f the structure of justification. The traditional argument employed to 
this effect is an epistemic regress argument known as Agrippa’s Regress. The regress 
begins by noting that if some justification is inferential or mediate (which it surely is), 
then the choices one faces are as follows:
1) All ju s tifica tio n  is in feren tia l and an in fin ite  regress loom s
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Advocates o f this structural position can either argue for the sceptical conclusion that the 
regress is vicious, or else they argue that the regress can be virtuous (a position known as 
Infinitism).31
2) A ll ju stifica tio n  is inferential but even tually  loops back on to itse lf  in a w ay that y ie lds 
ju stifica tio n  (C oheren tism ).
3) The regress term inates in som e beliefs that are p roperly  basic /o r im m edia te ly  ju s tif ied , and all 
non-basic  beliefs u ltim ate ly  derive the ir ju stif ica tio n  from  stand ing  in re la tion  to the basic beliefs 
(F oundationalism ).
As Pryor notes, the weakness of this type of argument is that it relies on 
establishing that the rejected alternatives really are unworkable. (Pryor, 2005, p. 184) 
Pryor presents an unusually simple argument for Foundationalism, namely, an argument 
from examples.
Pryor merely cites examples in which it clearly seems that they are instances of 
beliefs that are immediately justified, and argues that it is implausible to suggest that they 
are justified by other propositions one has justification for believing. Take these 
examples from Pryor: “Suppose I feel tired, or have a headache. I am justified in 
believing I feel those ways. And there does not seem to be any other propositions that 
mediate my justification for believing it. What would the other propositions be?” (Pryor, 
2005, p. 184) What seems to justify one’s belief about one’s own headache when one has 
a headache, for example, is one’s experience of one’s aching head. It is implausible to 
suppose that to be justified in believing that one has a headache one must also have 
beliefs about the features in question, e.g. one does not infer from a belief about the
31 For a defense o f Infinitism, see Klein (2005).
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experienced pain of one’s aching head and a believed principle that ‘if one has an aching 
head, then one has a headache’, that one has a headache! While one may often also have 
beliefs about the feature in question, e.g. about the pain in one’s head, it is implausible to 
suppose that these beliefs mediate one’s justification for one’s belief that one has a 
headache. If we stipulate that one lacks a belief about the pain in one’s head, and in the 
mere presence of one’s experience of one’s aching head, one is justified in believing that 
one has a headache.
Pryor cites other examples that include justified beliefs about why one performs 
simple bodily movements and justified beliefs about certain conscious mental acts one 
undergoes, such as imagining. Pryor suggests, and I think rightly, that since these seem 
like overwhelmingly intuitive cases of immediate justification, the burden of proof is on 
those who oppose immediate justification to show how these kinds of beliefs are not 
really immediately justified after all. The best argument against the possibility of 
immediate justification might be called the Master Argument for Coherentism.
Searching for the “Master Argument” for Coherentism:
I will follow standard usage and refer to the view that all justification is mediate 
(and infinite regresses cannot yield justification) as Coherentism. In addition to these 
explicit features, the key to characterizing this position as a version of Coherentism is to 
understand the mediation relation between beliefs as a matter o f coherence or fit. After 
some refinement, Pryor presents what he calls the Master Argument for Coherentism:
The C onten t R equ irem en t (R evised)
In o rder to be a ju s tifie r, you  need to have p ropositional conten t, and you need to represen t that 
p roposition  assertively .
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O nly B eliefs (R evised)
O nly beliefs (or o ther states that are ep istem ically  like beliefs) rep resen t p ropositions assertively .
T herefore, only  beliefs (o r o ther states that are ep istem ically  like beliefs) can be ju stifie rs . (P ryor, 
2005, p. 188)
It is strange that Pryor calls this the Master Argument for Coherentism because, if 
sound, it would not establish Coherentism. If sound, this argument concludes that only 
beliefs can be justifiers. But, for a start, this is compatible with forms of 
Foundationalism! For example, one might hold that unjustified beliefs can somehow 
justify other beliefs. Those other beliefs would be immediately justified since they did 
not derive their justification from the unjustified beliefs; how could they -  the unjustified 
beliefs had none to give. In this case it would still be true that only beliefs can be 
justifiers, but some unjustified beliefs would play this foundational role. While Pryor 
seems to recognize this possibility, he nevertheless does nothing to rule it out or to 
supplement the Master Argument to make it validly imply Coherentism. (Pryor, 2005, p. 
188; p. 191)
Another form of Foundationalism compatible with the Master Argument so- 
presented is one where non-basie beliefs are justified by justified basic beliefs, but the 
justified basic beliefs are not justified by anything else at all (either their justification is a 
brute fact, or perhaps they somehow justify themselves). Again, here it would be true 
that only beliefs can be justifiers, but this theory would maintain that some justifiers 
could both be justified and justify other beliefs without themselves being justified by 
anything else.
In order to establish Coherentism, the revised Content Requirement and Only 
Beliefs premise need to be supplemented with the following premise:
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Justifier: N o th ing  can be justif ied  without a discrete justifier.
Adding this premise would rule out the two types of Foundationalism I cited above that 
are compatible with the Master Argument as Pryor presents it. Justifier would block 
either unjustified or justified beliefs from playing a foundational role whereby they 
justify other beliefs without themselves being justified, or from justifying themselves, 
since the condition requires that the justified and the justifier be separate and distinct 
states. Combined with Content Requirement and Only Beliefs, this argument, if sound, 
would establish that only beliefs can be justifiers, and since they need to themselves be 
justified by something else, they would have to be justified by further beliefs.
But this is still not enough to establish Coherentism. Content Requirement, Only 
Beliefs and Justifier entail that only beliefs can be justifiers, and they too need justifying 
by other beliefs. But this is compatible with Infinitism. Recall that Infinitism is the view 
than an infinite regress o f justification need not be vicious. An Infinitist alleges that 
justificatory chains do not merely transmit justification, but that if the chain is long
32enough, it can generate justification. In order to block this position and to support 
Coherentism, we need a further premise:
F inite: In fin ite  ju s tifica to ry  chains cannot generate ju stifica tio n .
We now have a Master Argument for Coherentism. Content Requirement, Only 
Beliefs, Justifier and Finite jointly entail that all justification is mediate, necessarily 
involves only beliefs, and cannot regress ad infinitum. In addition to these explicit 
features, the key to characterizing this position as version o f Coherentism is to understand
32 Again, see Klein (2005) for details.
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the mediation relation between beliefs as a matter of coherence or fit. That is, a belief is 
justified iff it coheres (i.e. ‘fits’) with other beliefs in one’s noetic structure, the noetic 
structure has a finite number o f members, and no member is justified immediately (i.e. no 
belief derives justification from anything other than a belief, and every belief must derive 
its justification from somewhere). That is, the justificatory chain includes some closed 
loops, which results in justification, generated in virtue of the coherence or fit between 
the belief tokens that constitute the subject’s noetic structure.
If the Master Argument is sound, it establishes how and why immediate 
justification is impossible -  namely because according to theories of immediate 
justification, some beliefs are justified not by other beliefs, but by experience, which this 
argument concludes is impossible since the only justifiers are beliefs which must be 
justified by a finite number of other beliefs.
Assessment o f the Master-Argument for Coherentism:
A few words about the premises are in order. First, “propositional content” is 
taken to mean that the content is truth-evaluable. Propositional content is a species of 
what is sometimes called “representational content”. Such content is characterized as 
capable o f being correct or incorrect, and as being capable o f representing veridically. It 
is a further question whether such content is conceptual. Saying that the content is 
“assertively” represented is another way of saying it purports to be saying how the world 
is, unlike other propositional attitudes such as desiring that p  or entertaining that p  which 
make no claim to say how the world is. (Pryor, 2005, p. 187) Second, it is assumed, to
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my mind without argument, that beliefs are the only states that represent propositions 
assertively.
The motivation for the Content Requirement is a tendency to think that justifiers 
need to stand in logical relations to the beliefs they justify. As Davidson famously says 
in defense of the principle that only a belief can justify another belief, “Sensations [which 
have no representational content] cause some beliefs and in this sense are the basis or 
ground of those beliefs. But a causal explanation of a belief does not show how or why 
the belief is justified.” (Davidson, 2000, p. 157) For example, if a belief is the product of 
a reliable belief-producing mechanism, that will explain why the subject believes as she 
does. But on Davidson’s account, unless the subject believes her belief is reliably 
produced, and bases her belief on this belief, the belief will not be justified. Appeal to a 
cause will explain why someone believes as she does, but not if she ought to believe as 
she does. Justification, Davidson holds, is established by appeal to reasons, and the only 
reasons available to us are our beliefs.
Davidson notes that perception is usually assumed to be epistemically relevant 
because it is what connects the world to our beliefs about it. (Ibid., p. 156) He claims that 
sensations are thought to be “candidates for justifiers because we often are aware of 
them. The trouble we have been running into is that the justification seems to depend on 
awareness, which is just another belief.” (emphasis added) (Ibid., p. 157) I deny that 
conscious awareness is just another belief. Surely there is a distinction to be drawn 
between being consciously aware that p  and believing that p. The first is merely a kind of 
awareness (that need not involve belief). One’s experience presents one with assertive 
representational content -  one’s experience purports to say how the world is, and one can
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be conscious both of the world and of the nature of one’s experience of it. The latter 
attitude is a belief, viz., an assertive attitude one takes to a proposition. The content of 
awareness can also include how one’s experience appears to one; the content of a belief 
is a proposition that purports to represent the way things are in one’s perceptual 
experience. I will argue in chapter II that such non-doxastic awareness is the key to 
admitting immediate justification that meets epistemic internalist constraints.
I agree with Davidson that things outside our ken are justificationally irrelevant -  
but it is a mistake to think our consciousness is limited to beliefs. We are also conscious, 
or immediately aware, o f the world and our experience of it. It is this awareness that 
gives us justification for our non-inferential perceptual beliefs. Or so I will argue. By 
denying the Only Beliefs premise, and allowing certain kinds of experiences themselves 
to play a justifying role, we have undermined the Master Argument for Coherentism. 
Accordingly, we no longer have a reason to doubt that our examples o f prima facie  
immediate justification are probative.
The Revised Only Beliefs Requirement is False, But Why Accept the Revised Content 
Requirement?:
Pryor notes that many advocates of immediate justification will accept the line of 
reasoning I gave above and accept experiences as counterexamples to the Only Beliefs 
premise. (Pryor, 2005, p. 189) This move is obviously sufficient to undermine the 
Master Argument for Coherentism. But what about the Content Requirement premise? 
Pryor says that it is a very demanding premise that is motivated by what he labels the 
Premise Principle:
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Prem ise P rincip le
The only th ings that can ju stify  a b e lie f  that p  are o ther sta tes that assertively  represent 
p ropositions, and those p ropositions have to be ones that co u ld  be u sed  as p rem ises  in an 
argum ent for p. They have to stand in som e kind o f  inferential re la tion  to p: they have to im ply it 
or inductively  support it o r som eth ing  like that. (P ryor, Ibid.)
The first part of this principle rules out the possibility that beliefs can be justified by non- 
representational states such as facts about one’s reliability, one’s sensations and other 
non-representational mental activity. But that is just what the revised Content 
Requirement demands. It is the latter part o f the Premise Principle that is more 
demanding. Specifically, it is more demanding by requiring that the justifiers’ 
propositional content could also be used as premises in an argument. While the Premise 
Principle may motivate the Content Requirement, it is not the only motivation, as I will 
explain below.
The Content Requirement and the Egocentric Concept of Justification:
But what about the weaker Content Requirement? What motivates it? Pryor 
considers different possible motivations and finds them wanting. But rather than 
supporting Coherentism, I submit that the Content Requirement is not only true, but it is 
demanded by an important and valuable conception o f justification.
Reflection on our practice of epistemic evaluation reveals that there are different 
things that we value epistemically. Remember that epistemic justification is minimally a 
matter of epistemic appropriateness, where the appropriateness of the belief is assessed 
relative to the truth. There are different ways of making the notion of justification
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precise. But there is no reason at the outset to think there is a univocal sharpening that 
best captures what it is to be epistemically justified.
Analogously, we have the concept of being coloured. Surely there are minimal 
constraints on what it is for something to be coloured, e.g. it must have the property of 
producing a sensation in us as a result o f reflecting light in a certain way, etc. But there 
are different ways of being coloured and there is no reason to think that any one colour 
(red, green, etc.) best captures what it is to be coloured. Similarly, I submit, with 
epistemic justification, i.e. there are different ways of being epistemically justified and 
there is no reason to think that any one concept of justification (Deontological, 
Evaluative. Reliablist, etc.) best captures what it is to be epistemically justified. If this is 
correct, it need not be relativism about justification (or colour), but rather, a pluralism.
However, our way of thinking about epistemic justification ought to be 
constrained by our epistemic values, interest and goals. Examples o f such values include 
notions of epistemic responsibility and reasonableness that underlie what has been called 
the Deontological Concept of Justification. A further value is embodied in the Guidance 
Concept o f Justification, which says roughly that an essential feature of justification is 
that it helps guide the agent in how to proceed intellectually. I do not want to defend 
these concepts of epistemic justification. However, the kinds o f considerations that 
motivate them are closely related to, and in fact presuppose something that might be 
called the Egocentric Concept of Justification, conceived of here as concerning:
not the th ird-person  question  o f  w hether som eone e ls e ’s beliefs 
are true or reliably  arrived  at, bu t instead  the firs t-person  
question  about the tru th  (or re liab ility ) o f  m y ow n  be liefs  [ . . . ]
[w hen I] ask w hether I u ltim ately  have any good reasons for 
th ink ing  that m y beliefs are true or indeed that they  are re liab ly  
arrived at. (B onjour, 2001, p .6; 14)
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Given the fundamentally first-person nature of epistemic concepts that relate to such first- 
person questions, it can be seen that Egocentric epistemic justification must at least in 
part be a matter of possessing reasons, reasons to which the subject can appeal in 
wondering if her beliefs are true.
Given this concept of justification, we can begin to see how it motivates the 
Content Requirement: if we are seeking grounds to think our beliefs are true, the grounds 
need to be accessible to us. If we want grounds that allow us to defend our beliefs if 
challenged (even if we raise the challenge for ourselves), the grounds need to be 
accessible to us. In the next chapter I will go on to explain why if our grounds need to be 
accessible to us, the Content Requirement must be true. I will argue that, for example, 
my reason for believing that Jack was at the party is not the photo representing his being 
at the party, but my seeing that the picture represents him as such. My episode of seeing 
that serves as my reason has propositional content. Similarly one’s reason for believing 
that one has meningitis is not one’s aching head, but that fact that one feels  that one has a 
severe headache. One’s episode of feeling that serves as one’s reason also has 
propositional content.
In the next chapter I will argue that it is a necessary condition of Egocentric 
justification obtaining that the subject is aware of the grounds for her belief. I will also 
argue that non-representational states cannot serve as justifiers for the Egocentric concept 
o f justification since we are not able to access them in the right kind of way. After further 
motivating the necessity of the awareness requirement with what I will call the Subject’s 
Perspective Objection, I will elucidate the nature of this awareness. In so doing I will
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respond to the objection that the awareness condition either leads to vicious regress, or 
else is entirely unmotivated.
67
C h a p t e r  t w o
t h e  A w a r e n e s s  R e q u i r e m e n t  a n d  i ts  N a t u r e
2.1. On The Necessity of Awareness:
At the end of the last chapter, I sketched what I am calling the Egocentric Concept 
of Justification. Given the fundamentally first-personal nature of such an epistemic 
concept, this kind of epistemic justification is at least in part a matter of possessing 
reasons to which the subject can appeal in wondering whether her beliefs are true. That 
these reasons need to be accessible to the subject applies in the first person case where 
one is assessing one’s own justification, as well as when one is evaluating whether 
someone’s else’s beliefs are justified in this egocentric sense -  their reasons need to be 
accessible to them as well.33 Asking the first person questions that characterize the 
egocentric concept of justification, such as ‘what reasons do I have to think my beliefs 
are true’, reveals constraints on not only what kinds o f things can count as grounds for 
belief if  it can be justified egocentrically, e.g. certain properties of conscious mental 
states, but also whether and in what way the subject must have access to the fact that such 
grounds exist and are indeed adequate for justifying the belief in question. I intend to 
defend the following as a necessary condition of a be lie fs  being epistemically justified 
for a subject:
33 Asking about the justificatory status o f beliefs one actually holds may be the central case, but o f course 
one can also ask what one would be justified in believing, which can be asked before any belief on the topic 
is actually held.
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A w areness R equirem ent:
S ’s is ju s tif ied  in believ ing  that p  only if
i) there is som eth ing , X, that con tribu tes to the ju stifica tio n  o f  S ’s b e liev ing  that p\ and
ii) For all X that con tribu tes, S is aw are (or po ten tia lly  aw are) o f  X.
At least three questions about the awareness requirement immediately spring to 
mind: first, is it really true that awareness is a necessary condition for justification 
obtaining? Secondly, if awareness is required, what is the nature o f this awareness? 
These will be the primary focus of this chapter. But thirdly, what does ‘contribute’ mean 
here mean in the first conjunct? It is not that X justifies S ’s believing that p\ otherwise, 
the second conjunct stating the awareness requirement would be superfluous. But it is 
not superfluous. I maintain that the Awareness Requirement is necessary for 
justification, and it is met only if both of its conjuncts are satisfied. My focus in this 
chapter will be motivating and defending ii). However, the force of i) is that not just 
awareness o f anything can justify belief. Only certain kinds o f things justify certain 
beliefs. For example, if  B is a belief that p , viz., the belief that a given contingent 
empirical proposition is true, then having a perceptual experience as of p  may justify that 
belief, whereas hoping or imagining that p  will not. I will return to this issue and a 
further defense o f i) in chapter 5.
What I do not mean to convey by speaking of a factor ‘contributing’ to one’s 
justification is that one needs to be aware of only some o f the justificatory elements, and 
not others. My view, as it will emerge, is that all things on which epistemic justification 
turns must be such that the subject is aware or potentially aware of them. Accordingly, in 
this chapter I will first argue that awareness of one’s grounds for a belief is a necessary 
condition for that belief to be epistemically justified. This will be shown through drawing
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attention to our considered judgements about cases. I will consider two kinds of cases: 
first, I will clarify and draw out the implication o f cases of clairvoyance and other cases 
of unusual but reliable cognitive faculties. Secondly, I will show that even many of those 
who claim to reject the awareness requirement implicitly appeal to it to motivate their 
own accounts of justification. By considering the arguments for “Mentalism”, I shall 
show that, unless an awareness requirement is presupposed, the cases adduced by 
Mentalists are of no intuitive force. In turn, by considering just these cases I will try to 
establish that the awareness requirement is necessary for justification.
That will then lay the groundwork for giving an account o f the nature o f this 
awareness in the latter half of the chapter. By doing so I will examine and respond to an 
argument against the awareness requirement that we might call Bergmann’s Dilemma. 
My solution invokes what I call ‘non-doxastic strong awareness’ in a way that avoids the 
regresses that Bergmann advances.
Before doing so, however, I need to say something about defeaters and the nature 
o f defeat since defeasibility is in play in the cases I rely on to establish that external 
factors, that is, factors external to the subject’s consciousness awareness, are insufficient 
for epistemic justification.
Defeaters and the Nature of Justificatory Defeat:
Most basically, a defeater is something that provides one with a reason for ceasing 
to believe another of one’s beliefs, either by rebutting one’s belief by being inconsistent 
with one’s beliefs, or by undermining or undercutting one’s reasons for thinking it true.
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As I will explain below, depending on the kind of defeater in question, it may be a belief, 
a proposition, or a fact.34
A rebutting defeater is one where the belief is inconsistent with another belief one 
holds. For example, if one believes that an express train runs on Sunday, but is then told 
by an official holding an updated train schedule that there is no Sunday service at all, one 
now has a rebutting defeater for one’s belief that an express train will come on Sunday. 
The second belief that is based on the congruence between the official’s testimony and 
the updated train schedule is inconsistent with one’s earlier belief. Since one is 
unjustified in holding both beliefs at once, one ought to abandon at least one of the 
beliefs.
O f course one may have a defeater-defeater, a belief that trumps the would-be 
defeater. Perhaps one thinks that train schedules are notoriously inaccurate and the train 
employees have in the past proven to be wanton liars. Either way, it is important to note 
that since a rebutting defeater and the belief it purports to defeat are inconsistent, one 
would be unjustified in believing both at once.
An undercutting defeater, on the other hand, is not inconsistent with a belief one 
holds, but it casts doubt on one’s reasons for holding the belief. For example, one might 
believe that if  the lights are on inside, the library is open. But if  one learns that for 
security reasons the lights are always left on whether the library is open or not, this new 
information becomes an undercutting defeater for the belief that the library is open
34 Besides the issue o f justificatory defeat, there is the related but distinct phenomenon o f one’s 
justification being outweighed by other reasons one acquires. Suppose one believes th a t/; in light o f ones 
evidence q. q however is not conclusive evidence for p, but merely provides one with prima facie  
justification to believe it. Suppose at a later time one learns that r. r is strong evidence against p . But is 
possible that r does not undercut q -  q is still a reason to believe that p  -  nor is r inconsistent with q, and so 
it does not rebut it. Instead, r outweighs q. So this is not a case o f defeasibility, but it is a case o f one’s 
justification being negatively affected by new information that one acquires.
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simply because the lights are on. The belief that arises based on the security practices of 
the library is not inconsistent with the belief that the library is open if the lights are on. 
However, it does significantly undermine one’s certainty of grounds for thinking the 
library is necessarily open. In light of the undercutting defeater, it would be irrational to 
have this defeater while adamantly insisting that the library is open solely based on the 
building being lit.
When considering possible defeaters, it is important to note whether the defeater 
is intended to rebut or undercut. While rebutting defeaters are intrinsically stronger than 
undercutting defeaters, in that a rebutting defeater is always also an undercutting defeater 
(on the assumption that manifest inconsistency is the limit case of ‘casting doubt on one’s 
reasons for holding the belief), a successful undercutting defeater is sufficient to defeat 
the justification of the belief in question.
Kinds of Defeaters:
Doxastic Defeaters:
There are many different kinds of defeaters. First, one must distinguish between 
mental state or doxastic defeaters and factual or propositional defeaters. A mental state or 
doxastic defeater is a proposition that defeats another o f one’s beliefs by virtue of being 
believed, regardless of whether it is true or not. For example, there is debate whether or 
not religious pluralism is a defeater for religious exclusivists who maintain that their 
religious beliefs are immediately justified, without appeal to evidence.
35 For a defense o f the claim that pluralism need not be a defeater for unevidenced Christian belief, see 
Plantinga (2000), p. 437-457. For a contrasting view, see Robert McKim for an argument that the 
appropriate response to the facts o f pluralism is what he calls the “Critical Stance”. This position is 
partially characterized by a principle to the effect that “disagreement about an issue or area of inquiry
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While religious pluralism may be a defeater for one who holds the relevant beliefs 
about the facts of religious diversity, it can hardly be a defeater for those who are 
unaware of such diversity through no fault o f their own (not the result, say, of ignoring 
the facts) and so who lack the potentially defeating beliefs. For example, isolated tribes or 
pre-literate people living before the widespread dissemination of information cannot be 
subject to this kind of defeater if they are unaware o f it. In these cases the defeater is 
only potential since the person either lacks the beliefs about the facts o f pluralism, or if 
he does hold relevant (potentially) defeating beliefs, he is unaware of the connection 
between the defeater and his unevidenced religious belief.
Propositional Defeaters:
A factual or propositional defeater, by contrast, is a proposition that must meet the 
following conditions: a) it must be true, and b) if it were added to the set o f a subject’s 
beliefs, then the resulting set would no longer Warrant the belief in question. Key here 
is that factual defeaters must be true and they need not be believed nor need they be 
within the easy epistemic grasp of a subject, given the subject’s evidence in order to 
defeat. It is important to note that what is defeated here is Warrant, and not
"K 7justification. As I will argue below, this must be the case despite what some of the 
original authors might have implied by speaking of ‘justification’. When, for example, 
Lehrer and Paxon 1969 and Klein 2000 sometimes speak o f these kinds of defeaters
provides reason for whatever beliefs we hold about that issue or area o f inquiry to be tentative.” (McKim, 
2001 ,p. 141)
36 For early discussions o f this kind o f defeater, see Lehrer and Paxon (1969) and Klein (2000).
37 Again, Warrant is being understood here in Plantinga’s sense o f that which converts true belief to 
knowledge. See 1.1. for more on Warrant and its relation to other epistemic concepts.
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defeating ‘justification’, they must be implicitly taking ‘justification’ to be Warrant, for 
reasons I will give below.
As we will see, factual defeaters defeat knowledge, not justification. A standard 
example of a factual defeater, I take it, is Goldman’s famous fake barn case. (Goldman, 
1992a) That example was introduced as a Gettier case to refute the causal theory of 
knowledge.38 In the bam case one believes that one sees a bam, it is true that one sees a 
barn, and one is justified  that one sees a bam on the basis of one’s perceptual experience 
-  but, one fails to know  it is a barn since it is in a field full o f visually indiscriminable 
fake bams. The idea is that one does not know one sees a bam because it is just luck that 
one believed truly as one did; one’s belief could have easily been false on the same 
evidence (assuming, as some contest, that one’s evidence in this case is one’s perceptual 
experience as of a bam39). Further, the proposition about the fake barns is true and if it 
were added to the set of a subject’s beliefs, then the resulting set would no longer 
Warrant the belief in question. Thus it constitutes a factual defeater.
Note, however, that the intuition is *not* that the presence of fake bams defeats 
justification , but rather it is that they defeat knowledge (perhaps by defeating Warrant, if 
there is such a thing). First, it is highly intuitive that one has a justified belief about the 
bam on the basis o f one’s perceptual experience o f a bam, regardless of what other facts, 
if  any, might obtain, unbeknownst to oneself. Second, if  factual defeaters did  defeat 
justification, one would no longer have a Gettier case, since while there may be no 
received definition o f a Gettier case, minimally a Gettier case is an instance of a justijied,
38 The Casual Theory o f Knowledge holds roughly that a subject knows that p  iff the fact that p  suitably 
causes the subject’s true belief. For an early expression o f this kind o f theory, see Goldman (1992c).
39 See ch. 9 o f Williamson (2000) for an argument against a phenomenal conception o f evidence, and in 
defense o f a factive view that one’s evidence is what one knows. That is, according to Williamson, 
knowledge (and only knowledge) is evidence.
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true, belief that fails to be knowledge. But the fake barn case is a paradigm instance of a 
Gettier case. Therefore, the subject in fake barn country does a have justified belief, 
which he must, since his situation clearly constitutes a Gettier case. Given this, it is not 
clear how, if at all, merely factual defeat can be extended to justification, at least as we 
have been understanding the notion.
But can factual defeaters just be defined in terms of justification, in the sense that 
we have been understanding it, rather than being aimed at knowledge? In other words, 
might we understand a factual or propositional defeater as follows: as a proposition that 
must meet the following conditions: a) it must be true, and b) if  it were added to the set of 
a subject’s beliefs, then the resulting set would no longer justify  the belief in question? 
We could of course offer this analysis as a stipulative definition, but the problem is, there 
does not seem to be a class of defeaters that function in this way.
Take the fake bam case again. O f course there are facts/propositions that if 
believed then the resulting set of the subject’s beliefs would no longer justify the belief in 
question, e.g. the true proposition that the subject is in fake bam country. But this is just 
an example of a doxastic defeater. But as we saw when considering the subject in fake 
bam country, and whether or not his situation constitutes a Gettier case (which would 
entail that he is justified in believing as he does), we simply do not judge that facts or 
propositions that are not believed (and ‘should’ not be believed, given the subject’s 
evidence) in any way defeat the subject’s justification. The fact that we judge that 
propositional/factual defeaters apply to knowledge, but not justification, offers further 
support for the kind of epistemic intemalism I am advocating, i.e. only that of which the 
subject is (potentially) aware can contribute or detract from her justificatory status.
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Normative Defeaters:
Finally, one can distinguish normative defeaters. These defeat “by virtue of being 
propositions that S should believe given the evidence which is available to S.” (Lackey, 
1999, p. 475) Like propositional defeaters, normative defeaters are meant to defeat 
justification whether they are believed or not. Although unlike propositional defeaters, I 
hold that normative defeaters do genuinely target justification, rather than just knowledge 
(or Warrant). However, the existence of normative defeaters that need not be believed to 
be effective is consistent with what I have said about propositional defeaters above. 
Because while propositions not believed and outside the easy epistemic grasp of a subject 
do not defeat justification, normative defeaters should be believed whether they are 
believed or not, but this is so only given the subject’s evidence.
In the case of the fake bams above, the potentially (but not actually) defeating 
facts were outside the subject’s ken, and he could not have been reasonably been 
expected to discover them, or appreciate their epistemic import, given the evidence he 
has. This is quite different than the case of Norman the clairvoyant I discuss below, 
where, given his evidence, in some intuitive but clear sense, he ought not believe as he 
does. Therefore, at least in the case of Norman, normative defeaters seem to be the kind 
of defeaters Bonjour has in mind.
Cases of Clairvoyance and Unusual But Reliable Cognitive Faculties:
Laurence Bonjour introduces cases of clairvoyance as arguments against the claim 
that awareness of one’s grounds is not necessary for justification. (Bonjour, 1985) 
Bonjour defines clairvoyance as “the alleged psychic power o f perceiving or intuiting the
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existence and character of distant states of affairs without the aid of any sensory input”. 
(Bonjour, 1985, p. 38) Reliable cases of clairvoyance, if not actual, seem at least to be 
coherent possibilities. As such, they can help test our intuitive understanding of 
epistemic concepts.
Bonjour begins by offering three different cases of reliable clairvoyance as
putative counter-examples to the thesis that external reliability is sufficient for positive
epistemic status. The subjects in these cases, Samantha, Casper and Maud, are all
reliable clairvoyants, that is, in the cases in question, it is stipulated that they reliably
produce true beliefs via their clairvoyance. The structure of the cases is similar in other
ways as well. The subjects have no positive reasons or evidence that they are
clairvoyant. Further, in each case the subject is aware o f a defeater of some kind.
Take Bonjour’s first case:
C a se l. S am antha believes h e rse lf  to have the pow er o f  
c la irvoyance, though she has no reasons for o r against th is belief.
O ne day she com es to believe for no apparen t reason  that the 
P residen t is in N ew  Y ork City. She m ain tains th is belief, 
appealing  to her alleged  cla irvoyant pow er, even though  she is at 
the sam e tim e aw are o f  a m assive am ount o f  apparen tly  cogen t 
ev idence, consisting  o f  new s reports, p ress re leases, a lleged ly  
live te lev ision  p ictures, etc., ind icating  that the P residen t is at 
that sam e tim e in W ashington , D .C . N ow  the P resid en t is in fact 
in N ew  Y ork C ity , all evidence to the contrary , be ing  part o f  a 
m assive  official hoax  m ounted  in the face o f  an assassina tion  
threat. M oreover, Sam antha does in fact have com plete ly  
re liab le  c la irvoyant pow er under the cond itions tha t w ere then 
satisfied , and her b e lie f  about the P residen t d id  resu lt from  the 
opera tion  o f  that pow er. (B onjour, 1985, p. 38)
Here the subject has formed a perfectly reliable belief, but she lacks any positive reason 
for thinking she is capable of forming a reliable belief in the way she did. Further, she is 
aware of many defeaters that contradict her belief (the news report, etc.) and she has no 
defeater-defeaters to rebut them. It is because of this that Bonjour concludes that even
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though she has a reliably true belief, she does not know the President is in New York City 
because she lacks justification for the belief.
If one sets aside questions of Warrant and knowledge, it seems clear that 
Samantha lacks justification for her belief. This is no doubt in part due to the fact that 
she is disregarding large amounts o f compelling evidence that her belief is false. By 
believing improperly, Samantha’s belief is thereby unjustified. The only complicating 
factor that might make judging whether or not Samantha is justified is that she does have 
the background belief that she is clairvoyant, however, it is stipulated that that belief has 
no support for or against it. But what is clear is that even if that belief alone did 
somehow contribute to the prima facie  justification of her belief about the President’s 
whereabouts, she obviously possesses many undefeated doxastic defeaters that are 
sufficient to defeat or outweigh any justification that belief may have otherwise enjoyed.
The same point can be made using a completely ordinary case. Suppose a highly 
reliable informant tells me that the President is in NYC. But then fifty other informants 
tell me that he is in Ottawa. Suppose further that we stipulate that these fifty informants 
are in fact, unbeknownst to me, utterly unreliable. What am I justified in believing? 
Surely I have justification to believe that the President is in Ottawa; so if I believe that 
the President is in NYC, my belief would be quite unjustified. Even if first informant’s 
testimony did contribute to the prima facie  justification of my belief about the President’s 
whereabouts, I obviously possess many undefeated doxastic defeaters that are sufficient 
to defeat or outweigh any justification that belief may have otherwise enjoyed.
The next two cases Bonjour considers, those of Casper and Maud, are structurally 
similar to that o f Samantha. In these cases, instead of having a defeater for the specific
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clairvoyant belief in question, they have defeaters against the subject himself having 
clairvoyant powers in the second case, and against anyone being clairvoyant in the third 
case. Here, too, Bonjour concludes that the subjects lack justification because, even 
though the belief is true and reliably formed, the subject’s belief is unjustified since it is 
held in the face o f seemingly cogent defeaters. Here again, if one sets aside the question 
of whether the subjects have Warrant for their belief and hence know the proposition in 
question, it can be agreed the subjects lack justification  for their defeated belief. Again, 
even if a dogmatic externalist wants to maintain that the clairvoyants know the 
whereabouts of the President, it is clear that the clairvoyants are nonetheless unjustified 
since, as far as they can tell, all available signs point to the falsity o f the belief. To be 
sure, all three cases show that the presence of undefeated-(doxastic and/or normative) 
defeaters is sufficient to undermine epistemic rationality.
In light of the considerations raised above, some have opted for a qualified 
extemalism, one that contends that reliability is not sufficient for positive epistemic status 
-  it can be defeated. This seems right. Still, a qualified extemalism does not require 
positive evidence that the belief is true or is reliably formed if it is to enjoy positive 
epistemic status, but it does require that the subject have no good or strong reasons of 
which she is aware (or should be aware) against the belief in question. This position falls 
halfway between intemalism and an unqualified extemalism. The former requires both 
positive grounds for a belief as well as the absence of undefeated grounds against a belief 
if it is to have positive epistemic status.
The rationale for requiring positive grounds that motivates the internalist need not 
require that these grounds be beliefs -  I will argue that the demand for positive grounds
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can be satisfied by the subject being consciously aware (in a non-doxastic way) o f her
grounds, which themselves need not be beliefs (for example, in the case of perceptual
belief, the grounds may be perceptual experiences of certain kinds). An unqualified 
extemalism says that reliability or some other external factor is sufficient for positive 
epistemic status, regardless of any evidence (positive or negative) that the subject is 
aware of. Bonjour’s case o f Norman is set in terms o f a qualified extemalism. Bonjour 
writes,
Case 4. N orm an, under certain  cond itions that usually  ob tain , is 
a com pletely  reliable c la irvoyant w ith respect to certa in  k inds o f  
subject m atter. He possesses no evidence or reasons o f  any kind 
for or against the general possib ility  o f  such a cogn itive  pow er or
for or against the thesis that he possesses it. O ne day N orm an
com es to believe  that the President is in N ew  Y ork C ity , though 
he has no ev idence either for o r against this belief. In fact the 
b e lie f  is true and results from  his cla irvoyan t pow er under 
c ircum stances in w hich it is com pletely  reliable. (B onjour, 1985,
P -41)
In the case o f Norman, he reliably produces clairvoyant beliefs, and in this case 
there are no doxastic defeaters present. Still, since Norman lacks reasons or evidence for 
the belief that the President is in New York City, Bonjour concludes Norman’s belief 
cannot enjoy positive epistemic status. Bonjour goes on to reason as follows: if Norman 
believes he is clairvoyant, that belief clearly lacks positive epistemic status on both the 
internalist’s grounds since he lacks reasons for thinking so, as well as on the externalist’s 
grounds, since the belief that he is clairvoyant is not reliably produced. (Bonjour, p. 42) 
That is, there is nothing in the case as described that the power o f clairvoyance also 
reliably produces true beliefs about the source of the beliefs. As such, any unevidenced 
beliefs about the subject’s clairvoyance itself would be unreliably produced, and so on 
the externalist’s theory, unjustified. If, on the other hand, Norman does not believe that
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he is clairvoyant, from his point of view there is no way he could reliably arrive at the 
true belief that the President is in New York City. From Norman’s own subjective 
conception of the situation, his clairvoyant belief feels no different than a mere hunch or 
lucky guess. From this Bonjour concludes that Norman lacks justification and therefore 
does not know which city the President is in.
Someone might object that Bonjour moves too quickly here by claiming that if the 
subject is not aware o f positive grounds for his belief, he will therefore regard his belief 
as no better than a hunch. Such an objector would have a point in that an unevidenced 
clairvoyant belief need not feel like a hunch or lucky guess. But, as I will show below, 
that is insufficient for the belief to be justified.
Consider three types of cases:
A) A subject wonders if there is a table in the next room. The subject enters the 
room, has a conscious perceptual experience of a table, and on the basis o f that 
experience, believes that there is a table in front of him.
B) A subject wonders if  there is a table in the next room. The subject has no idea 
whether there is a table in the next room, so he guesses. He has no further 
grounds of which he is aware about whether or not there is a table in the next 
room. We can stipulate that his guess is unreliable.
C) A subject wonders if there is a table in the next room. The subject has an 
inclination to believe that there is, although he has no further grounds of which he 
is aware about whether or not there is a table in the next room. Here we stipulate 
that this belief was produced by his highly reliable clairvoyant faculty.
Bonjour seems to treat case B and C the same -  if a subject does not have access to his 
grounds, then from his own perspective, his belief will feel utterly random, as a guess 
would feel.
The problem with guesses or hunches in this context is that we do not think that 
they give us any reason to think that a belief that is based on them stands any greater 
chance of being true. Sometimes we are allowed to rely on hunches and guesses; but not 
when our concerns are epistemic. Sometimes we may have pragmatic reasons that 
demand that a decision is made quickly where truth is not our (primary) concern, or 
sometimes we must act without all the relevant information. For example, in a game 
show one might have pragmatic reasons to guess which door the prize is behind, in which 
case a guess might suffice. But in this case, the guess cannot serve as the basis for an 
epistemically respectable judgment about the location of the prize. This is because in 
epistemic matters, our primary concern is truth. We know that hunches and guesses are 
not truth-conducive in any sense. They have as much chance o f leading to truth as to 
falsehood and, as such, they cannot contribute to epistemic justification.
What about so-called ‘educated’ guesses? Can they never lead to epistemically 
justified belief? In some circumstances they can, but they do not do this by virtue of 
being pure guesses. An educated guess is one that is based on grounds of some sort, 
although the grounds are only partial or incomplete. Similarly, what if a hunch proved to 
be a reliable guide to truth? In this case, again, this is not a ‘pure’ hunch, but a hunch 
supplemented with inductive evidence that this is an epistemically appropriate way of 
forming beliefs in the circumstances. It is clear, however, that without inductive grounds 
or at least partial evidence, hunches/guesses can never lead to epistemically justified
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beliefs due to the fact that they lack any sort of truth-connection. In Chapters 4 and 5 I 
will further explore what kind of truth-connection must exist between proper grounds and 
epistemically justified belief.
At any rate, it does not follow from the fact that the subject has a belief produced 
by his clairvoyance that it needs to strike the subject as being random. It seems there 
could be cases where the clairvoyant holds his clairvoyant belief with conviction, even 
strong conviction. In fact, the clairvoyant could take his belief as obviously true, just in 
the same way that we take our perceptual beliefs formed on the basis of conscious visual 
experience as obviously true. So, contrary to what Bonjour says, the clairvoyant belief 
could have the functional properties of normal perceptual belief. It need not present itself 
as hunches and lucky guesses do. But despite that, the clairvoyant’s belief is not 
justified.
A key difference remains that explains why the unevidenced clairvoyant is not 
justified, whereas our beliefs based on conscious visual experiences are: in the latter case, 
we are consciously aware o f our grounds. This seems to be the best explanation of these 
cases. The reason that awareness is justificationally relevant is the following: whether or 
not a belief is justified is not a brute fact. Obviously, simply believing something does 
not necessarily make it true. Even believing something with conviction does not make it 
true. If a belief is justified, it thereby has some connection to truth (the question of the 
exact nature o f the truth-connection is for the moment an open one; again, see Chapter 4 
and 5). If a belief is justified, it is justified in virtue of some further thing(s) obtaining. 
Call this thing that contributes to the belief s justification its ground. My position is that
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one of the things that it is necessary that one is aware o f is one’s grounds, if one’s belief 
is to be justified.
There is a distinction to be drawn, however, concerning what is meant by 
‘grounds’, as there is a danger of running two important issues together. In the paper 
“Other Minds”, J.L. Austin notes that concerning knowledge and belief, it is common to 
ask ‘how do you know’ and ‘why do you believe’, but not ‘why do you know’ and ‘how 
do you believe’. (Austin, 1961, p. 46) O f course one can ask ‘why do you know?’ if by 
that one means, roughly, ‘why did they tell you?’, or something similar. But this is not 
what is meant by asking ‘why do you believe?’, which is asking for justification, not an 
explanation of how the belief was acquired. Related issues arise in a similar way with 
justified belief. That is, by putting the ‘how do you know’ question in terms of 
justification, one might be asking two very different things. On the one hand, one might 
be asking what the source o f one’s justified belief is, that is, in what way did one come to 
acquire this belief? On the other hand, one might be asking what the justificatory basis of 
one’s belief is, that is, what reasons does one have for thinking it true?
These two questions obviously can come apart. For example, suppose one is 
justified in believing that bachelors are unmarried men. What are one’s grounds for this 
belief? As to the sources question, perhaps one’s way o f coming to believe this is that 
one was taught the relevant concepts as a child, which seems to be a paradigm example 
o f an empirical belief source. This is to assume that the five senses are empirical sources 
o f belief. One’s justificatory basis for one’s belief about bachelors, however, is non- 
empirical. Presumably, one’s justification arises from conceptual understanding, or some 
other a priori justifier, e.g. in virtue of the self-evident character of the proposition.
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It is possible for one to be aware of the source of one’s belief but not its 
justificatory basis, as the case above shows. Similarly, it is possible for one to be aware 
of one’s justificatory basis for a belief while not being aware o f its source (perhaps 
because one acquired the belief long ago and has since forgotten how it was acquired). 
The issue of memory presents an interesting special case for the awareness requirement 
that I will not be able to address in this thesis, but will leave for further research. 
However, it is acquiring justified belief that is the central case o f epistemic justification, 
not its mere retention. I place special emphasis on the acquisition of belief, rather than its 
retention, because it is conceptually more fundamental: one cannot retain a belief unless 
one has acquired it; but one can acquire a belief but fail to retain it (perhaps because one 
has poor memory). In the paradigm case of acquiring justified perceptual belief, I 
contend that one must be aware of both the source of one’s belief, as well as its 
justificatory basis, which together constitute the ground o f one’s belief. Without 
awareness of one’s ground, from one’s own perspective the justification o f one’s belief is 
a brute fact, which we know is inconsistent with its being justified (more on this below).
For example, in the case of a belief about the external world based on a conscious 
perceptual experience, the subject is aware of her grounds, so she is aware of a reason to 
think her belief is true. From her perspective her belief ‘s being justified is not a brute 
fact: it is justified by her experience. She is aware o f both the source o f her belief 
(sensory perception) as well as its justification (that is, the fact that the conscious 
perceptual experience has a certain phenomenal character and an intentional content). It 
is the clairvoyant’s lack o f awareness of his grounds that makes his belief unjustified. 
The clairvoyant is neither aware of the justificatory basis o f his belief nor of its source,
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and either of these lacks o f awareness is sufficient for the belief to be unjustified. As to 
the sources question, the clairvoyant lacks awareness of any way that he could come to 
have justified beliefs about the whereabouts of the President. He also lacks awareness of 
any reason to think that what he believes is true (independently of the question of how he 
acquired this reason).
There is a further difference between the way conscious awareness contributes to 
justification in the normal visual perception case, and the way the lack o f awareness 
ensures that the clairvoyance based belief is unjustified. In the normal case the subject is 
sensitive to kinds o f defeaters that the clairvoyant is not. In the case o f belief about the 
external world based on a conscious perceptual experience, the subject is aware whether 
the belief is consistent with her grounds. If she loses the source of her belief, or if the 
belief s justification is undermined or rebutted by further considerations, the belief will 
be dropped. That is, in an ideally rational person, a belief is “extinguished” when that 
person judges that belief not to be supported by appropriate reasons. (Cf. Scanlon, 2000, 
p. 20) A clairvoyant belief is not sensitive to these kinds of defeaters. The clairvoyant 
belief cannot be dropped in response to considerations about its source or justification 
since the clairvoyant is not aware of the beliefs  grounds. This insensitivity to grounds 
implies that the belief is not justified, and further, that such sensitivity is made possible 
only by an awareness o f grounds.
These considerations give rise to what we might call the Subject’s Perspective 
Objection, which along with the egocentric concept of justification, is the primary 
motivation for the awareness requirement respecting justification. Michael Bergmann 
introduces the Subject’s Perspective Objection like this:
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B ergm an n ’s S u b jec t’s Perspective O bjection: I f  the subject
hold ing  a b e lie f isn ’t aw are o f  what that b e lie f has go ing  for it, 
then she isn ’t aw are o f  how  its status is any d ifferent from  a stray 
hunch or an arbitrary  conviction. From  that we m ay conclude 
that from  her ow n perspective it is an accident that her b e lie f  is 
true. A nd that im plies that it isn ’t a ju stified  belief. (B ergm ann,
2006, p. 12)
Given what I have argued above, it is clear that this formulation needs revising. As I
argued, the subject may not regard a belief whose grounds she is ignorant of as a mere
hunch or arbitrary conviction. My revised formulation below takes this into account. We
can now state the Subject’s Perspective Objection thus:
R evised S u b jec t’s P ersp ective O bjection  (SPO ): I f  the subject 
ho ld ing  a b e lie f is not aw are o f  the b e l ie f  s g rounds, then she is 
not aw are o f  how  its status is any different from  a stray 
hunch /arb itrary  conv ic tion /strong  but g round less conviction . As 
such, i f  the subject regards her b e lie f  as ju stified , she ough t to 
regard the fact that the b e lie f  is ju s tif ied  as a brute fact. From  
that we m ay conclude  that from  her ow n perspective she ough t to 
regard it as an accident that her b e lie f  is true, i.e. from  her 
perspective a b e lie f  w hose ju stifica tio n  appears to be a b ru te  fact 
could  ju s t as easily  be false. A nd that im plies that the b e lie f  is 
not ju stified .
While qualified extemalism is surely an improvement over the unqualified 
varieties, it does not go far enough. If  there is a rationale for needing the absence of 
defeaters for a belief to be rational, it is the same reasoning that motivates the need for 
positive evidence as well -  the difference between these two types of evidence is one of 
degree, not kind. If a belief is unjustified if it is held in the face o f evidence against it, 
even if unbeknownst to the subject the belief is true and reliably formed, the belief is still 
unjustified if it is held and the subject has absolutely no indication that it is true.
A subject ought not to just think that her belief is justified in virtue o f something 
or other, when she is not aware of it, or what it could be. She will have to say that she
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has no reason to regard her belief as justified as we saw with some of the clairvoyants 
above, and so she cannot then just maintain, in an ad hoc way, that she is justified in 
virtue of something that she is not currently aware o f  This is at best a mere promissory 
note, with no assurance of repayment. But perhaps she has a reason or evidence that in 
certain circumstances if she takes herself to be justified, then she usually is justified. But 
then in such a case the awareness condition is met: what justifies her in belief is not 
something that she is not aware of. Rather, her belief is justified in virtue of her justified 
belief that if she is in certain circumstances and believes something on topic d>, then she 
is usually justified, and  that she is in those circumstances.
For example, Jack believes that the Battle of Hastings was in 1066. Here are two 
possible scenarios: he may not recall where he learned this fact, and if he merely thinks 
that he is justified in virtue of something or other, but he is not aware of what it is, then 
his belief is unjustified, as the SPO rightly predicts. Take the second scenario: Jack 
might be aware of inductive evidence, that combined with a justified belief about what 
kind of proposition he is considering, might yield justification in believing that 
proposition. That is, Jack may have strong inductive evidence that he is usually correct 
about dates o f events in early medieval English history, and he may be aware that he is 
now considering a proposition about an event in early medieval English history. As such, 
his belief may well be justified, and if it is, it is justified by internalist lights.40
40 Cases o f putative justified belief that might be thought to be problematic for the awareness requirement, 
since it not obvious what the subject’s grounds might be, include ‘bare’ memory, the a priori, knowledge 
of our own mental states, the positions of our own limbs, etc. While these are interesting cases that a 
complete theory o f epistemic justification should ultimately address, I will not be able to address these 
cases in this thesis. Instead they must be left for further research, although this passage indicates one 
possibility for how to address certain cases of memory justification in a way consistent with epistemic 
intemalism. Nevertheless, my primary focus will be on the justification o f perceptual belief. For more on 
the scope o f this thesis, and my rationale for this focus, see the Introduction.
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But to be sure, from the subject’s point of view, beliefs that emerge from a 
qualified extemalism appear to have no better epistemic status than at best a strong but 
groundless conviction. Therefore, it seems that the common sense case to be made for 
understanding epistemic justification surely favors the internalist, conceived here as 
someone who accepts the awareness requirement as necessary for justification.
Before moving on to discuss Mentalism, it is important to note a feature o f the 
dialectic. So far I have argued that certain cases are not cases of epistemic justification. 
This is an intuitive verdict, which I hope is found plausible. In addition to not being 
instances of epistemic justification, all of the cases I considered above lack a certain 
awareness condition. It is of course a further claim that this is why they lack justification. 
I submitted that this is the best explanation of our judgments about the cases, and 
accordingly, I concluded that the awareness condition is necessary for epistemic 
justification obtaining. But given that I am arguing by inference to the best explanation, 
there will always be a gap in the argumentative strategy since such arguments employ 
nothing like deductive validity. Despite this intrinsic feature of such arguments, I hope I 
have done enough to bridge the gap, and thereby have shown that the awareness 
requirement is necessary for epistemic justification.
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2.2. Mentalism:
So far I have argued that the awareness requirement is a necessary condition for 
justification by considering cases o f clairvoyance (the same kinds of judgments would be 
evoked by considering cases o f unusual but reliable cognitive faculties generally, 
respecting the grounds of which the subject has no awareness). I will now show that 
even many of those who claim to deny the awareness requirement implicitly appeal to it 
to motivate their accounts of justification. By considering the arguments for 
“Mentalism” I will show that, unless an awareness requirement is presupposed, the cases 
that such arguments appeal to are o f no intuitive force.
Mentalism is a theory of epistemic justification that is least like the other 
positions that have been called intemalism that I have discussed so far. In fact, if to be an 
internalist one must endorse some kind of awareness requirement like the one I have been 
suggesting, then Mentalism would be regarded as thoroughly externalist. Richard 
Feldman and Earl Conee, the chief advocates of Mentalism, claim that Mentalism is the 
thesis that “a person’s beliefs are justified only by things that are internal to the person’s 
mental life.” (Feldman and Conee, 2001, p. 233) So the “internal” in intemalism here 
means internal to the mind.
Specifically, their official formulation o f Mentalism is as follows: “S: The
justificatory status o f a person’s doxastic attitudes strongly supervenes on the person’s 
occurrent and dispositional mental states, events, and conditions.” (Ibid., p. 234) From 
this formulation, they express the main implication o f S thus: “M: If any two possible 
individuals are exactly alike mentally, then they are alike justificationally, e.g., the same 
beliefs are justified for them to the same extent.” (Ibid.) This latter claim simply spells
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out a consequence of supervenience. But it is worth noting that the antecedent may be 
impossible to fulfil. That is, it is not clear if two individuals can be exactly alike in 
respect of their mental states. For example, if one subject believes that he is / ’ and the 
other believes that he (the second subject) is/ ,  the subjects seem to be in different mental 
states, since they believe different things. Accordingly, the supervenience formulation 
may not illuminate anything. I will further address the issue o f internalism/extemalism 
about mental content and its possible implications for epistemic intemalism in chapter 3.
Feldman and Conee expressly say that an advantage of Mentalism is that it 
parallels what philosophers have called “intemalism” in the philosophy of mind and 
ethics. (Ibid., p. 235) In the philosophy of mind, the internalist claims roughly that the 
contents of one’s thoughts supervene upon one’s intrinsic physical properties -  the 
outside environment and relations to it have no bearing on the content of one’s thoughts. 
But of course unless Mentalists are also internalists about the mental, they need not be 
committed to the position that epistemic justification depends on internal psychological 
properties, since these positions are distinct. Besides being both a Mentalist and an 
internalist about the mental, one could also be a Mentalist about justification and an 
externalist about the mental; or an internalist about the mental and an externalist about 
epistemic justification; or of course, an externalist about both. The position I am 
defending is an intemalism about justification, not in the M entalist’s sense of course, but 
rather conceived as someone who accepts the Awareness Requirement. For the moment, 
I am remaining agnostic about whether extemalism or intemalism about mental content is 
correct (more on this issue in chapter 3).
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In ethics, an internalist is someone who holds that one has a reason for action only 
if one has some desire that would be satisfied by performing that action. The position is 
internalist since desires, which are internal states of affairs, are the only thing relevant to 
what reasons for action one has. Nevertheless, it is unclear why calling a position in 
epistemology “intemalism” is an advantage simply because the label is used in similar 
ways in other areas of philosophy. What label we use is irrelevant to the truth of the 
position.
It is important to note that Mentalism as Feldman and Conee construe it has no 
access or awareness requirement of any kind. However, there may be some connection 
between Mentalism and access. If one is endorses an access requirement, depending on 
what it is that one holds must be accessible (e.g. only certain properties of mental states 
are relevant for epistemic justification), then a kind of intemalism that is characterized by 
an awareness requirement may entail Mentalism. But of course it need not, since one 
might hold that the things one must be aware of are not themselves mental. For example, 
in direct realist accounts of perception, subjects are aware of things in the world -  they 
are not mental.
Be that as it may, the converse is not true: Mentalism does not entail forms of 
access intemalism since Mentalism only requires that the factors that determine 
justification are internal to the mind, not that the subject can tell that they are internal, or 
even detect their presence, wherever they happen to be located. Whether the “mental 
states, events and conditions” lie below the surface of consciousness and are thus 
undetectable is justificationally irrelevant for the Mentalist, given their official 
formulation of their position, something the access theorist flatly denies.
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Arguments For Mentalism:
In defending Mentalism, Feldman and Conee construct six pairs of cases where
they invite the intuition that in the first instance the subject has a justified belief and in
the second case the belief is intuitively not justified, or else one belief is more justified
than the other. Feldman and Conee contend that the best explanation of these apparent
epistemic differences is that there are “internal” differences in their preferred sense of
internal to the mind, although not necessarily accessible or within the subject’s
“epistemic perspective”, as I maintain is necessary for justification. If this is an
intuitively correct diagnosis of the cases, this is meant to support their thesis that
differences in justification have an entirely mental origin, and have nothing to do with
other factors, including what the subject is aware of. Their first two cases and comments
on them are representative of all the cases they provide and their assessment o f them.
They introduce them as follows:
E xam ple  1 Bob and Ray are sitting  in an a ir-cond itioned  hotel 
lobby read ing  y es te rd ay ’s new spaper. Each has read  tha t it w ill 
be very w arm  today and, on that basis, each believes that it is 
very w arm  today. Then Bob goes ou tside and feels the heat.
They continue to believe that it is very w arm  today. B ut at this 
po in t B o b ’s b e lie f is b e tte r ju stified .
C om m ent: B o b ’s ju stifica tio n  for the b e lie f  w as enhanced  by his 
experience o f  feeling  the heat, and thus undergo ing  a m ental 
change w hich so to speak “ in ternalized” the actual tem perature.
R ay had  ju s t  the forecast to rely on.
E xam ple  2  A fter go ing  out and feeling  very w arm , Bob goes 
back  in and tells Ray o f  the feeling. H ere are tw o versions o f  the 
re levant details:
2a) B ob is in fact a p illa r o f  in tegrity , bu t Ray has no reason to 
th ink  so. As far as Ray can tell, it is ju s t as likely that Bob is 
try ing  to deceive h im  as that Bob is te lling  the truth.
2b) Bob is a p illa r o f  in tegrity , and Ray has observed  and recalls 
m any exam ples o f  B o b ’s honesty  and none o f  d ishonesty .
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In exam ple (2b) R ay ’s b e lie f that it is very w arm  becom es m ore 
strongly  ju stified  after he hears from  Bob. In exam ple (2a) 
hearing from  Bob does not affect the strength  o f  R ay ’s 
ju stifica tio n  for his belief.
C om m ent: B o b ’s honesty , som ething out o f  R ay ’s ken in (2a), 
has becom e “ in ternalized” by Ray in (2b). B o b ’s in tegrity  m ade 
no ju stifica to ry  difference to R ay’s b e lie f  until it w as suitably  
brough t into R ay’s m ind. (Feldm an and C onee, 2001 , p. 236)
By considering these cases, it is far from clear whether they effectively 
distinguish Mentalism from a theory of justification that embraces the awareness 
requirement, since the feeling of heat in example 1, and observations and recollections of 
Bob’s honesty in example 2 are both things that the subject is aware of. If we stipulate 
that he is NOT aware of them, the cases lose their intuitive plausibility. While Feldman 
and Conee may be right about which subjects are justified and to what extent, I deny that 
they offer the best explanation of those facts.
For example, i f  in example 1 Bob’s belief is better justified when he goes outside, 
this is because he is aware that he experiences the heat. The mere experience of heat, 
without the subject’s awareness of it (if such a case is possible), would not yield 
justification on its own. Incidentally, it is somewhat ambiguous in what way Feldman 
and Conee maintain that Bob’s justification is enhanced over Ray’s upon going outside 
and feeling the heat. Surely he has an additional source of justification, that is, he now 
has his experience as well as the testimony of the newspaper. So in one sense his 
justification is more stable since it now has multiple independent sources. His belief is 
justificationally “overdetermined”, so to speak. But that is not necessarily to say that the 
strength o f his justification is increased. At any rate, if we stipulate that Bob has the
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experience o f the heat, but is not aware of it, it is far from clear that his justification 
differs in any way from Ray.
Similarly, in the second set of examples, the emphasis is on what Ray can tell 
about Bob’s honesty. It is Ray’s consciously recalling inductive evidence that Bob is 
honest that marks the difference between 2a) and 2b). If  instead Ray had those same 
inductive grounds stored in unconscious memories, it is not at all clear that there are 
justificatory differences between case 2a) and 2b).
Feldman and Conee are seeking to give the best explanation of our verdicts about 
these cases. They claim the explanation is that there is “no justificatory difference to 
Ray’s belief until it [the ground for the belief] was suitably brought into Ray’s mind.” 
(Feldman and Conee, 2001, p. 236) That is surely right. What Feldman and Conee fail 
to recognize, however, is that being “suitably” brought into mind means that the subject 
is aware o f his grounds. If it is possible for grounds to be in the mind but for the subject 
to be unaware of them, it is false that the subject is justified, as careful consideration of 
these cases reveal. This shows that even those who explicitly deny the awareness 
requirement in the course o f their defense of their theory of justification implicitly rely on 
it. Feldman and Conee cannot show that the Mentalist condition is properly fulfilled 
without the awareness requirement because all the cases they discuss possess the 
awareness requirement. If we explicitly exclude the awareness requirement, the cases 
lose any plausibility they had.
Therefore, while the Mentalist is right that there can be no justificatory difference 
without a mental difference, there is crucially an additional necessary condition that 
needs to be met, namely the Awareness Requirement. So besides supporting Mentalism,
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the arguments offered by Feldman and Conee offer support my view as well. Granting 
that Mentalists obviously do not think that just any mental difference yields a 
justificatory difference, they still fail to put any constraints on what kind of mental 
differences are relevant to epistemic justification. My account of justification specifically 
addresses this problem by arguing for the necessity of the Awareness Requirement. 
Accordingly, my theory of justification better explains Feldman and Conee’s examples 
than Mentalism does.
So far I have argued that awareness of one’s grounds for a belief is a necessary 
condition for that belief being epistemically justified. Without it, an account of 
justification gives rise to the Subject’s Perspective Objection. This was shown through 
drawing attention to our considered judgments about cases. I considered two kinds of 
cases: cases of clairvoyance and cases that were originally offered in defense of 
Mentalism. By considering the latter cases, I showed that even those who claim to deny 
the awareness requirement must implicitly appeal to it to motivate their accounts of 
justification. Having made a case that the Awareness Requirement is necessary for 
justification, I will now turn to give an account o f the nature o f this awareness.
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2.3. On the Nature of Awareness: Responding To A Dilemma for Intemalism
In a recent book, Michael Bergmann argues that the Awareness Requirement that 
defines the kind of epistemic intemalism I favour generates a dilemma: either it leads to a 
vicious regress, and thereby to a scepticism about whether any o f our beliefs are justified, 
or it is entirely unmotivated (i.e. that meeting such an awareness condition cannot meet 
the SPO, the primary motivation for the awareness condition). As a result, Bergmann 
argues, epistemic intemalism, the Awareness Requirement, and the intuitions that 
motivate it captured in the SPO must be abandoned, despite their initial plausibility. By 
critically examining Bergmann’s dilemma we can see why it fails, and in so doing clarify 
and defend what kind of awareness that epistemic justification demands.
Bergmann’s Dilemma:
Bergmann presents his argument against the awareness requirement (and thereby 
intemalism) as follows:
A D ilem m a f o r  In te m a lism
I. A n essential feature o f  in tem alism  is that it m akes a su b je c t’s actual 
o r po ten tia l aw areness  o f  som e ju stif ica tio n -co n trib u to r a necessary 
cond ition  for the ju stifica tion  o f  any b e lie f  he ld  by  that subject.
II. The aw areness required  by in tem alism  is e ith er s tro n g  aw areness or 
w eak  aw areness.
III. I f  the aw areness required  by in tem alism  is strong  aw areness, then 
in tem alism  has v icious regress p rob lem s lead ing  to  rad ica l scep tic ism ...
IV. I f  the aw areness required  by in tem alism  is a w eak aw areness, then 
in tem alism  is vu lnerab le to the SPO , in w hich case in tem alism  loses its 
m ain m otivation  for im posing the aw areness requirem ent.
V. I f  in tem alism  e ither leads to radical scep tic ism  o r loses its m ain 
m otivation  for im posing the aw areness requ irem ent (i.e. avo id ing  the 
SPO ), then we should  not endorse in tem alism .
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VI. T herefore, we should not endorse in tem alism . (B ergm ann, 2006, p.
13-14)
‘Strong’ and ‘weak’ awareness are introduced as technical terms. Strong 
awareness involves “conceiving of the justification-contributor that is the object of 
awareness as being in some way relevant to the justification or truth of the belief’. 
(Bergmann, 2006, p. 13) Weak awareness, by contrast, involves no such conceiving. 
(Ibid.) I accept premise I since it merely expresses my Awareness Requirement, and I 
will accept premises II and V for the sake of argument. Also, I will argue that Bergmann 
is correct about premise IV for the reasons he gives; accordingly, I will respond to the 
dilemma by seizing its other horn -  I will show that Bergmann is wrong that strong 
awareness leads to vicious regress (premise III). By doing so I will vindicate the 
Awareness Requirement and the constraint on epistemic justification it imposes.
Being ‘weakly’ aware o f one’s ground for a given belief involves either i) not 
conceiving of the ground in any way, i.e. a non-conceptual awareness of the ground; or 
ii) while the ground is conceptualized as being a certain way, it is not conceived as 
relevant to the truth or justification of the belief it is meant to support. An example of 
non-conceptual weak awareness is the one experienced by, say, a cat watching a game of 
chess. The cat, presumably lacking the concept of chess, is seeing a situation in which 
chess is being played, but it does not see that a game of chess is being played. The cat is 
aware of chess being played by being consciously related to a state of affairs, but it is 
only weakly aware.
Conceptually weak awareness, on the other hand, consists o f the subject being 
aware of her ground, conceptualizing it as being a certain way, but failing to be aware of 
its relevance to what is believed. For example, say Jill believes that Jack is in the room.
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She also sees someone in the room who is in fact Jack dressed in a Santa Claus costume 
handing out presents to children. She is consciously aware of the person appearing a 
certain way. Further, she conceptualizes it as such. However, while she is aware of 
Jack’s presence in the room (because she sees him in a Santa outfit), she is not aware that 
Jack is in the room, since he is cleverly disguised in the costume. Jill fails to draw any 
connection between her believing that Jack is in the room and her conscious experience 
of what is in fact Jack in the costume. She fails to conceive of her perceptual experience 
as relevant to the justification of what she believes. Upon reflection, Jill is not aware of 
any reason to think that her belief that Jack is in the room is true.
Consider one final case to illustrate the difference between this kind of awareness 
and the strong awareness introduced above. Suppose someone simply looks in a room 
and seems to see that John is there and believes that John is there. Is this an instance of 
conceptually weak awareness? A reason to think so is that the subject need not be 
thinking (in any relevant sense) in terms of evidence or justification. The reason that the 
case as described so far is a case of weak awareness is that it is possible for the subject to 
have both the experience and the belief and not base the latter on the former, and in no 
way even potentially appreciate an evidential connection between them.
What needs to be the case in order for this example to be an instance of strong 
awareness is the addition of a further state: the subject is aware that the justification 
contributor (here, his visual experience o f John’s being in the room) is relevant to the 
truth or justification of what is believed (namely, that John is in the room). What this 
reveals is that strong awareness takes the form of a second order state. What one is aware
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of, or at least potentially aware of, is an evidential ‘fit’ between one’s grounds on the one 
hand, and what is believed on that basis, on the other. More on this below.
As Bergmann points out, if the subject is merely weakly aware of the grounds of 
his belief, e.g. non-conceptually aware or conceptually aware of the grounds, but not 
aware of any connection between the grounds and a supported belief, then that subject is 
vulnerable to the SPO. From the subject’s own perspective, it is an accident that what he 
believes is true, since from his own perspective, the status o f his belief is no better than a 
hunch or arbitrary conviction, or as I grant, at best a strong but groundless conviction 
(which is nevertheless incompatible with a belief being justified). But since the SPO is 
given against extemalism, if it applies here as well against weak awareness, this would 
undermine the Awareness Requirement.
Bergmann makes two further distinctions regarding strong awareness. First, 
strong awareness may be doxastic or non-doxastic. Doxastic strong awareness “involves 
the belief that the object of awareness is in some way relevant to the truth or justification 
o f the relevant belief.” (Bergmann, 2006, p. 14) Non-doxastic strong awareness is 
simply strong awareness that does not involve belief. But since it must involve the 
concept of justification, how can it involve such concepts without belief? It is true that 
such states o f awareness are conceptually laden, i.e. the subject must have certain 
concepts, such as justification and truth to be in the state, but the state is not itself a 
belief. Compare this to a conceptually laden perceptual experience: a subject must have 
certain concepts, such as a ‘cat’ and ‘mat’ for example, in order to be in the state of 
seeing that the cat is on the mat — but here the state itself is not a belief. Rather, it is a
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kind of experience. Similarly for non-doxastic strong awareness. I will develop this idea 
further below.
Secondly, strong awareness may be actual or potential. As the label suggests, 
strong actual awareness requires that the subject actually be aware, “whereas the potential 
strong awareness requirement demands only that the subject be able on reflection alone to 
be aware.” (Ibid.) If the awareness was non-propositional in form (a kind of weak 
awareness), then there could be actual awareness that only potentially gives rise to a state 
of justified belief. Such cases would be neither quite actual nor potential cases in the 
above sense. But as we saw in the Jack and Jill case above, non-propositional or other 
kinds of weak awareness are not justificationally relevant. What is required is 
specifically strong awareness, which may in turn be either actual or potential. Bergmann 
argues that all versions of strong awareness lead to objectionable regresses, and hence 
scepticism.
Take the obvious regress first generated by this principle:
Actual Doxastic Strong Awareness Requirement (ADSAR):
S ’s b e lie f  B is ju stified  only i f  (i) there is som eth ing , X , that 
con tribu tes to the ju s tifica tio n  o f  B and (ii) S is ac tua lly  aw are o f  
X in such a w ay that S ju stified ly  believes that X  is in som e way 
re levant to the appropria teness o f  ho ld ing  B. (B ergm ann , 2006, 
p. 14-15)
By demanding a further justified belief (as stated in (ii)) as a necessary condition 
of having any justified beliefs at all, it is easy to see how both a mental state and a 
complexity regress are generated. (Bergmann, 2006, p. 16) As Bergmann points out, for 
S’s belief B to be justified, it requires a further justified belief with respect to a further 
justification contributor (call it X I). This belief will be PI: “PI: XI is in some way 
relevant to the appropriateness of holding B.” (Ibid.)
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But this justified belief will, o f course, require a further justified belief about its 
grounds (call that ground X2). This belief will be P2: “P2: X2 is in some way relevant to 
the appropriateness of believing that XI is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of 
holding B.” (Ibid). The result here is that if ADSAR were true, we would require an 
infinite hierarchy of beliefs of ever-increasing complexity.
The fundamental objection here is that doxastic strong awareness generates a 
complexity regress, not a mental state regress. This can be seen if one makes the move 
from requiring actual to merely potential access. Here, an advocate of the position could 
argue that there is merely a potential infinite regress, not an actual infinite regress, so the 
regress is harmless, assuming that we could have an infinite number of dispositions to 
believe. (Bergmann, 2006, p. 16) While this move may block the mental state regress, it 
still requires us to be able to believe propositions o f infinite complexity. Since most of 
us cannot grasp even the third and fourth level propositions, given our cognitive limits, it 
is obvious that we are unable to grasp the infinitely complex. Accordingly, this theory 
predicts that we do not have any justified beliefs. Given that this is intuitively false, 
strong doxastic awareness (actual or potential) must be rejected. Or so Bergmann claims.
A Reply:
Consider again the problematic formulation of the strong access requirement that 
occurs in the requirement’s second conjunct:
Actual Doxastic Strong Awareness Requirement (ADSAR):
S ’s b e lie f  B is ju stified  only  if  (i) there  is som eth ing , X , that 
con tribu tes to  the ju stifica tio n  o f  B and (ii) S is ac tually  aw are o f  
X in such a w ay that S ju s ti f ie d ly  believes  that X is in som e w ay 
relevant to the appropria teness o f  ho ld ing  B. (em phasis  added)
(B ergm ann, 2006, p. 14-15)
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What generates the regress here is that it is assumed that the kind of strong awareness 
required is doxastic. The solution to Bergmann’s dilemma is to realize that there are 
forms of non-doxastic strong awareness that can contribute to a subject’s having non- 
inferential or immediate justification. To defend this claim, it is important to understand 
both what immediate justification and non-doxastic strong awareness are. In 1.5. I 
defended the claim that there is immediate justification, that is, justification that does not 
come from holding other justified beliefs. There I showed that putative examples of 
immediate justification prima facie  support the existence of immediate justification, and 
undermined the cogency of a central argument against them (i.e. the so-called Master 
Argument for Coherentism). With that in place, we can turn to non-doxastic strong 
awareness.
On Non-Doxastic Strong Awareness:
With an idea of what is meant by immediate justification, we can return to the 
idea that one’s non-doxastic strong awareness allows for immediate justification in a way 
that avoids the regresses that Bergmann advances. Recall that the motivation for the 
Content Requirement (see 1.5.) is a tendency to think that justifiers need to stand in 
evidential relations to the beliefs they justify. As we saw in chapter 1, Davidson says in 
defense o f the principle that only a belief can justify another belief, “Sensations [which 
have no representational content] cause some beliefs and in this sense are the basis or 
ground of those beliefs. But a causal explanation of a belief does not show how or why 
the belief is justified.” (Davidson, 2000, p. 157) For example, if  a belief is the product of 
a reliable belief-producing mechanism, that will explain why the subject believes as she
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does. But according to Davidson, unless the subject believes her belief is reliably 
produced, and bases her belief on this belief, the belief will not be justified. Appeal to a 
cause will explain why someone believes as he does, but not if he ought to believe as he 
does. Justification, Davidson holds, is established by appeal to reasons, and the only 
reasons available to us are our beliefs.
Recall further from chapter 1, that Davidson notes that perception is usually 
assumed to be epistemically relevant because it is what connects the world to our beliefs 
about it. (Ibid., p. 156) He claims that sensations are thought to be “candidates for 
justifiers because we often are aware of them. The trouble we have been encountering is 
that the justification seems to depend on awareness, which is just another belief.” 
(emphasis added) (Ibid., p. 157) Bergmann seems to think of awareness in a similar way 
as consisting largely only of beliefs, or if he does think that there are forms of awareness 
that are distinct from belief, e.g. he allows for a certain kind of non-conceptual ‘weak 
awareness’, he seems to think that they all share a property in common with belief that is 
problematic in this context, viz., the property of being apt for epistemic justification 
(which threatens to give rise to vicious regress).
Crucially, I deny that conscious awareness need just be another belief. Surely 
there are distinctions to be drawn between experiencing that p , believing that p, and the 
further state o f being aware that one is in these states, and the relations between them. 
The first is obviously a kind of experience that can be shown to be distinct from belief. 
For example, suppose one has a conscious perceptual experience of the Muller-Lyer 
illusion. In this case, one has an experience as of the lines appearing to be of unequal 
length. Having such an experience does not entail that one believes that they are unequal
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in length. If one is familiar with the illusion one will believe that the lines a r e  the same 
length, despite their appearance. This state is a belief, viz., an assertive a tt i tu d e  one takes 
to a proposition.
In addition to these two states, one can be aware that one is in them, and certain 
facts about them. The content of this awareness is how one’s experience a p p e a r s  to one, 
both in the sense of an awareness of the state’s representational content (i.e. one’s 
experience purports to say how the world is), as well as h o w  or in what w a y  the content is 
presented, e.g. as a perceptual experience with a certain phenomenal character, as 
opposed to a hoping or a wishing. The content o f a belief is just a p r o p o s i t io n  that 
purports to represent the way the world is, and one can be aware that one is in such a state 
while simultaneously being aware that one’s experience is such, and is relevant to what is 
believed.
Just as it can be shown that perceptual experience and perceptual belief are 
distinct, it can be shown that the kind of awareness I am interested in is distinct from 
those states as well. Obviously this kind of awareness is distinct from p e r c e p tu a l  
e x p e r ie n c e  since some lower creatures have perceptual experiences without this kind of 
awareness. First, the kind of awareness I am pointing to is a second order kind of ability 
that they lack, since they have only first order mental abilities.
Secondly, this kind of awareness is c o n c e p tu a l  in that one cannot be in it unless 
one possesses the constituent concepts required to represent the content of what one is 
aware. A kind of perceptual experience that I was considering above is also conceptual 
in this sense. For example, just as the cat cannot see th a t  a game of chess is being played 
without the concept of chess, the cat cannot be aware th a t  he is having a visual
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experience of that kind which supports a belief of his without possessing various fairly 
sophisticated concepts, e.g. chess, the concept of a perceptual experience, belief, etc. We 
of course possess such concepts, and as such this problem does not arise for us. But since 
lower order animals lack these kinds o f concepts, they do not have the capacity for this 
kind of awareness. Since they lack this awareness, but do have a capacity for a kind of 
perceptual experience, the two are distinct.
This kind o f awareness is also distinct from belief since someone can have a 
perceptual belief and a perceptual experience while lacking awareness of the relation 
between them, perhaps because they are distracted or otherwise inattentive. This is a 
kind of ‘weak’ awareness that is too weak to play a justificatory role, as I alluded to 
above in the formulation of Bergmann’s Dilemma. On the other hand, a subject might 
have awareness without belief, since she may have a defeater for her belief and rationally 
drop it, while still being aware of her perceptual experience, its prima facie  evidential 
import to a belief she held, etc. On the face of it, there is no reason to assume that this 
state of awareness that remains is itself a belief.
The fact that this kind of awareness is a kind of experience, rather than a belief, 
can be appreciated by noting that awareness, like other kinds of experiences, cannot be 
defeated. That is, suppose one seems to see a wombat in the garden and also believes 
that there is a wombat in the garden. If a doxastic defeater is introduced, e.g. the subject 
justifiably believes that he has been slipped a wombat image-inducing hallucinogen, and 
the subject is rational, he will suspend judgement on whether or not there is a wombat in 
the garden. What gets defeated is the subject’s belief, viz., he no longer believes that 
there is a wombat in the garden. But his perceptual experience remains unchanged. New
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beliefs do not affect the way things look to him. Similarly, the subject’s awareness that 
he is a having a certain perceptual experience, and its relation to what was believed, is 
not, and it seems cannot, be affected by defeaters -  unlike belief. Strong awareness, 
therefore, is distinct from belief, since the former cannot be affected by defeaters, 
whereas the latter can.
These considerations seem to show there is a kind of conscious awareness that is 
distinct from perceptual experience and belief. So my contention is that one can be 
simultaneously aware that: one’s experience is such, and, that one believes that things are 
as one’s experience represents them as being, as well as that the grounds stand in an 
evidential relation to what is believed. Such awareness is an instance of ‘strong’ non- 
doxastic awareness, and it (or its possibility upon reflection) is necessary for such a belief 
to be justified if the SPO is to be avoided. Of course one may also believe these things 
(i.e. believe that one is having a perceptual experience, believe that one’s grounds support 
what one believes, etc), in which case the question of how these higher order beliefs are 
justified arises, and a regress is generated. But again, there is no reason to assume that 
awareness must take a doxastic form.
But if one is strongly aware that these things are so, then does one not take them 
to be so? In which case, in what sense is the state non-doxastic? But this is to assume 
that the only way of ‘taking things to be so’ is in the form of belief. But obviously this 
does not follow. Things are ‘taken to be so’ when, roughly, they are represented 
assertively, which is to say, when they are represented as being a certain way. And belief 
is certainly one such state that functions in this way. But as we already noted in chapter 
1, perceptual experiences also represent things as being a certain way, and they are
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certainly non-doxastic. Similarly, I submit, with strong non-doxastic awareness. Thus, 
the following general inference is invalid:
a) A state is conceptually laden and represents its content assertively
b) Therefore, this state is necessarily a belief.
But perceptual experience is a counterexample to the above principle. There is no 
general reason, therefore, to assume that strong awareness must take a doxastic form, 
simply in virtue of its being conceptual and representing its content assertively. And no 
specific reason against the possibility of non-doxastic awareness seems forthcoming 
either.
Besides conceptually distinguishing strong awareness from one’s belief and one’s 
conscious experience, and noting that there is no reason to assume that such a state must 
take a doxastic form, can more be done to show that it actually exists? I hope to have 
motivated the need for such states because without it, one is left with ‘weak’ awareness, 
which I argued is too weak to play a justificatory role, since it gives rise to SPO. But 
without further positive argument, invoking strong awareness as a way of blocking 
Bergmann’s dilemma may seem like introducing a deus ex machina. Accordingly, I will 
now offer two arguments for the existence of states of strong awareness, which I will call 
the Argument From Introspection and the Transcendental Argument, respectively.
First, and most directly, one can detect one’s states o f strong awareness through 
introspection. When one attends to one’s visual experience of the kookaburra in tree, and 
one’s belief that that is a kookaburra, one can also be aware that one is in these states, as 
well as the evidential relation between them, i.e. that this experience is good grounds for 
this belief, since the latter can be justified on the basis o f the former. If through
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introspection one detects the state, and my earlier discussion functions as an elimination 
argument, i.e. the state is not a belief, it is not the first order experience, etc., then the 
state can be taken at face value: a state of strong awareness; a conscious experience that 
one is having a certain perceptual experience that justifies a belief that is based on it.
But is this empirically implausible? Would one normally say that one wanders 
around the world aware o f one’s own experiences and beliefs in this way? Admittedly 
one does not often attend to these experiences, and as such they tend to go unnoticed. 
But that is not to say that they are not there and that we cannot turn our attention to them 
if needed, e.g. in the course of defending the justification of one of our perceptual beliefs, 
if only to ourselves. It is an unreasonable expectation that if our mental life exhibits 
certain features, then these need to be constantly consciously manifest to us. Instances of 
strong awareness are no different in this regard.
For example, we have countless beliefs, the majority of which are not occurrent at 
one time. O f course we can call many of them to consciousness. But that is not to form 
the belief, but merely to recall it. The fact that the belief was not occurent until recalled 
does not show that it was not held. Even among mental states that one is actually 
conscious of at a time have aspects that go unnoticed. For instance, many o f these states 
have phenomenal properties, even though we do not attend to these aspects of the states. 
Consider again when one is conscious that the kookaburra is in the tree, but one fails to 
take notice of particular shade of its plumage until one attends to it. O f course we can 
identify such properties, and attend to them though introspection. But it is not as if these 
properties are created through introspection; they are just noticed through introspection, 
even though in a sense one was conscious of them the entire time.
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Similarly, states of strong awareness exist and can be detected through 
introspection, and this fact is not diminished by the fact that these states are not ones that 
we often attend to in the course of the daily lives. This in turn does not detract from the 
fact that they are necessary for epistemic justification to obtain and allow for a kind of 
rational defensibility if challenged.
Besides the above argument from introspection, I will also offer a transcendental 
argument for the existence of states of strong awareness. My general methodological 
approach throughout this thesis has itself been broadly transcendental: I have been 
arguing that given that we do have justified beliefs, what is a necessary condition of our 
beliefs enjoying such a property? To that end I have been defending an awareness 
requirement. The following argument is similarly transcendental in that I am enquiring 
into the necessary conditions of experience. To fix terms, what I mean here by a 
transcendental argument is one of the following form: since p  is a necessary condition for 
q, and since q is beyond dispute, therefore p  is the case.
What I take to be obvious and beyond dispute in this context is that we are 
justified in believing many, if  not most, of the things that we take ourselves to be justified 
in believing (see Introduction). What I also hope to have shown so far is that external 
factors (such as the reliability of a process) are insufficient for epistemic justification to 
obtain.41 A consequence of this is that the most radical forms of epistemic extemalism 
are false. To that end I have argued that a form of intemalism is true, namely one that 
embraces an awareness condition. That some form of conscious awareness is necessary 
for epistemic justification to obtain is an intuitive verdict, and one that I hope is also not
41 See chapters 3 and 4 for arguments that external factors (such as the reliability o f a process) are not 
necessary for epistemic justification to obtain, either.
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in dispute in this context. What remains at issue is what the nature of this conscious 
awareness consists o f  To that end, consider the following argument:
Transcendental A rgum ent f o r  S trong  A w areness:
i) Som e kind o f  aw areness is a necessary condition for ep istem ic ju s tifica tio n  obtain ing , 
(see section  1 o f  this chapter)
ii) Such aw areness is either ‘w eak ’ or ‘s tro n g .’ (see above)
iii) W eak aw areness is too w eak to be relevant for ju stifica tio n , since the SPO  w ould  still
apply.
iv) I f  the SPO  applies, then one does not have epistem ic ju stifica tio n .
v) W e do have epistem ically  ju stified  beliefs.
vi) T herefore the SPO  does not apply, (from  iv and v)
vii) T herefore the k ind o f  aw areness that m ust be present is not ‘w eak ’, (from  i, iii, iv, v
and vi)
v iii) T herefore the k ind o f  aw areness that m ust be presen t is ‘s tro n g ’, (from  ii, vii)
Since we do have justified beliefs, and awareness is required, but it cannot be 
weak awareness, then strong awareness must exist. That is, strong awareness is necessary 
for the possibility o f our having justified beliefs, and given that we obviously do have 
justified beliefs, strong awareness must exist. If it did not, scepticism would follow. But 
scepticism is false. Hence a transcendental argument for the existence of strong 
awareness.
It is worth noting that in mounting my transcendental argument I am arguing for a 
more modest conclusion that traditional transcendental arguments tend to aspire to. 
Traditional transcendental arguments tend to try to refute scepticisms of various kinds by
moving from some fact about our mental life that is beyond dispute to the truth of some 
extra mental proposition, e.g. Kant famously argues in the Critique o f  Pure Reason that, 
among other things, certain truths about space and time are necessary for the possibility 
of experience. I am not attempting to bridge the gap between the mental and extra mental 
by arguing that facts about the latter are necessary to account for obvious facts about the 
former.42 More modestly, I am merely arguing that it is a necessary condition of being in 
one mental state (having a justified belief) that we must be in another (having strong 
awareness); the latter is indispensable to the former.
The kind of strong awareness I am pointing to, like perceptual experience and 
beliefs, has a propositional content, in that its content is capable of being true or false. 
Again, my contention is that one can be simultaneously aware that: one’s experience is 
such, and, that one believes that things are as one’s experience represents them as being, 
as well as that the grounds stand in an evidential relation to what is believed. The kind of 
awareness I am highlighting, on the face of it, seems to be a second order kind of 
experience. Metaphorically, it is like “seeing that” something is the case. When one is 
having an experience as of hands, and one believes that one has hands, one can be aware 
that (or “see that”) one’s belief is evidentially supported by one’s experience. It is 
difficult to say what kind of experience this awareness is since one can be aware that so 
many radically different kinds of things are so, e.g. perceptual experiences, that one’s 
own mental states are such, etc. This may suggest that the awareness involved is a kind
42 To bridge that gap on the basis o f a transcendental argument seems difficult at best, and impossible at 
worst. As Barry Stroud has argued, it seems that at best a transcendental argument could establish how 
things must appear or what we must believe, rather than how they must be. He goes on to argue that this 
gap can only be closed by accepting idealism or verificationism, neither o f which seem like very plausible 
positions in their own right, let alone as responses to scepticism. See Stroud (2000). By not moving from 
the mental to the extra mental, my argument does not face this difficulty, since there is no gap between 
merely appearing to be strongly aware and being strongly aware. If 1 seem  to be aware that I am having a 
certain perceptual experience and that it justifies a belief o f mine that is based on it, then I am so aware.
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of sui generis mental state that shares many properties in common with other kinds of 
experience, without being identical to any one of them.
A concern needs to be addressed. Someone with Bergmann’s sympathies might 
object that if awareness and has propositional content, its epistemic status is an open 
question. However, certain kinds of perceptual experience are propositional, in that the 
nature of such experiences is that it appears that p, and that is presumably enough to 
allow it to stand in logical and evidential relations to beliefs. But we do not think 
perceptual experience would need, or even admit of, epistemic justification. Similarly, 
why think that awareness that p  would need, or could even admit of, epistemic 
justification? Intuitively, epistemic justification is a property of beliefs, not of 
propositional attitudes or experiences generally.
It seems odd to talk of my fearing that p  or hoping that p  or my experiencing that 
p  as being epistemically justified. For example, it seems a category error to say things 
like ‘My smelling that the toast is burnt is epistemically justified’ or ‘I have epistemic 
justification for my hearing that the car pulled into the garage’. The best explanation of 
this oddness is that smelling and hearing, as kinds of experiences, are not apt for 
epistemic justification. Similarly for awareness, given that it is a kind of experience, as I 
argued above. O f course, beliefs about one’s fear or hope or experience admit of 
epistemic justification, and those other propositional attitudes and experiences themselves 
may admit of other types of justification, such as moral, pragmatic or aesthetic. But 
epistemic justification, properly so-called, applies only to beliefs.
I agree with Davidson that things outside our ken are justificationally irrelevant, 
but it is a mistake to think our consciousness is limited to beliefs. We are also conscious,
or strongly aware, of our experience. It is these experiences that give us grounds for the 
justification of our non-inferential perceptual beliefs, combined with our non-doxastic 
awareness of them. Remember that, given the fundamentally first-person nature of the 
epistemic concept we are interested in, what interests us are reasons to which the subject 
can appeal in wondering if her beliefs are true, and thereby goes a step towards avoiding 
the SPO: if we are seeking grounds to think our beliefs are true, the grounds need to be 
accessible to us. If we want grounds that allow us to be aware from our own perspective 
of the non-accidental nature of the truth of our beliefs, the grounds need to be accessible 
to us in a certain kind of way. Non-representational states cannot serve as justifiers for 
the egocentric concept of justification, since while one might be able to aware o f  these 
states (a kind of weak awareness), one cannot be aware that these obtain in way 
necessary to avoid the SPO, as I hope to have shown above.
But now does one need to be aware of the awareness o f the connection between
sense experience and belief in order for that awareness to not fall prey to the SPO? That
is, if  a second level awareness is needed, is a third level o f awareness needed, and if so, is
a vicious regress not thereby generated? If not, why not, given the need for the extra
level of awareness in the first place? To answer this possible objection, it is important to
recall exactly what the SPO says:
R evised  S u b ject’s P erspective O bjection  (SP O ): I f  the  sub ject 
ho ld ing  a b e lie f is not aware o f  the b e l ie f s  g rounds, then she is 
not aware o f  how  its status is any differen t from  a stray 
hunch/arbitrary  conviction /strong  but g round less conviction . As 
such, i f  the subject regards her b e lie f  as ju s tified , she ough t to 
regard the fact that the b e lie f is ju s tif ied  as a brute fact. F rom  
that we may conclude that from  her ow n p erspective  she ough t to 
regard it as an accident that her b e lie f  is true, i.e. from  her 
perspective a b e lie f w hose ju stifica tio n  appears to be a b ru te  fact 
could ju s t as easily  be false. A nd that im plies that the b e lie f  is 
not justified .
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The SPO motivates the idea that when one is enquiring about the justificatory 
status of belief then a certain kind of awareness is required if that belief is indeed 
justified. As I argued above, ‘weak’ awareness is too weak for this purpose, and so a 
form of ‘strong’ awareness is needed. But to demand awareness of this state of 
awareness on the grounds of the SPO is to commit a category error. The SPO arises at 
the level of belief, and is relevant to whether or not that belief is justified for the subject. 
A state of strong awareness, by contrast, is neither a belief (it is a kind of experience), nor 
is it even apt for epistemic justification (again, given that it is a kind of experience), and 
so the SPO is inapplicable.
I hold that to be justified in believing that p  on the basis of a perceptual 
experience with the content p, one must be (or potentially be) aware that the experience is 
justifying evidence for one’s belief. I argued that such a state is necessary for epistemic 
justification to obtain. But it could hardly be a necessary condition of having an 
experience of a certain kind in general that one would need a further experience of it. If  
so, one could never have any experiences at all, since presumably having an infinite 
number o f experiences is impossible.43 Just as having a first order perceptual experience 
does not require a further state in order for it to be one of which one is consciously aware, 
similarly the kind of state that constitutes one’s strong awareness o f one’s ground and its 
relation to what is believed can be had without requiring further awareness of it. In short,
43 Perhaps allowing that a subject could have an infinite number o f dispositions to have the requisite 
experiences could block a mental state regress? Perhaps. However, the fundamental problem here is a 
complexity regress. While a subject can be aware of certain conscious states that she is in, most o f us do 
not have the capacity to be aware of many levels higher than that, since the content is too complex to grasp. 
Cf. p. 101-102 above for a discussion of mental state v. complexity regresses cast in terms o f belief rather 
than awareness.
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while the kind of non-doxastic strong awareness I advocate is motivated by the SPO 
when considering whether a perceptual belief is justified on the basis of a given 
perceptual experience, it is unmotivated, and surely unnecessary to require a third level 
awareness (or more) either as a condition of having strong awareness, or for strong 
awareness to play its essential justificatory role.
Someone might object that there is a difference between a belief having the 
property of justification, as opposed to showing or proving that one’s belief has 
justification. (Pryor, 2005, p. 194) The objection would hold that to conflate having 
justification and showing justification would simply be a version of what is called a 
“level confusion”, e.g. when one confuses being justified in believing that p  versus being 
justified in believing that one is justified in believing that p.44 I am aware of this 
distinction and I am not making this confusion. When we reject Norman’s belief about 
the President’s whereabouts, for example, we are rejecting it fo r  the reason that he has no 
access to grounds for his belief. We are not questioning his reasons to think that he is 
justified, we are questioning his justification simpliciter 45
A further constraint imposed by the Awareness Requirement is that one can only 
base beliefs on what is consciously accessible to one, i.e. beliefs or experiences that are 
conscious, or were conscious and can be easily brought to consciousness again. I am 
suggesting that it is a necessary condition of basing a belief on a ground that one 
appreciates the evidential relevance of the ground to the belief. The result is that
44 See Alston (1989d) for a discussion o f level confusions in epistemology.
45 Richard Fumerton makes a similar point in defense o f his Principle o f Inferential Intemalism. He defines 
the Principle of Inferential Intemalism as follows: “To be justified in believing one proposition p  on the 
basis o f another proposition E, one must be 1) justified in believing E and 2) justified in believing that E 
makes probable p ."  (Fumerton, 1995, p .36)
116
believing for a reason is “discriminative”. As Audi notes, in the case of one belief being 
based on another, if one’s supported belief is discriminative,
the b e lie f  that r does not qua  reason belief, or basis  belief, as we 
m ay call it, tend to give rise to or sustain ju s t any belief, but only 
those that S takes r to support; secondly , w here r is the only  
reason for w hich S believes /?, so far as S is d isposed  to explain 
or ju s tify  his b e lie f that p  (e.g. on being asked w hy he believes 
it), he i) spontaneously  tends to appeal to r, and ii) does not 
spontaneously  tend to appeal to o ther beliefs, in the explanatory  
o r ju stifica to ry  attem pt. (A udi, 1993a, p. 242)
Likewise, if one’s basic perceptual belief is based on a conscious perceptual experience, 
that experience will justify some beliefs and not others, namely beliefs one takes the 
experience to support (where this ‘taking’ is strong non-doxastic awareness). Where the 
experience is the only reason for the belief, one will tend to spontaneously appeal to 
one’s experience as the basis of one’s belief if asked to justify one’s belief. Such a 
relation ensures that our justified beliefs are not mere effects o f their grounds, but rather 
are guided by our grounds.
On the model of internalist non-inferential justification that I am proposing, my 
justification for my belief that /?, where p  is a perceptual belief about the external world, 
is a perceptual experience with the content p. It is an essential feature of that experience, 
if it is to count as a justifier, that in addition to it I have (or potentially have) strong non- 
doxastic awareness of my grounds. My conscious awareness o f the experience is directly 
and immediately available to me simply in virtue of having the perceptual experience. 
As a perceptual experience, it can stand in justificatory relations to beliefs without it 
being apt for epistemic justification, since it is not a belief. Similarly, my non-doxastic 
strong awareness of the perceptual experience satisfies the internalist’s condition, without
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being apt for epistemic justification either, since it is not a belief, and therefore no 
justificatory regress (complexity or mental state) is generated.
But as I introduced with the Awareness Requirement, there is more to being 
epistemically justified than mere awareness: there must actually be something that 
contributes to one’s justification that one is aware of. Only certain kinds of things that 
one is aware of will justify certain kinds of beliefs (e.g. imagining that I will win the 
lottery does not justify my belief that I will win the lottery). In the case of perceptual 
belief, that ground is obviously a perceptual experience of a certain kind. What 
properties this ground must have if it is to function as a justifier is a question to be 
addressed throughout the rest of this thesis. What I hope to have shown here, however, is 
how internalists can avoid a fundamental dilemma that threatens vicious regress. Our 
beliefs are justified since we are (or can be upon reflection) strongly aware of reasons to 
think our beliefs are true in a way that blocks Bergmann’s Dilemma since this awareness 
is non-doxastic. In other words, my belief is egocentrically justified since I am non- 
doxastically strongly aware, from the first person perspective, o f a reason to think my 
belief is true in a way that avoids the SPO and blocks Bergmann’s dilemma.
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e
T h e  C a s e  o f  t h e  N e w  E v i l  D e m o n : Is  ( A c t u a l ) R e l i a b i l i t y  N e c e s s a r y  f o r
J u s t i f i c a t i o n ?
3.1. Introduction:
In Chapter 2 I introduced Laurence Bonjour’s cases of clairvoyance as a way of 
showing that external factors are insufficient for justification. Similar style arguments 
have been offered to show that external factors, such as the reliability of the mechanism 
supporting the belief, are not necessary for justification. Hence, justification is an 
entirely internal matter.
The main argument in support of the conclusion involves cases of comparing 
what constitutes justified belief in the actual world with one’s counterpart who lives in a 
demon world, like the one entertained in Descartes’ First Meditation.46 As the New Evil 
Demon problem was first introduced, it was claimed that the demon world is one which 
by hypothesis is, from our perspective, just like the actual world. Different versions of 
the thought experiment might be stronger or weaker, that is, the demon may deceive the 
subject about different ranges of beliefs. For example, in the most radical versions the 
demon hypothesis, the demon might threaten not only the justification of our perceptual 
beliefs, but also our justification for seemingly self-evident truths, like Descartes’ Cogito, 
simple logical or analytic truths, or beliefs about the current contents o f our own minds.47
46 I take it that the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Evil Demon problems involve the same thought experiment, but draw 
different conclusions from it. The ‘old” problem is the sceptical one, viz., how do we know that we are not 
dreaming or are the victims o f an evil demon that is radically deceiving us? The ‘new ’ problem concerns 
justification, viz., do our counterpart demon victims differ from us in epistemic justification?
47 Jonathan Schaffer argues that there is a demon with unlimited sceptical range who threatens universal 
doubt. Rather than deceiving us with falsities, the debasing demon, as he calls it, would allow us true
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A more modest evil demon scenario is one where what we experience and believe 
is just like in the actual world, except the demon ensures that all our perceptual beliefs 
are false. It is this kind of demon scenario that will be the primary focus of this chapter. 
If sound, the argument based on comparing counterpart subjects in this demon world and 
the actual world purports to show that external factors are not necessary for justification. 
Further, and crucial for our purposes here, the argument also purports to show that the 
two subjects are justificationally equivalent, and so intemalism about justification is 
supported, as I will explain.
As I will discuss below, many philosophers who have been moved by arguments 
presented by externalists about mental content deny that such a case is possible. That is, 
they deny that there could be a world where a counterpart has all the same beliefs that we 
do, but that all o f their beliefs are false (because given extemalism about content, what 
beliefs the counterparts have may be different). Since many people hold that some form 
of content extemalism is obviously true, if it is incompatible with epistemic intemalism, 
this would seriously threaten my internalist position. However, I hold that the necessity 
of the awareness requirement that I introduced in chapter 2 remains substantially 
unaffected no matter which view of content turns out to be correct. What is key to the 
thought experiment is that the two worlds are completely subjectively indistinguishable 
from each other by those who inhabit them in all the ways that they are consciously 
aware of, which is what matters for epistemic justification. I will argue that even if a 
standard moral of the New Evil Demon intuition is untenable due to considerations 
arising from content extemalism, the case can be reinterpreted to support the awareness
beliefs, but meddles with the basing relation in a way that undermines justification. For details see Schaffer 
(manuscript).
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requirement on justification that I introduced in chapter 2 in a way that is wholly 
compatible with content extemalism.
In the final part of the chapter I consider other reasons offered by John McDowell 
to reject the New Evil Demon intuition. I consider McDowell’s position since he is not a 
paradigm epistemic externalist (in fact, according to Neta and Pritchard (2007), he is a 
kind of epistemic internalist) and yet he rejects the New Evil intuition. If his case is 
convincing, it will both undermine a motivation for the kind of intemalism I endorse, plus 
it will undermine a central claim of mine, namely, that external factors are not necessary 
for epistemic justification obtaining. I will try to show that McDowell’s arguments leave 
my position unscathed. That is, factors external to the subject’s conscious awareness, 
such as the actual reliability of the belief forming mechanism used in a world, are not
48necessary for epistemic justification to obtain.
48 Even if actual reliability is not required, might conditional reliability be necessary for epistemic 
justification to obtain? For example, even if the subject’s beliefs are not reliably formed in the actual 
world, perhaps due to the meddlings o f an evil demon, must they need to be reliable in some ‘normal’ 
world if they are to be epistemically justified? I will explore and reject proposals o f these kinds in chapter 
4.
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3.2. What is the “New Evil Demon” Intuition?
Stewart Cohen, who originally introduced the New Evil Demon problem, notes 
that if Reliabilism about justification is true, (i.e. a belief is justified iff it is the product of 
a reliable belief-forming process), then in the case of the demon world, perceptual beliefs 
will never be justified since they are always false. (Cohen, 1984, p. 281) O f course a 
Reliabilist can maintain that some false beliefs can be justified, since while false, they 
may still be the product of a process that is generally reliable. Even so, as a New Evil 
Demon case is set up, the relevant class of the subject’s beliefs are always false, as the 
demon ensures, and so they are unreliably produced, and hence unjustified by Reliabilist 
lights.4950
Cohen argues as follows:
T hus we can im agine tw o inhabitan ts o f  this [dem on] w orld, A, 
w ho is a good reasoner, i.e., reasons in accordance w ith the 
canons o f  inductive in ference, and B, w ho engages in confused 
reasoning , w ishful th ink ing , reliance on em otional a ttachm ents, 
guessw ork, etc. S ince the beliefs o f  A  and B are bo th  produced 
by unreliab le  processes (the evil dem on sees to this), a re liab ilist 
theory  o f  ju stifica tio n  m ust render identical ep istem ic appraisals 
o f  bo th  sets o f  beliefs. P lain ly , this cannot be correct. A ’s 
beliefs are conditioned  by the evidence w hereas B ’s beliefs are 
not. A is a good reasoner w hereas B is not. A ’s beliefs are
49 But even if such processes are not reliable in the actual world in which they are deployed, are they not 
reliable in some sense? Might they be conditionally reliable in the sense that they are reliable in some 
‘normal’ world, and hence resulting beliefs are epistemically justified? Again, I will explore and reject 
proposals o f these kinds in chapter 4.
50 Reliabilism and the issue of false justified beliefs give rise to another potential complication. Suppose 
that a subject validly infers some beliefs from others. Can these beliefs not be justified, even for the 
reliablist, since certain patterns of inference are reliable? O f course in these cases they may generate 
falsehoods since the premises are false, but the patterns employed themselves are in general reliable. What 
consequence does this have for epistemic justification?
While some beliefs arrived at in this way may be justified, it is hard to say in general what is true of such 
cases, since there does not seem to be a straightforward connection between valid inference and 
justification. Valid inference is neither necessary nor sufficient for justification. It is not necessary: many 
o f our justified beliefs are justified non-inferentially, e.g. beliefs in certain conceptual truths, beliefs about 
our own bodily sensations, etc. It is not sufficient: simply because one believes that p , and one believes 
that if p  then q, it does not follow that one is justified in believing that q. Sometimes the rational thing to 
do is to believe that ~p instead. As Gilbert Harman has argued, rules o f logical implication are one thing, 
and rules o f reasoning are another. See Harman (1986).
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reasonable w hereas B ’s b e lie f are not. There is a fundam ental 
ep istem ic d ifference betw een the beliefs o f  A and the beliefs o f  
B. But the R eliabilist does not have the theoretical m eans to 
d isplay  this difference. I w ould claim  that the d istinction  
betw een the beliefs o f  A and B is m arked prec ise ly  by the 
concept o f  ju stified  belief. (C ohen, 1984, p. 283)
Cohen anticipates what the Reliabilist could say about justification here: while the 
beliefs of A in the demon world may be “rational” or “reasonable”, this does not affect 
her justificatory status. (Ibid.) The subject in the demon world has no justification 
because, on the Reliabilist’s account, she lacks reliably true beliefs, which they take as a 
necessary condition for justification. So even if A and B in the demon world did have the 
odd true belief, for example, it would fail to be justified, let alone constitute knowledge, 
because from an epistemic point of view, the truth of the belief was accidental (a kind of 
demon-created Gettier-case). Cohen rejects this Reliabilist move, saying that 
“reasonable” and “rational” are “virtual synonyms” for “justified”, so that if one 
concedes that the subjects are rational and reasonable, one is also thereby conceding they 
are justified too. Cohen is right that intuitively the subject A in the demon world does 
have justified beliefs, and we should hold on to this conclusion unless we have a good 
reason to give it up. What remains at issue is if  externalists of different stripes (e.g. about 
mental content, or justification) can give us such a reason.
A further moral is often drawn from cases like the above in defense of epistemic 
intemalism. Just as subject A and B are not equally justified, even though they are 
equally unreliable, it is often claimed that subject A, the good reasoner, is just as justified 
as his good-reasoner counterpart in the actual world. Call A ’s good-reasoner counterpart 
in actual world A*. Intuitively, A and A* are equally justified in believing as they do. If 
so, again actual reliability and other external factors are not necessary for justification
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since the two subjects are equally justified and the external factors are present in one case 
and not another.
I agree with what we can call the New Evil Genius View (NEG), which Ram Neta 
and Duncan Pritchard define as follows: “(NEG) The extent to which S is justified at t in 
believing that p  is just the same as the extent to which S’s recently envatted duplicate is 
justified at t in believing that p .” (Neta and Pritchard, 2007, p. 381) As they rightly point 
out, this is a deeply rooted intuition that counts in favour of epistemic intemalism. They 
add the qualifier “recently envatted” as way of trying to skirt the problematic issues of 
content extemalism.51 Depending on the kind of content extemalism endorsed, this 
qualifier may be sufficient to handle the problems I will discuss below. If not, as I will 
explain, the intuitive support of the New Evil Demon case is not lost in support of 
epistemic intemalism as I conceive of it (by embracing the awareness condition) even if 
the most austere forms of content extemalism are true.
51 But does their qualifier do that? It depends on the details o f the content extemalism endorsed. However, 
demonstratives might be thought to pose a special problem here nevertheless. Suppose that a subject S 
believes that that object is red. His twin S* cannot have that same thought since he is hallucinating. So 
there is at least one proposition that S is justified in believing that S* is not. Pritchard and Neta’s 
formulation does not avoid this potential problem. But as I will argue below, such results are compatible 
with the kind o f epistemic intemalism I endorse. Key here will be how “sameness” of justification between 
twins is understood.
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3.3. Content Externalism:
Before it is possible to see if epistemic internalism and content externalism are 
incompatible, it is necessary to understand what these theories amount to. In chapter 2 
we saw that epistemic internalism should be understood as the view that holds that the 
awareness condition is necessary for justification, viz.,
The A w areness R equirem ent: S ’s is ju stified  in believ ing  that p  only if
i) there is som eth ing , X , that con tribu tes to the ju stif ica tio n  o f  B; and
ii) For all X that con tribu tes, S is aw are (or po ten tia lly  aw are) o f  X.
Recall that in Chapter 2 I motivated and defended ii), as well as considered the nature of 
such awareness. I will address i) more fully in Chapter 5. What I did stress in Chapter 2 
was that by a factor ‘contributing’ to one’s justification I do not mean that one needs to 
be aware of only some of the justificatory elements, and not others. My view, as it 
continues to emerge, is that all things on which epistemic justification turns must be such 
that the subject is aware or potentially aware of them. And what kinds of things can a 
subject be aware o f that are justificationally relevant? As I will argue in this chapter, 
only those things which a subject would share in common with his envatted duplicate, as 
the New Evil Demon case reveals.
Content internalism/extemalism are theories about the nature of intentional 
mental content (what one’s thoughts are about), and how it is fixed or determined. How 
the views are best formulated turns on other views one might hold in the philosophy of 
mind, e.g. the status of Physicalism (roughly, the view that everything, and therefore the
mind, is in some sense ‘physical’).52 In formulating the views as generally as possible, 
one would want to include traditional content internalists who are not Physicalists. But 
for simplicity and ease of exposition, I will formulate the views in terms that presuppose 
the truth of Physicalism.53 Of course the definitions can be altered to make them more 
inclusive if desired.
So assuming the truth of Physicalism, we may put some of the possible views as 
follows:
C ontent In terna lism -P : The conten t o f  an ag en t’s m ental states supervene upon his in trinsic 
physical properties.
Is content externalism the denial of internalism? If so, it is far from obvious. 
While holding that content does not supervene on intrinsic physical states, someone may 
consistently deny that content is determined by external factors. Perhaps content is some 
sui generis feature alongside the subject’s intrinsic physical states and the external world. 
Accordingly, we should understand the denial of Content Intemalism-P as follows:
N on-In ternalism -P : A t least som e o f  the conten t o f  an ag en t’s m ental states fa ils  to supervene 
upon his in trinsic  physical properties.
Besides merely denying content internalism, Content Externalism makes a 
positive claim that includes some determination relation, such as supervenience, to the 
subject’s environment. Accordingly, we may understand it thus:
C ontent E xternalism -P : A t least som e o f  the co n ten t o f  an a g e n t’s m ental states fails to
supervene upon his intrinsic physical properties, but rather, is essen tia lly  dependent on his 
physical environm ent (includ ing  his social env ironm ent).
52 The formulation of Physicalism is not a trivial matter. For scepticism that the doctrine can be formulated 
in way that is both true and informative, see Crane and Mellor (1990). For a more optimistic line on saying 
precisely what Physicalism amounts to, see Jackson (1998) ch 1.
531 will indicate this presence of this presupposition by affixing ‘-P’ to the labels o f the positions.
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Fortunately for my purposes here, I do not have to take a stand on the truth of 
Physicalism, or what the exact relation is (if any) between a subject’s thoughts and the 
external environment. The view that Physicalists, non-Physicalists, Content Externalists 
and Non-Internalists can all agree upon, which threatens to be incompatible with the kind 
of epistemic internalism I endorse, can be put as follows:
N on-In ternalism  (G eneral): At least som e o f  the conten t o f  an ag e n t’s m ental states fails to 
supervene upon the phenom enal features o f  his m ental states.
That is, what a subject’s thought is about (viz., what proposition he is entertaining) does 
not depend upon how things seem to him. According to this view, which most of my 
opponents will accept, two subjects can seem to be aware of all the same things, and yet 
the contents of their thoughts differ. If this is true, this might seem to threaten my 
interpretation of the New Evil Demon case and undermine its support for the kind of 
epistemic internalism that I am defending.
Content externalism is often presented as obvious on the basis of a style of 
thought experiment first introduced by Hilary Putnam, and later developed by Tyler 
Burge. (Putnam, 1973; Burge, 1979) In Putnam’s examples, we are asked to imagine 
two worlds that are nearly identical in every respect. The only difference is that on our 
planet, the stuff in lakes and rivers that we call “water” is H20, whereas on Twin earth, 
the stuff the inhabitants call “water” actually has the molecular structure XYZ -  
otherwise the two substances are indistinguishable. We are asked to suppose further that 
the year is 1750 so that molecular structures have yet to be discovered.
Now Oscar, an inhabitant of earth, has beliefs and other attitudes about water, 
which he expresses in language with the word “water”. His twin, Twin Oscar, Putnam 
suggests, has beliefs and other attitudes NOT about water, since water is H20, but rather
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about XYZ, (which we can call twater), even though he expresses these thoughts in his 
language with the word “water”. So the claim is that when Oscar says, for example, ‘I 
want a drink of water’, he is not saying the same things as Twin Oscar when he says T 
want a drink of water’. Support for this claim comes from noting that since when Oscar 
utters the above remark he says something true, and when Twin Oscar utters it he would 
be saying something false if by “water” he meant water (since the word “water”, stands 
not for H20, but XYZ in his world). Therefore, they cannot be asserting the same 
proposition. Putnam’s own conclusion about his case is that the “meaning” of terms, 
which he takes to be their “extension” (roughly, a term’s extension is the set of things it 
applies to) is not determined purely psychologically, but depends on how the world is. 
Hence Putnam’s famous dictum, “meaning’s just ain’t in the head”.
The kind of externalism here is generally taken to not be limited to just meanings, 
or a purely linguistic externalism, but to thought contents. The Twin Earth thought 
experiments are taken to support content externalism generally, understood here as the 
view that two different thoughts can be had by internally identical subjects. So despite 
being internally identical, Oscar has a water (H 20) thought; Twin Oscar has a twater 
(XYZ) thought, which, while very similar, are not the same thought, since their truth- 
conditions differ. They have different beliefs about the stuff found in lake and rivers 
since what it is they believe, i.e., the content of their belief, is the content it is because of 
the environments the subjects find themselves in.
Tyler Burge presents two arguments for this stronger conclusion as the best 
interpretation of Putnam’s cases in his paper “Other Bodies”. (Burge, 1982) The 
conclusion of the first argument is that if  Twin Oscar could genuinely have a water
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thought, rather than a twater thought, it would be genuinely mysterious how this is 
possible since he has never had any contact with water, or even with anyone who has. As 
Burge points out, no one on Twin Earth even uses a word that means water, since their 
word means XYZ. (Burge, 1982, p. 109) The driving premise of this argument is that 
for someone to think that p, where p  is a proposition, it is a necessary condition of such a 
thought that the subject possesses the concepts that constitute the proposition. For 
example, one cannot believe that the cat is on the mat unless one has the concepts of ‘cat’ 
and ‘mat’. If concepts are the ‘building blocks’ of thoughts, then without concepts, one 
lacks the building materials to construct thought. It is difficult to see how empirical 
concepts like water could be acquired in non-empirical ways. Surely no one would insist 
that Twin Oscar could have a belief about water because he possessed the concept of 
water innately!
Still, what I remain unclear about is whether empirical concepts being acquired 
empirically is supposed to be a necessary truth, or whether it is mere contingently true 
about beings who are constituted as we are. For example, is it possible that by some 
freak occurrence (such as being struck by lightening, or being exposed to a kind of 
radiation) Twin Oscar could acquire the water concept even though there is none in is 
environment? If so it would be an “empty” concept, in the sense of having a meaning but 
having no extension? Or it would have neither a meaning nor an extension?
I am raising this question to see what the commitments of externalism are. While 
empirical concept acquisition on the face of it may seem to pose special problems for 
externalists, these problems may be no different for internalists about content. That is, 
acquiring concepts need not in general happen by perceptual encounter with samples.
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Many of us have the concept of a mongoose, yet few of us have encountered one. Also, 
externalism itself allows that someone could have a concept innately, or acquire it from 
God, so long as the subject was situated in a suitable environment. I will have to leave 
these issues unresolved here.
Burge’s second argument that thought contents are individuated externally is that 
if they were not, then a large number of Twin Oscar’s beliefs would be false. That is, if 
Oscar has the water concept, then any of his beliefs about the stuff in his world that fills 
the lakes and rivers would be false since he would believe falsely of XYZ that it was 
water (which is necessarily H20). Burge argues that since “their beliefs were acquired 
and relate to their environments in exactly parallel and equally successful ways”, it is 
implausible to hold that many of Twin Oscar’s beliefs are false.” (Ibid. p. 10) I am not 
sure whether this argument actually establishes content externalism or merely 
presupposes it, but it does seem a nevertheless counter-intuitive result, if correct, that if 
Twin Oscar had the concept water, his beliefs about twater would be false.
The conclusion of this second argument can be strengthened if one realizes that a 
Twin Earth philosopher could reason in ways parallel to Burge and Putnam. He could 
argue that if  the subjects on Earth (which he would call ‘Twin Earth’) had the twater 
concept, then many of their beliefs about H20 would be false. They would use the words 
‘I believe that stuff in the ocean is water’, but they would be believing falsely since their 
word ‘water’ refers to the concept XYZ and there is no XYZ in their world. All they are 
acquainted with is H20. If one is drawn to the conclusion that Twin Earthians have 
mostly true beliefs about the liquid in their lakes and rivers and we on earth have mostly 
true beliefs about the liquid in our lakes and rivers, then since the truth-conditions of the
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beliefs of the respective world inhabitants are different, this might be thought to offer 
some evidence that mental content is externally determined.54 I will tentatively accept 
this conclusion for the purposes of this chapter.
But perhaps Putnam/Burge-style thought experiments that invoke Natural Kinds 
are not necessary to show the appeal of content externalism. It seems obvious that we 
can think about the world. A more direct route to externalism, therefore, may come from 
thinking about proper names. Take the name Prime Minister Trudeau, as I use it. If  I am 
asked for an explanation of its significance I would quite simply point to the fifteenth 
Prime Minister of Canada and say it is his name. He is the thing that has been assigned 
the name Trudeau. I take it that it cannot have been assigned to him in a world where he 
never existed.
Suppose on Twin Earth there was a Twin Trudeau, whom they called ‘Trudeau’. 
Even if superficially like Trudeau, obviously the name ‘Trudeau’ in that world would 
mean Twin Trudeau, not Trudeau. So although being remarkably similar to Trudeau 
(Oscar), Twin Earthians are not speaking the same language or thinking about the same 
thing. If this is correct, then at least some content is externally individuated. Again, I 
will tentatively accept this conclusion for the purposes o f this chapter since my aim is not 
defend content externalism, but to merely convey its general appeal, and then assess its 
compatibility with the kind of epistemic internalism I am defending.
Before moving on to epistemic intemalism/extemalism, I want to raise one 
puzzling issue about content externalism. Content externalists are committed to saying 
that in order to have a thought about something, it is necessary that one have a concept of
54 This is far from conclusive, however. For example, surely the meaning o f T  is internally determined. 
If Oscar and his twin each think a thought employing the first-person indexical, the thoughts have different 
truth conditions -  even though their meaning is determined internally.
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that thing. To have a concept of a thing, they maintain, it is necessary that such things 
exist in one’s environment. Given this, it is not entirely clear to me what a content 
externalist can plausibly say about thoughts we have about non-existent objects. 
Presumably, if unicorns existed, they would be a natural kind, which, through either 
direct or indirect contact with unicorns, I could acquire the unicorn concept and thereby 
have thoughts about unicorns.55 But unicorns do not exist, so, given externalism, I do not 
have the unicorn concept? Consequently, if externalism is true, can I not have unicorn 
thoughts?
For example, if this interpretation is correct, I cannot believe that if unicorns 
existed, they would have a horn; or for that matter, I cannot even believe that unicorns do 
not exist. It seems counter-intuitive to say that when I believe that unicorns do not exist I 
do not believe anything at all. I do -  it is that they do not exist! I am not sure how 
externalists propose to answer satisfyingly this query. I raise it in part to cast doubt on 
externalism since if content externalism is false, it is not incompatible with epistemic 
internalism. But I also raise the concern to provide an opportunity to clarify what the 
externalist commitments are.
In response I suppose that a committed externalist could say that it is obvious that 
we do think and talk about external objects, and our claims and thoughts do relate to 
them. They could go on to admit that there are some other cases, such as thought about 
unicorns and other non-existent objects, to which their general account does not apply,
55 On the other hand, perhaps ‘unicorn’ is a mock natural kind term. There are no unicorns to observe so 
how can we say what they are like (other than that they do not exist)? We do have a conception o f their 
superficial features such as their shape and colour. But superficial features do not define a species. In fact, 
we all allow that there could be two animal kinds that are superficially identical, and yet be different 
species. If so, this might suggest that ‘unicorn’ is an ersatz natural kind term, in which case the term may 
be semantically deficient, which in turn might make thoughts about unicorns a special case of what is true 
o f thoughts in general.
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and these therefore pose a special problem. The fact that there are such special cases 
does not mean that the externalist treatment of the normal case is incorrect. Or so they 
could maintain. Also, in anyone’s view we can construct concepts. To take Hume’s 
example, we have the concept o f ‘the Golden Mountain’, even though the concept is not 
instantiated. Instead, it seems to be built up of the more simple concepts ‘gold’ and 
‘mountain’. Again, I will have to leave these issues unresolved here, but just raise these 
issues in part to cast doubt on externalism since if content externalism is false, it is not 
incompatible with epistemic internalism, and also in part to provide an opportunity to 
clarify what the externalist commitments are.
With this potential problem highlighted, I will now turn to Timothy Williamson’s 
claim that epistemic internalism is incompatible with content externalism.
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3.4. A Reply to Williamson on the Incompatibility of Epistemic Internalism and 
Content Externalism:
On Williamson’s construal of content externalism, “two internal duplicates may 
differ in what they believe or have propositional attitudes towards.” (Williamson, 2007, 
p. 2) He takes this conclusion to be established by the Putnam-Burge style thought 
experiments I introduced above. Williamson’s expresses the basis o f incompatibility as 
follows:
It is not in d ispute that we can pick an exam ple in w hich O scar’s 
b e lie f that there are pools o f  w ater is ju stified . P erhaps he is 
sw im m ing in one. Thus O scar has the ju stified  b e lie f  that there 
are pools o f  w ater. But Tw in O scar lacks a ju stif ied  b e lie f that 
there are pools o f  w ater, because he lacks the b e lie f  that there are 
pools o f  water. Thus O scar and Tw in O scar d iffer in their 
ju stified  beliefs, even though they are internal duplicates.
L ikew ise, o f  course, Tw in O scar has the ju stified  b e lie f  that there 
are pools o f  tw ater, w hile O scar lacks a ju stified  b e lie f  that there 
are pools o f  tw ater, because he lacks the b e lie f  that there are 
pools o f  twater: that is ju s t another difference in ju stified  b e lie f 
betw een O scar and Tw in O scar. (W illiam son, 2007, p . 3)
Williamson’s point seems to be that Oscar and his Twin are internally alike and yet, 
given externalism, there are differences in their justified beliefs, which according to him 
is contrary to the epistemic internalist’s thesis. So if the two are internally identical, then 
what they are justified in believing must be the same. But since what they are justified in 
believing is different, epistemic internalism is false since it maintains sameness of 
justification between counterparts.
The question is, are Oscar and his twin internally identical? It seems so. They are 
internally the same, i.e. crucially for our purposes there is nothing subjectively 
distinguishable between them, but the content o f their thoughts is nevertheless not 
internally determined. What move can be made against Williamson’s charge that
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epistemic internalism is incompatible with content externalism? As we will see, 
everything depends upon what is meant by ‘sameness’ of justification.
The first thing to note is that the New Evil Demon Intuition supports the 
awareness condition, that is, one’s counterpart is equally justified in believing the content 
he does on the basis he does, as we are in believing our counterpart contents based on 
counterpart evidence in our world. For example, where we have a justified belief about 
water based on awareness of water, our twin is justified in believing things about t-water 
on the basis of his awareness of t-water. To be sure, our twin has no more or no less 
justification than we do for believing what he does, nor is he justified in believing no 
more or no fewer things than we are, for we are both aware of the same kinds of things. 
In that sense our justification is the “same”, and this sameness is explained in part by the 
fact that the awareness condition is met. But that is not to say that internal duplicates are 
identically justified, since for one, they are believing different propositions (on the 
assumption that content externalism is true).
What is also important is that the subjects are internally alike in an important 
sense. This is NOT in the sense that the content of their belief is the same (since it is not 
given content externalism), but that if  what it is like for them is the same, that is, if  there 
is no phenomenal difference between them, then the same kinds of propositions are 
justifiable for them, whether or not they believe them.56 The sameness in how things 
seem to them must mean that any differences between them must be ones that transcend
56 This reflects the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. One way of putting this 
distinction is that propositional justification is what one has justification to believe. Doxastic justification, 
on the other hand, is when one is justified in believing as one does, based on the grounds one does. 
Doxastic justification, therefore, is propositional justification plus proper basing. This is the difference 
between believing that p  with justification as opposed to simply having justification to believe that p  but 
either: do not believe that p, or, one believes that p  but for the wrong reasons. See chapter 1 as well as 
Audi’s The Structure o f  Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) chs. 7 and 9 for his 
precise formulation o f the distinction.
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what they are in a position to be conscious of; what is accessible to them must be the 
same in the sense of being indistinguishable to them if they consciously attend to it.
What I am suggesting is that a phenomenally indistinguishable experience can be 
shared by Oscar and Twin Oscar and be the basis of their justification for different 
propositions. The New Evil Demon case, therefore, also supports Fallibilism, conceived 
here as the view that a subject can be justified in believing something false, since the 
New Evil Demon case can be set up to provide a vivid example of subjects who believe 
falsely, but are nonetheless justified. Suppose Oscar and his twin are being ‘appeared to 
water-ly’, that is, they have perceptual experiences that are phenomenally 
indistinguishable from each other of a clear, colourless, odourless liquid that fills lakes 
and streams. In fact, this stuff is phenomenally indistinguishable from what on Oscar’s 
planet is water and what is on Twin Oscar’s planet is twater. If one were being appeared 
to by water, one by twater, neither could tell the difference if presented with the other. 
Suppose further that the liquid they are actually presented with is neither water nor 
twater, but rather a nearly identical liquid, save for the fact it is composed of the 
molecules QRS. Now if content externalism is true, neither Oscar nor his twin can have 
thoughts about QRS since neither possesses the concept.
But what beliefs does the perceptual experience of QRS justify? It justifies Oscar 
and his twin, for example, in believing the following propositions: that the substance 
appearing before him is drinkable; that the substance appearing before him is wet; that 
the substance appearing before him is the one that fills lakes and rivers, etc. Importantly, 
such an experience would justify Oscar in believing that he is being presented with water.; 
similarly (though not identically), Twin Oscar is justified in believing that he is being
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presented with twater. In effect, given epistemic internalism, the same phenomenal 
visual experience can justify contrary propositions, even if the intentional content of that 
experience is a different proposition, making what they believe false. Hence justified 
belief is fallible.
Furthermore, it seems Williamson distorts what it means to say that if two people 
are internally identical, then are justified in believing the same thing. I take this NOT to 
mean that if two people are internally identical then they necessarily must believe the 
same justified propositions; but rather, if two people are internally identical, then they are 
necessarily justificationally identical. That is to say, there is a sameness of justification, 
not sameness o f content. The environment may determine which content a subject 
believes, but it does not determine which contents the subject is justified in believing. 
That is to say, if two people are internally alike in the relevant respects, then if one has a 
justified belief and one’s twin has the same belief, it will be justified and justified to the 
same extent as the first. A justificatory difference would be if Oscar has the justified 
belief that /?, and Twin Oscar had an unjustified belief that p  where p  is the same content 
in both cases. Twin Oscar merely lacking the belief (justified or otherwise) that p  
because he is unable to form it, given his concepts and his environment, is not a 
justificationally relevant difference. Rather, that is just difference o f content -  which is 
exactly what content externalism requires.
In summary, I have argued that although externalism about content may well be 
true, internal similarities, in the sense of internal to the subject’s conscious awareness, do 
determine justificational similarities. These similarities are not at the level of what 
propositions the subject is justified in believing, but at the level of the structure of
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justification. That is, internal duplicates are justified in believing exactly the same 
number of propositions and to exactly the same extent, on the basis of the same internally 
accessible grounds. Further, the propositions held by the counterpart subjects will 
themselves be counterparts, e.g. they are as similar as possible while still being non­
identical, as well as play an identical role in the subject’s noetic structure.
Given this, as well as what I have argued above, content externalism is 
compatible with the awareness requirement, a necessary condition on justification, and 
the defining feature of internalist justification.
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3.5. Other Reasons to Reject the New Evil Demon Intuition: McDowell’s
Epistemological Disjunctivism:
In part 3 of “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge”, John McDowell argues for 
a form of epistemological disjunctivism, that is, a view that holds that two 
indistinguishable perceptual experiences can differ in that they put the subject in two 
different positions to know two different things.57 In the experience where there is a fact 
being ‘made manifest’ to one, the subject is in a position to know that p , whereas in the 
situation where the fact is not made manifest, the subject is merely in a position to know 
that it merely seems to him that p. In developing this view McDowell considers and 
rejects a version of the Argument from Illusion, the standard argument used to try to 
show that indistinguishable perceptual experiences are of the same epistemic value or of 
the same fundamental kind. I think that even if McDowell is right that the argument is 
not sound and that two indistinguishable perceptions can differ in what they put the 
subject in a position to know, this does not affect what the subject is justified  in believing.
So while McDowell may be right that the subject’s epistemic status is not 
identical in the veridical and in the hallucinatory case (since they differ in knowledge), it 
does not follow that they have different justificatory statuses. My theory is committed to 
the claim that the two cases are the same in respect of justification, and this is supported 
by the fact that we judge subjects and their demon-deceived counterparts to enjoy 
sameness of justification (in the sense I explained above). I take this intuitive judgement
57 As Paul Snowdon has recently pointed out, McDowell’s version o f disjunctivism is cast purely 
epistemologically, that is, the view is about the difference between two experiences cast in terms o f what 
one is in a position to know. This is different from the kind of disjunctivism that he and others defend in 
the philosophy o f perception that holds that i) the case o f veridical perception is a fundamentally different 
kind of state than a hallucinatory state and ii) that it does not follow from the fact that two experiences are 
indistinguishable that they are of the same kind. According to McDowell’s disjunctivism the dispute is 
epistemological, whereas the one Snowdon represents is metaphysical. For details see Snowdon (2005).
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to be a datum that should only be rejected if we are given a good reason to do so. So far 
we have seen that content externalism provides no such reason. We will now consider 
whether McDowell provides sufficient reason to overturn this judgement. To begin to do 
so, it is necessary to turn to the version of the Argument From Illusion that McDowell 
presents.
All sides should agree that our ability to tell how things are by looking at them is 
fallible -  there are cases that deceive us. These deceptive cases are cases where ~p is the 
case, although this perceptual experience is qualitatively identical to non-deceptive cases 
in which p  is the case. Advocates of this argument maintain that if  one’s experience falls 
short of knowing the fact in the deceptive case, it also falls short in the non-deceptive 
case as well. The ‘highest common factor’ shared between these two cases is the one 
compatible with ~p.  As McDowell puts it, the highest common factor between the two 
cases is “at best a defeasible ground for the knowledge”. (McDowell, 1998a, p. 386) 
The picture is that of these common appearances constituting a ‘veil of ideas’ that 
mediate between mind and world.
This might be understood in at least two ways: one is the traditional idea of a 
literal veil made of ideas. Such ‘sense data’, which is what we are directly aware of, 
either constitutes the world (idealism), or else mediates between us and the mind- 
independent world, thereby hiding the world from us. The other idea is simply that all we 
can tell is how things appear to us. The argument that McDowell sketches merely gets us 
to the second idea and not the first, since it does not follow from the fact that one has 
perceptual experiences that are subjectively indistinguishable from each other that the 
objects of perception are mere sense data. At least in the case of illusion, it could be that
140
the objects of perception are mind-independent objects, but share an appearance. But 
with either model in place, it is easy to see how one might be led to sceptical conclusions 
about the extent of our knowledge. This follows on the plausible assumption that it is a 
necessary condition of knowing that p  that one must at least be able to discriminate p  
from ~/?.58 By hypothesis this condition is impossible to meet if one’s grounds for 
believing that p  are qualitatively identical to one’s grounds when ~p is the case. 
McDowell sets out to combat such scepticism.
McDowell’s response to the argument is to deny that there is necessarily 
epistemologically common ground in the deceptive and non-deceptive cases. His 
suggestion is that “an appearance that such-and-such is the case can be either a mere 
appearance or the fact that such-and-such is the case making itself perceptually manifest 
to someone.” (Ibid., p. 386-387) One might think that McDowell’s disjunctive 
suggestion looks promising -  that in the deceptive and non-deceptive cases the difference
58 Principles that have been proposed to capture the relevant notion o f ‘discrimination’ required for 
knowledge include Sensitivity and Safety. Sensitivity holds that: “If an agent knows a proposition, then that 
agent’s true belief must be sensitive in the sense that, had that proposition been false, she would have not 
believed it.” (Pritchard, 2006, p. 182) See Nozick (1981) for an early defense of the ‘truth-tracking’ theory 
o f knowledge that employs the sensitivity principle.
Safety, by contrast, holds that: “If an agent knows a proposition, then that agent’s true belief in 
that proposition must be safe in the sense that it couldn’t have easily been false (alternatively: were the 
agent to continue believing that proposition in similar circumstances, then the belief would almost always 
still be true).” (Pritchard, 2006, p. 180-1) Another way o f putting this is that a subject’s belief is safe just 
in case a subject believes that p  becausep  is the case and the belief is stable or robust in the sense that in all 
o f the nearby possible worlds in which the subject would continue to believe that p ,p  is true in at least most 
of those worlds.
What both of these principles have in common is that they are epistemically externalist in nature. 
One salient way in which they differ is that Safety but not Sensitivity allows subjects to know the denials of 
sceptical hypothesis. A further difference is that Safety is consistent with knowledge being closed under 
known entailment, whereas Sensitivity requires the rejection of the highly intuitively closure principle, 
which seems to count decisively against Sensitivity. Closure here is being understood, roughly, as the 
principle that if one knows a proposition p, and knows that it entails another proposition q, then one knows 
q as well. This principle is so overwhelmingly intuitive and as close to self-evident as any epistemic 
principle can be that it should be taken as a datum. As such, if any theory is incompatible with closure, so 
much the worse for the theory.
As my aim here is to elucidate the nature o f epistemic justification, rather than knowledge, and 
given that for methodological purposes I am presupposing the falsity o f scepticism, 1 will remain neutral on 
how best to characterize the notions of discrimination and anti-luck that seem to be required for knowledge.
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may well be a difference in what one is acquainted with in experience, viz., whether it is 
a fact or a mere appearance. This may have epistemological implications insofar as they 
are reflected in differences in what the subject is in a position to know. However, there 
are many different kinds of epistemic evaluation other than knowledge e.g. “Foley- 
rationality”, or epistemic blamelessness/responsibility, or reasonableness, and most 
centrally, epistemic justification.59 This is worth noting because it may turn out that 
certain kinds of internalism or externalism may hold for some epistemic concepts, but not 
for all, and so generalizations across epistemology should be made with great care (see 
chapter 1).
What is clear is that even if one adopts McDowell’s disjunctive stance, nothing 
straightforwardly follows to suggest that the deceptive and non-deceptive case are not 
identical in justification. A complication may be thought to arise, however, due to the 
fact that McDowell repeatedly stresses that “knowledge -  at least as enjoyed by rational 
animals -  is a certain sort of standing in the space of reasons.” 60 (McDowell, 1998c, p. 
395) While exactly what McDowell means by this phrase is the matter of some debate61, 
one would assume that we have some prior grasp of what constitutes a reason, e.g. a 
consideration that counts in favour of something. The idea seems to be that whether or 
not one knows depends on things to do with reasons. Whatever else may be true of 
reasons, it seems that they are related to justifications. For example, it seems plausible to 
suppose that reasons are those things that justify beliefs.
59 By traditional lights, justification is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge. But I remain agnostic 
on this point. That is not to say, however, that justification is not an interesting and important concept of 
epistemic appraisal in its own right.
60 This m otif o f the ‘space o f reasons’, which McDowell attributes to Wilfrid Sellars, is repeated frequently 
throughout his work. See especially McDowell (1996).
61 See for example essays in Smith (ed.) (2002).
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If this is what McDowell means by reasons and their space, then I hold that 
McDowell is conceiving of justifications and reasons in an inaccurate way. This is 
because he holds that in a case of veridical perception and a case of hallucination we are 
differently placed vis a vis knowledge, whereas the subjects are similarly placed in 
relation to justification/reasons, as the case of the new Evil Demon reveals. So 
McDowell is making some mistake about reasons: either they are not required for 
knowledge, and therefore knowledge is not a standing in the space of reasons; or else 
reasons are required for knowledge, and since the same reasons/justification is present in 
both the veridical and hallucinatory case, the fact that the subject fails to know in the 
hallucinatory / illusory case is due to some extra-justificational feature of the situation, 
e.g. that what he believes is false. A further consequence of this is that McDowell is 
mistaken that there are factive empirical reasons, on the assumption that it is reasons that 
justify belief, given that the same reasons are present both in the veridical and the 
hallucinatory case. I shall add more on the coherence o f the notion of factive empirical 
reasons below.
It is important to note that there is a ‘common factor’ between the deceptive and 
non-deceptive cases, even if this common factor is not a metaphysical one at the level of 
perceptual states (one’s mental state) or a common state o f knowledge. What is common 
is a phenomenally indistinguishable appearance. In the context of discussing the so- 
called Phenomenological Argument for the Highest Common Factor View, McDowell 
himself concedes: “The alternative conception [McDowell’s brand of disjunctivism] can 
allow what is given to experience in two sorts of case to be the same in so fa r  as it is an 
appearance that things are thus and so; that leaves it open that whereas in one kind of
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case what is given to experience is a mere appearance, in the other it is the fact itself 
made manifest.” (emphasis in original) (Ibid., p. 389)
This sameness of appearance that things are thus and so is what I argue is the 
basis of epistemic justification which must be so, given that a subject and her deceived 
twin are both justified and have all the same things accessible to them. The reason that 
the appearance of a fact making itself manifest is not justificationally relevant is because 
if it were, there would be a difference in justificatory status between a subject and her 
twin; but as careful consideration of the case reveals, there is no such difference. When a 
fact makes it itself manifest, what the subject has access to is the fact itself (that is, an 
appearance of a certain kind), not the fact that it is a fact making itself manifest. From 
the subject’s own perspective, what is accessible in the deceptive case is exactly what is 
accessible in the non-deceptive case, viz., an appearance that things are thus and so 
(regardless of what kind of perceptual state the subject is in, or what she may be in a 
position to know). In short, what the subject knows on McDowell’s account is a fact, 
whereas what the internalist about justification requires is awareness of the ground of his 
belief, as a ground. What the New Evil Demon case shows is that it is justificationally 
irrelevant whether what the subject is aware of is genuinely a fact making itself manifest 
or a mere appearance -  the subject is equally justified in believing as he does, on the 
basis he does, in both cases.
The above remarks raise the question about epistemic access. I argued in chapter 
2 that the kind of access that is necessary for epistemic justification is ‘strong’ conscious 
awareness, and in the case of immediate justification, non-doxastic strong awareness.
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Which kinds of things need to be accessible if justification is to obtain? Consider these 
three different kinds of internalism that Duncan Pritchard and Ram Neta formulate:
1) S’s epistemic justification for believing that p  is constituted solely by S’s mental 
states.
2) S’s epistemic justification for believing that p  is constituted solely by facts that S 
can know by reflection alone.
3) S’s epistemic justification for believing that p  is constituted solely by properties 
that S has in common with her recently envatted physical duplicate. (Neta and 
Pritchard, 2007, p. 382)
In seeing where McDowell fits into the above categories, we can come to see the 
strengths and weaknesses of each.
The first version of internalism is what I have been calling ‘Mentalism’.62 As I
argued in chapter 2, while Mentalism may capture a general truth, it is misleading as a
theory of epistemic justification, since it does not include an essential awareness
condition, and as such it should be rejected in the above form (See 2.2). Given that
McDowell stresses that knowledge is nothing more than an appropriate standing in the
space of reasons, and given that he conceives of reasons as mental states, he also accepts
the spirit of 1). Support that McDowell holds that knowledge is nothing more than a
proper standing in the space of reasons can be found in the following passage in which he
criticizes what he calls the “hybrid conception of knowledge” :63
In the hybrid  conception , a satisfactory  standing in the space o f  
reasons is only  part o f  w hat know ledge is; tru th  is an extra 
requirem ent. So tw o subjects can be alike in respect o f  the
62 First introduced and defended, to the best o f my knowledge, by Feldman and Conee in “Internalism 
Defended” reprinted in Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism, ed. Komblith, Oxford: Blackwell, 
(2001). For more on Mentalism see 2.2.
63 The ‘hybrid’ conception of knowledge, I take it, is one that conceives of knowledge in terms of ‘inner’ 
and ‘outer’ features; i.e. a picture of knowledge as a relation that obtains between a believer who possesses 
good reasons (which are internal the subject) and a fact or a true proposition (which is external to the 
subject).
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satisfactoriness o f  their standing in the space o f  reasons, 
although only one o f  them  is a know er, because only in her case 
is what she takes to be so actually so. But if  its being so is 
external to her operations in the space o f  reasons, how  can it not 
be outside the reach o f  her rational pow ers? A nd i f  it is ou tside 
the reach o f  her rational pow ers, how  can its being  so be the 
crucial elem ent in an in tellig ib le conception  o f  her know ing  that 
it is so -  what m akes the relevant d ifference betw een  her and the 
o ther subject? Its being so is conceived  as external to the only 
thing that is supposed to be ep istem olog ically  sign ifican t about 
the know er herself, her satisfactory  standing  in the space o f  
reasons. (M cD ow ell, 1998c, p. 403)
Support that McDowell thinks of reasons as mental states can be found in the 
following passage:
Som eone who rem em bers that th ings are a certain  w ay, like 
som eone who sees that th ings are a certain  w ay, has an excellen t 
reason for taking it that th ings are that way; the excellence 
com es out in the fact that from  the prem ise  that one rem em bers 
that th ing are this and so, as from  the prem ise that one sees that 
th ings are thus and so, it follow s that th ings are  thus and so. The 
epistem ic positions them selves put the ir occupants in possession  
o f  reasons for their beliefs; those reasons do no t need to be 
supplem ented w ith less cogent argum ents from  n on-question - 
beggingly  available prem ises. (em phasis in o rig inal)
(M cD ow ell, 1998b, p. 427-428)
So according to McDowell, one’s reason to believe that a desk is in front of one, for
example, is one’s seeing that there is a desk in front of one, which is a mental state of the
subject.
However, for reasons similar to the ones I gave in chapter 2, McDowell should 
reject this formulation of Mentalism since it includes no awareness requirement. Support 
for the claim that McDowell thinks that some form of awareness requirement is needed is 
the following: “I agree with [Elizabeth Fricker] that we lose the point of invoking the 
space of reasons if we allow someone to possess a justification even if it outside his 
reflective reach.” (McDowell, 1998b, p. 418) On Neta and Pritchard’s reasonable
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enough interpretation, McDowell uses ‘being inside of one’s reflective reach’ to mean
that the agent is able to know it by reflection alone. (Neta and Pritchard, 2007, p. 384)
The reason that McDowell should reject Mentalism as formulated if he accepts a
reflective access requirement is that it is not at all obvious that one can always tell by
reflection alone what mental states one possesses. Even if one has privileged access to
one’s mental states, that is not to say that one has infallible access. If one needs
reflective access to one’s justificatory grounds and this access is fallible or limited, and
one’s grounds are one’s mental states whether or not one has reflective access to them,
then it seems that one will have some justifications that one does not have access to, i.e.
reasons that are ‘outside the subject’s reflective reach’. This, McDowell claims, defeats
the point of ‘invoking the space of reasons’, and as such is unacceptable. To put it in my
own terms, Mentalism is unacceptable since it violates the Subject’s Perspective
Objection (SPO), which recall is the following:
I f  the subject hold ing  a be lie f is not aw are o f  the b e l ie f s  
g rounds, then she is not aw are o f  how  its status is any differen t 
from  a stray hunch/arbitrary  conv iction /strong  bu t g roundless 
conviction. As such, i f  the subject regards her b e lie f  as ju stified , 
she ought to regard the fact that the b e lie f  is ju s tif ied  as a brute 
fact. From  that w e m ay conclude that from  her ow n perspective  
she ought to regard it as an accident that her b e lie f  is true, i.e. 
from  her perspective a b e lie f w hose ju stifica tio n  appears to  be a 
brute fact could ju s t as easily be false. A nd that im plies that the 
b e lie f  is not ju stified . (See C hapter 2 for m ore details)
The second kind of internalism, a kind of ‘access internalism’, is the one that 
McDowell seems to subscribe to, given his remarks about the point of invoking the space 
of reasons. He thinks that one’s positive epistemic status, in the case of perceptual 
beliefs at any rate, is determined by facts making themselves manifest to one in one’s 
experience, which if they are to play the role of reasons, must be within the subject’s
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reflective reach. Recall that McDowell unequivocally states that: “I agree with 
[Elizabeth Pricker] that we lose the point of invoking the space of reasons if we allow 
someone to possess a justification even if it outside his reflective reach.” (McDowell, 
1998b, p. 418) Again, while it is not entirely clear what being inside one’s reflective 
reach amounts to, I will follow Neta and Pritchard in understanding it as meaning that a 
reason is within one’s reflective reach when it can be known by reflection alone.
It is somewhat unclear if what is supposed to be accessible upon reflection is the 
experienced fact, or the fact that it is a fact. That is, is what is accessible upon reflection, 
for example, that one has hands when one sees that one does, or that one is seeing that 
one has hands (which entails that one has hands)? If the former, it is not clear if this will 
count as ‘access internalism’ as Neta and Pritchard construe it; if the latter, it does not 
seem that one can tell by reflection if, for example, one is really seeing one’s hands, 
rather than merely seeming to see. More on this below.
It might seem puzzling why McDowell stresses the importance of reflective 
access in connection with space of reasons in the passages I quote above. What is the 
significance of reflection? Nothing essential, I submit. It is presumably myopia that has 
led to overlooking central cases of justified believing, such as having beliefs about what 
one is presently experiencing in sense perception. In that case one does not introspect the 
world around one, or access it through reflection; rather one perceives it. What is 
common to the kind of perception and reflection or introspection that the internalist is 
moved by, and that McDowell seems to be interested in here in connection to his 
conception of the space of reasons, is conscious awareness. In sum, it does not seem like 
there is anything particularly significant for McDowell about reflection per se. What is
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justificationally important about reflection, for McDowell as well as for me, is that it is 
our way of becoming conscious of the contents of our minds, just as perception is our 
way of becoming conscious of the world.
Returning to the issue of knowing in the space o f reasons, although McDowell 
does not explicitly say that having facts making themselves manifest to one in one’s 
experience is sufficient for justification, since he does not say any more either way (apart 
from requiring the absence of defeaters), and claims that justification is solely a function 
of what is reflectively accessible, this leads me to conclude that he is so committed.
One problem with this kind of internalism arises if it is offered as a theory of 
doxastic justification. It is possible to experience a fact, but not base any relevant belief 
on it. I contend that the basing relation is necessary (but not sufficient) for doxastic 
epistemic justification. Any viable theory of justification needs to respect the epistemic 
difference between believing that p  and having a good reason to believe it, and believing 
that p  because of the ground, that is, on the basis of the ground. A fact made manifest, 
and hence ‘internal’ in McDowell’s sense, is insufficient for justification. But crucially 
for my purposes, the New Evil Demon case shows that a fact being made manifest is not 
necessary for justification either, since a subject can be equally justified in believing 
something if it is based on its seeming to the subject that p, rather than p  itself really 
being the case. But perhaps McDowell is offering his position as a theory of 
propositional justification, in which case the above criticism would not apply.
But there is an even more fundamental objection: is McDowell’s version of 
internalism even coherent as Pritchard and Neta suggest? The unique McDowellian
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thesis is the conjunction of two claims, which I will follow Pritchard and Neta as 
understanding as follows:
R eflective A ccessib ility  o f  Reasons: (RA R) One is in a position  to know , by using o n e ’s
reflective capacities, w hat o n e ’s reasons are for believ ing  that p.
F activity  o f  R easons: (FA R) There are factive em pirical reasons for beliefs about the external 
world. (N eta and Pritchard , 2007, p. 388-389)
The conjunction  o f  these tw o theses gives us:
(M C D ) One is in a position to know, by using only one’s reflective capacities, w hat o n e ’s 
reasons are for believing that p  -  even w hen those reasons are (as they som etim e are) 
factive em pirical reasons. (Ibid. p. 389)
Whether or not this view is coherent depends on not only the coherence of RAR and 
FAR, but also on their conjunction. Is it really possible to be in a position to know what 
one’s reasons are if they are factive? Does this not require knowing that they are factive, 
and this is not something that is knowable upon reflection?
For example, if one sees that p , one can ‘access one’s reasons’ in the weak sense 
of knowing that one is having a perceptual experience with a certain phenomenal 
character, but one cannot tell by introspection alone whether one is seeing that p, or 
merely seeming to see that p  (i.e. seeing a situation in which p). That is, what content a 
state has is not something that can be read off how things appear to the subject. For 
example, seeing that the cup is chipped and seeming to see that the cup is chipped are 
different states with different truth-conditions, and yet they appear identically to the 
subject who experiences them.
If according to McDowell one’s reason to believe that p  is the factive state of 
one’s seeing that p  (and not the non-factive but phenomenologically indistinguishable 
state of one seeming to see that p), then ‘knowing what one’s reasons are’ seems to 
require being able to discriminate one’s factive perceptual state from one’s qualitatively
150
identical non-factive state. But this is impossible, since there is nothing subjectively to 
distinguish between them. In short, it is false that a subject can know what his reasons 
for a belief are if those reasons are factive. Knowing the facts are not enough to know 
them as the reasons that justify one’s belief, if what is justificationally relevant is their 
factiveness, since this is something that transcends the subject’s reflective awareness. If 
what is key is that only what can be known by reflection alone can be justificationally 
relevant, then reasons for empirical belief about the external world cannot take a factive 
form.
Notice that the non-factive conception of reasons that my account of epistemic 
justification presupposes does not face this incoherence, since in effect I endorse RAR 
but not FAR. In paradigm cases of justified belief, which therefore meet the Awareness 
Condition, the subject is in a position to know, by using her reflective capacities, what 
her reasons are for believing as she does. A problem here about knowing what one’s 
reasons are by reflection alone might arise in the case of doxastic (rather than 
propositional) justification, depending on the nature of the basing relation. That is, a 
problem may arise if the relation between one’s belief and one’s reason when one’s belief 
is held fo r  that reason is a causal relation o f some kind. This would be a problem because 
knowing what causes what is not an a priori matter.
However, at least in the case of propositional justification, the basing relation 
plays no role, in which case one can know by reflection alone what one’s reason is for 
holding a particular belief.64 For example, when one believes that one has hands on the 
basis of seeming to see hands at the end of one’s arms, one is aware that one’s reason for
64 See 1.3. for a discussion o f the basing relation. See chapter 2 for an explanation and defense of the 
notion o f non-doxastic awareness.
this belief is one’s perceptual experience as of hands. One is aware of how, or in virtue 
of what, one is justified in believing as one does. While there are empirical reasons for 
beliefs about the external world, which are factive as FAR maintains, they are not reasons 
in virtue of their factive nature -  factive and non-factive states with the same phenomenal 
features are equally good (or bad) reasons that can justify empirical beliefs about the 
external world.
If Mentalism and the standard form of access internalism are inadequate theories 
of epistemic justification, the best remaining candidate is Neta and Pritchard’s 3): S’s 
epistemic justification for believing that p  is constituted by properties that S has in 
common with her recently envatted physical duplicate, which must be so to account for 
our evaluative judgement that a subject and her duplicate in vat do not differ in what they 
are justified in believing.
The principle about envatted replicas follows from our evaluative thesis about 
sameness of justification between counterparts. But is our claim about sameness of 
justification not derivative from something more basic? It is difficult to say. But what is 
important here is that our claim to sameness of justification is an evaluative thesis, not an 
explanatory thesis.65 It says only that twins internally alike are justificationally alike; not 
why or in virtue of what are they so justified. As Nico Silins has recently pointed out, 
this is a virtue of evaluative theses in general, since what supports them is pure intuitive 
plausibility, not motivations from theoretical judgements about the nature of justification. 
(Silins, 2005, p. 386) As relatively pre-theoretical judgments, they can be used as data in 
philosophical theory building, as I have been doing here. Such data should be used
65 See Silins (2005) p. 385 for discussion of evaluative v. explanatory theses in epistemology.
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unless we have good reason to reject it, which is of course what I have been evaluating 
throughout this chapter.
The common properties between internal twins are that things appear to the 
subjects to be a certain way. This is the case even if metaphysical disjunctivism about 
perception is correct and these two experiences are in fact of two different ontological 
kinds. Similarly this thesis remains intact even if McDowell’s epistemological 
disjunctivism is broadly correct and the subjects are in positions to know different things, 
although the details of the position will need to be different since the conjunction of RAR 
and FAR is of dubious coherence, as we have seen. Still, perhaps there is some kind of 
reflective access that can be conjoined with McDowell’s thesis that there are factive 
empirical reasons, which if true, might be relevant for knowledge since an agent can 
know things in the veridical situation that his recently envatted counterpart could not 
know. But such an approach does not apply to non-factive modes of epistemic 
evaluation, such as justification traditionally construed, which does not vary unless there 
is a change in how things seem to the agent.
In summary, I have argued that we can have unreliable but justified beliefs, as 
cases involving the New Evil Demon show. The case of the New Evil Demon shows 
sameness o f justification between counterparts in a demon and a non-demon world. 
What this shows is that since the subject is justified but actually unreliable in the demon 
world, then he is justified in the non-demon world whether he is actually reliable or not, 
so long as the properties he shares with his demon world counterpart are still instantiated. 
That the subject’s belief-forming mechanisms happen to be reliable in the non-demon 
world is beside the point vis-a-vis his epistemic justification. The case of the New Evil
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Demon also supports Fallibilism, understood here as the position that one can be justified 
in believing something that is false. As we have seen, neither arguments regarding 
content extemalism nor McDowell’s version of epistemological disjunctivism count 
against these conclusions.
For all I have shown above, actual reliability or truth-conduciveness is not 
necessary for epistemic justification to obtain, but it could still be the case that the reason 
that the subject is justified in the demon world is precisely because his beliefs would be 
reliable in the non-demon world. So even if actual reliability is not required, might 
conditional reliability be necessary for epistemic justification to obtain? If so, then there 
would be a (external) condition on which epistemic justification depends that would not 
meet the Awareness condition, in which case epistemic intemalism as I construe it would 
be false. It is to these issues that I now turn.
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C h a p t e r  F o u r
T h e  T r u t h - C o n n e c t i o n : W h a t  It  I s  N o t  -  R e l i a b i l i t y  R e d u x  
4 .1 .  In tr o d u c t io n :
As I noted in Chapter 1, one of the central characteristics of justification is, as 
Alston says, that it has “to do with a specifically epistemic dimension of evaluation.” 
(Alston, 1989a, p. 83) As I noted there, the use of the qualifier “epistemic” is needed to 
individuate epistemic justification from other possible sorts, such as moral, aesthetic, or 
pragmatic justification. I agree with Alston that some connection to truth is what makes a 
given thing epistemic. (See 1.2. for the four basic features of justification) In this 
chapter I will investigate proposals that conceive of the relation between justified belief 
and truth as one of truth-conduciveness. I will argue that, given intemalism about 
justification, either in the sense I defend in Chapter 2 involving the Awareness 
Requirement, or in a weaker sense that Christopher Peacocke endorses, the truth-relation 
cannot be characterized in terms of truth-conduciveness or reliability. This is not just to 
reiterate a conclusion of Chapter 3 that justification need not be actually truth-conducive. 
I will argue further that the truth-connection cannot even be one of truth-conduciveness 
in a conditional mode. Having dispatched truth-conducive accounts of the truth- 
connection, I will be in a position to develop a positive account of the truth-connection in 
Chapter 5.
Here and throughout I will use ‘truth-conduciveness’ and ‘reliability’ interchange­
ably to denote the property of a tendency to result in true beliefs. So to say of a belief
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that it is likely to be true, therefore, means roughly that the method that gives rise to the 
belief is likely to deliver true results in the circumstances deployed. This is, of course, 
quite vague, but the notion of reliability is a notoriously difficult concept to make precise 
in any non-trivial and informative way. I take this as a further consideration counting 
against employing the notion of reliability in philosophical theorizing. I will return to 
this issue of how to characterize reliability at the end of this chapter.
To appreciate the prima facie  threat to a substantial truth-connection, which 
would undermine the notion that the account of justification I have been defending is 
genuinely epistemic, recall that I have argued that actual truth-conduciveness or 
reliability is neither necessary nor sufficient for epistemic justification.66 In Chapter 2 I 
argued that we can have reliable but unjustified beliefs, as shown by cases of 
clairvoyance and other cases in which the subject lacks conscious awareness of her 
grounds. In Chapter 3 I argued that we can have unreliable but justified beliefs, as cases 
involving the New Evil Demon show.
The case of the New Evil Demon shows sameness of justification between 
counterparts in demon and non-demon worlds. What this shows is that since the subject 
is justified but actually unreliable in the demon world, then he is justified in the non­
demon world whether he is actually reliable or not, so long as the properties he shares 
with his demon world counterpart are still instantiated. (See Chapter 3) That is, since the 
subject is justified in a demon world, but not reliable, reliability is not necessary for 
justification. That the subject’s belief-forming mechanisms happen to be reliable in the 
non-demon world is beside the point vis-a-vis his epistemic justification. Given that this
66 1 take my arguments as also directed against accounts that conceive o f the connection between justified 
belief and truth as one o f entailment. This is because 1 am treating truth entailment as the limit case of 
truth-conduciveness.
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is the case, what is the relation between justified belief and truth? For all I have shown in 
Chapter 3, the truth-connection cannot be one of actual reliability or truth-conduciveness, 
but it could still be the case that the reason that the subject is justified in the demon world 
is precisely because his beliefs would be reliable in the non-demon world. In this chapter 
I will block this move: reliability in either its actual or conditional mode is not necessary 
for epistemic justification to obtain.
Given that actual reliability has been ruled out as an account of the truth- 
connection, I will turn to conditional accounts of reliability, beginning with Alvin 
Goldman’s Normal Worlds Reliabilism (Goldman, 1986). By seeing how this account is 
prima facie  incompatible with various forms of epistemic intemalism, I will evaluate 
Christopher Peacocke’s recent attempt to reconcile his form of intemalism with the kind 
of conditional reliability account that Goldman introduces. Seeing how Peacocke’s 
account fails will reinforce the conclusions of Chapter 3 that truth-conduciveness (actual 
or conditional) is not the correct account of the truth-connection for internalists. I shall 
try to show that an account of the truth-connection in terms of truth-conduciveness is not 
motivated, but even if it were, Peacocke’s account (and others like it) sets an impossible 
burden to meet, which results in its being inconclusive as to whether or not any of our 
beliefs are justified. As such, the theory must be rejected, as common sense confidently 
assures us that the beliefs on which Peacocke’s theory casts doubt are indeed justified.
In short, I argued in chapter 3 that actual reliability is not a necessary condition 
for justification; here I will argue that conditional reliability is not necessary for 
justification to obtain, either. Taken together, these chapters aim to show that external
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factors are not necessary for justification to obtain, and so epistemic intemalism is further 
supported.67
67 Even if it is a requirement o f intemalism that reliability is not necessary for justification, this o f course 
leaves open what the relationship is between justification and knowledge, as well as it if there are other 
useful epistemic evaluations for which reliability plays an essential role.
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4.2. The Subject’s Role and the Truth Connection: Normal World Reliabilism
The New Evil Demon cases show that if a subject’s belief that p  is epistemically 
justified, the belief that p  need not actually be likely to be true -  that is, the belief need 
not actually be reliably produced or sustained. The connection between justified belief 
and truth must lie elsewhere. At this point one might naturally think that the reason that 
the subject is justified in the demon world is precisely because his beliefs would be 
reliable in the non-demon world.68 And one could adopt this view short of ‘mad-dog’ 
extemalism69, holding that reliability is necessary for justification, but also maintaining 
that what the subject is (or easily could be) aware o f is also necessary for justification. 
Such an approach tries to accommodate a role for reliability, while holding that the 
subject’s point of view is also essential to epistemic justification.
Alvin Goldman’s Normal World Reliabilism seems to be an account that could be 
brought into service to support such a view. Goldman’s theory says that a belief is 
justified if and only if it is likely to be true in ‘normal worlds’. That is, the belief need 
not be likely to be true in the actual world. Instead, reliability is relativized to so-called 
‘normal worlds’. Normal worlds are fixed by what beliefs the subject holds, and so
68 Here and throughout I have been speaking of demon worlds, meaning a world o f a kind that Descartes 
considers in his first meditation. But nothing essential rests upon choosing this sceptical scenario, as such a 
hypothesis is meant to be merely representative. Other skeptical scenarios besides the Cartesian evil 
demon include being an envatted brain at the hands o f evil super-scientists, being asleep and having a lucid 
dream, etc. These scenarios will be taken as sceptically equivalent for present purposes, and accordingly, 
are intersubstitutable salva veritate.
For short, all these sceptical scenarios can be collectively referred to as “philosophical dreaming”. 
Sosa defines philosophical dreaming thus: “S philosophically dreams p  iff S experiences as if p , but 
unveridically so.” (Sosa, 2003, p. 143) So in the text when I refer to a non-demon world, 1 at least mean 
one where the evil demon hypothesis is false, and, that by and large, one’s perceptual experiences are 
veridical.
69 ‘Mad-dog extemalism’ is understood here as the view that the subject’s perspective is justificationally 
irrelevant, and that factors external to it, e.g. the reliability o f the process that gave rise to the belief in 
question, are necessary and sufficient for epistemic justification to obtain.
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accommodates the intuition that the subject’s perspective necessarily affects the truth- 
connection. Goldman writes,
W e have a large set o f  com m on beliefs about the actual w orld: 
general beliefs about the sorts o f  objects, events, and changes 
that occur in it. We have beliefs about the k inds o f  th ings that, 
realistically , can and do happen. O ur beliefs on this score 
generate what I shall call the set o f  norm al w orlds. These are 
w orlds consistent with our g enera l beliefs about the actual 
w orld, (original em phasis) (G oldm an, 1986, p. 107)
So the idea is that while justified beliefs may not be likely to be true in the actual world 
(say, because the actual world is a demon world), they would be true if the actual world 
were among the set of ‘normal worlds’, where these are worlds where most of our general 
beliefs are true. We can put this idea like this:
C onditional R eliability  Version o f  the Truth C onnection : I f  S ’s b e lie f  that p  is ju s tified , then p  is 
likely to be true in w orlds w here S ’s o ther general beliefs about the w ay the w orld is are true.
I will say more at the end of this chapter about difficulties in trying to make the notion of 
‘normal worlds’ precise.
As stated, the conditional version of the truth connection is a form of epistemic 
extemalism, since the reliability of a belief-forming mechanism and what world it is 
being used in are not things that the subject can be aware o f on reflection alone (if at all). 
However, different kinds of internalists and externalists alike could hold that this truth 
connection is necessary for justification; although for reasons I will explain, no such truth 
connection is even necessary for epistemic justification. Externalists’ accounts of 
justification could hold that the principle as stated is sufficient: if  a belief is likely to be 
true in worlds that would make true most of the subject’s other beliefs, then the belief is
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justified. A more qualified extemalism could hold that such a conditioned truth 
connection is sufficient for justification in the absence of defeaters.
On the other hand, an internalist might hold that a truth connection of this kind is 
necessary for justification, but the subject also must have some kind of cognitive access 
to the fact that this relation obtains. The crudest of such approaches would consist of 
doxastic accounts that Stewart Cohen calls “Intellectualist” theories of justification. He 
constmes Intellectualist theories as follows: ‘in  order for S to be justified in believing B, 
S must believe that certain conditions obtain which make the truth of B probable.” 
(Cohen, 1984, p. 286) So, combining the Intellectualist and Conditional Reliability 
approaches, one gets the following view:
The In tellectua list C onditional Version o f  the Truth C onnection: In order for S ’s b e lie f  that p  to 
be ju stified , S m ust believe  that p  is likely to be true in w orlds w here S ’s o ther general beliefs 
about the way the w orld is are true.
But an advocate of this kind of position should not be satisfied with requiring the 
subject to merely believe the conditional that i f  he were in a ‘normal’ world, then his 
justified beliefs are also likely to be true. What we are interested in is not just whether 
the subject believes that his beliefs may be justified, but whether he has reason to regard 
them as actually justified, that is, does the subject have reason to regard the token beliefs 
he holds as justified in the world he finds himself in (normal or otherwise)? To establish 
this conclusion, the subject would also have to believe that the actual world is a ‘normal 
world’; or if the actual world is not ‘normal’, that how he formed his belief would be 
reliable if it had been formed in a normal world. And, presumably, it is not enough that 
the subject merely believes that the actual world is a ‘normal world’, or that it is one 
where how he formed his belief is conditionally reliable, even if it is, because such a
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belief could be held for absurd reasons, or for no reason at all. Someone who advocates 
an ‘Intellectualist’ model of justification, presumably, would insist that the subject’s 
second order belief about the connection between his first order belief and truth must be
justified.
At this point one might think it obvious that no such Intellectualist account could 
possibly be correct on pain of scepticism. First, does the Intellectualist face a vicious 
regress of increasingly complex justifications? Second, it seems that people just do not 
tend to have beliefs, justified or otherwise, about the reliability of their belief-forming 
mechanisms. Cohen himself rejects such accounts for just this reason. (Cohen, 1984, p. 
286) But he goes on to note that an Intellectualist could respond to this objection in two 
ways: he could either maintain that people do have the relevant supporting beliefs, but 
have them subconsciously or that the beliefs are somehow held dispositionally. (Ibid.) 
The first approach is obviously an empirical matter, and cannot simply be presupposed. 
Cohen seems to reject the dispositionalist account on the grounds that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine when a belief is actually held dispositionally, and when it is just 
something that someone would affirm (for the ‘first time’, as it were) if it were 
entertained.70 Despite this obvious epistemic difficulty, the distinction between a subject 
having a disposition to entertain a belief already held, and the subject merely acquiring 
the belief if he considered the relevant proposition, seems genuine.
A more promising response is not to insist that people do have these beliefs, but 
that there is justification to believe them. Christopher Peacocke defends a variant of the
70 Robert Audi defends a similar distinction between believing and affirming. For discussion of this point, 
see Audi (1982).
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kind of Intellectualist approach I have been describing. Peacocke in effect takes up the
kind of challenge that Alston issues in The Reliability o f  Sense Perception. Alston asks,
W hy suppose that sense perception is, by and large, an accurate 
source o f  inform ation about the physical env ironm ent? [ ...]
M ore generally , why suppose that any o f  the bases on w hich we 
regularly and unquestionably  form beliefs are reliable, can be 
relied on to yield m ostly true beliefs?  [ . . . ]  Do w e, o r can we, 
have any solid reason for this assurance? [ . . .]  Do w e possess, or 
can we obtain, adequate reasons for supposing  that this is the 
way things are?” (A lston, 1993, p. 1)
Alston ultimately answers this question in the negative, arguing that all positive attempts 
to answer this question fall prey to vicious forms of objectionable epistemic circularity. 
(Alston, 1993) Taking a more optimistic line, as I will explain below, Peacocke’s 
account tries to reconcile Intellectualist elements with a conditional reliability version of 
the truth-connection in trying to answer Alston’s challenge. I will call this view 
Peacocke’s Intemalism , which I will refine below, but which essentially contends that it 
is possible to show or prove a priori that we are justified in believing that the conditional 
reliability relation holds between our justified beliefs and truth.
Peacocke’s view is different from the Intellectualist account in that he does not 
think we all necessarily have beliefs about the reliability of our belief forming 
mechanisms, but his account preserves Intellectualist elements by maintaining that we 
can be justified in such beliefs a priori. The account is a form of intemalism, but not in 
my sense that we must be aware of the grounds of our justified beliefs. Peacocke’s 
account does share internalist elements in the sense that he does not think that reliability 
is sufficient for rationality. Further, he holds that it is not just that we can be justified in 
believing that i/'we are in a normal world, our beliefs are likely to be true. Rather, he 
thinks that he can show a priori that we have reason to think we actually inhabit such
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worlds, and that our belief-forming processes are likely to be reliable in them. That is, he 
thinks he can show that we can be justified in believing that a necessary condition of 
justification holds.
However, one might still wonder if being able to show in principle a priori that 
we are in a world where belief formation processes are likely to be reliable will 
ultimately be of much help in defending epistemic intemalism. Even if Peacocke’s 
arguments are sound, they will not be of help to the person who is not aware of these 
arguments, or to the person who, while aware of the existence of such arguments, cannot 
follow the reasoning. It is true that Peacocke’s approach will not address the general 
first-personal or egocentric concerns that I argue motivate the form of epistemic 
intemalism I am defending. Nevertheless, if sound, Peacocke’s arguments would help 
combat the most radical forms of epistemic extemalism, and if not support intemalism, at 
least support a form of non-extemalism. Also, to those who were apprised of Peacocke’s 
arguments and could follow them, they would have the resources to be epistemically 
justified in my internalist sense. Such arguments would allow for a kind of internally 
accessible rational defensibility for the reliability of sense perception. As such, the 
compatibility of some form of awareness intemalism (though perhaps not in its strongest 
forms) depends on how successful accounts like Peacocke’s incorporates reliability 
conditions with Intellectualist elements.
Accordingly, I will now turn to the details of what I will call Peacocke’s 
Intemalism, and assess its coherence.
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4.3. Peacocke On Entitlement and Truth-Conduciveness:
In The Realm o f  Reason, Christopher Peacocke develops a ‘generalized 
rationalism’ concerning, among other things, what it is for someone to be ‘entitled’ to 
form a given belief. While Peacocke’s work focuses on what he calls entitlement rather 
than justification, much of what he says could be applied mutatis mutandis to the theory 
of justification, and so is worth evaluating here. This is because Peacocke’s basic 
conception of entitlement shares many features in common with justification that 1 
outlined in Chapter 1. For instance, as I highlighted in connection with justification, 
Peacocke similarly maintains the following about entitlement: it applies to beliefs, but 
perhaps derivatively so, since Peacocke’s focus is as follows:
1. on the entitlement to transitions from perceptual experience to judgements that
share that content;
2. entitlement is an evaluative or normative, not merely descriptive concept;
3. entitlement exhibits a truth-connection (hence it is an epistemic notion); and
finally,
4. entitlement comes in degrees. (Peacocke, 2004, p. 6-11)
A further reason to think that what Peacocke says about entitlement could be 
extended to justification (at least as I have been explicating it) is that Peacocke thinks of 
an entitled transition as a ‘rational’ transition, where this is understood as being 
incompatible with a purely reliablist account. Peacocke explicitly states that he is 
“opposed to what is sometimes called ‘extemalism’ about justification in epistemology.” 
(Peacocke, 2004, p. 12) He thinks that the case against pure reliabilism is in part made 
by examples like cases of clairvoyance that I discussed earlier. (See Chapter 2)
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However, other than saying that rationality is not (merely?) a matter of truth- 
conduciveness, Peacocke gives no positive account of what epistemic rationality consists 
of. Nevertheless, we can evaluate what he does say about entitlement and truth- 
conduciveness. In addition, however, I suggest that the best explanation of the fact that 
Peacocke goes on to provide the a priori arguments I will discuss below is that he thinks 
that the availability of such arguments is in part what is necessary for distinctively 
rational truth-conducive transitions.
According to Peacocke, one is entitled to form a certain belief if the belief is the 
product of a transition one is entitled to make; a partial answer to what comprises an 
entitled transition is captured by Peacocke’s first principle of rationalism:
Principle I: The Specia l Tru th-C onduciveness Thesis
A fundam ental and irreducible part o f  w hat m akes a transition  
one to which a th inker is entitled  is that the transition  tends to 
lead to true judgem en ts (or, in case the transition  relies on 
prem ises, tends to do so w hen its p rem ises are true) in a 
d istinctive way characteristic  o f  rational transitions. (Peacocke,
2004, p. 11)
This principle in effect states a necessary condition for entitlement, and in so doing gives 
an account of the truth-connection: truth-conduciveness is a necessary property of 
entitlements; what else is required, such as what it is for a transition to be rational, he 
does not say.
Almost immediately after stating this principle, Peacocke modifies it to account 
for the New Evil Demon intuition I defended in Chapter 3. In such ‘demon worlds’, 
Peacocke recognizes that one is entitled to various beliefs, despite the fact that the demon 
ensures that the transitions one makes are not (actually) truth-conducive. The
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requirement that the transition be truth-conducive in a distinctively rational way is to hold 
not in the actual world, but “only in worlds of a kind which one has a prima facie , 
defeasible entitlement to believe one is in.” (Peacocke, 2004, p. 13) The parallel with 
Goldman’s Normal Worlds Reliabilism is clear.
However, unlike Goldman’s externalist approach, the cogency of the Special 
Truth-Conduciveness Thesis will rest on the cogency of the argument for our entitlement 
to believe we are not the victims of an evil demon. Without such argument then at best 
we are left with de facto  conditional reliability, which by Peacocke’s lights, is not 
sufficient for entitlement. What Peacocke’s Intemalism amounts to, I suggest, is 
maintaining that a necessary condition of entitlement holding is the a priori availability 
of a sound argument that provides a justified presumption in favour of believing that we 
are in a ‘normal’ world, thus establishing that conditional reliability is likely actual. But 
before I evaluate the arguments Peacocke provides, what is the motivation for conceiving 
of the truth-connection in terms of truth-conduciveness?
Motivations for the Special Truth-Conduciveness Thesis:
The first motivation offered for this principle seems to be a conceptual truth about 
the nature of judgement. Peacocke writes, “It is a constitutive aim of judgement that one 
tries to judge that p  only if it is true that /?.” (Peacocke, 2004, p. 13) So far, so good — 
here Peacocke seems to be endorsing a version of a point that is more commonly 
expressed by saying that ‘belief aims at truth’. But given this, it is not clear how the next 
line follows. Peacocke continues, “Rational ways of coming to make judgements must 
be ones that tend to lead to the truth.” (Ibid.)
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First, this second sentence is incompatible with Peacocke’s own view that in the 
demon world one is still entitled to one’s beliefs -  the way these beliefs were formed 
does not tend to lead to truth nor affect their rationality. Second, how could a tendency 
for truth follow as a necessary condition from an aim of judgement? By analogy, an 
archer need have no less aimed at a target just because he misses his target. In fact, an 
archer could still aim at the target despite never hitting it, be it either because he is a very 
poor aim, or because an evil demon inevitably intervenes, and knocks his arrow off 
course. In general, there is no inference from ‘I am doing X to get Y ’, to ‘the only way I 
am justified in acting is in a Y-conducive way’. Perhaps one has evidence that X is Y- 
conducive, even if it is not. So while it may be true that the aim of judgement is truth, 
this does not motivate a notion of truth-conduciveness as the correct account of the truth- 
connection.
To clarify this further, note that by ‘tendency’ one could either mean the 
frequency with which something happens, or else the disposition for something to occur. 
These are distinct. Simply because something lacks a tendency in the first sense because 
it is blocked, e.g. rational ways of coming to make judgements might not actually lead to 
truth due to the meddlings of an evil demon, it does not follow that it lacks a tendency in 
the second sense. For example, a vase may have tendency to break if dropped because it 
is so disposed, even if that disposition is masked in the sense that the circumstances in 
which the disposition would manifest itself are not allowed to occur, e.g. the vase is 
wrapped in foam.
Similarly, someone might maintain that rational ways of coming to make 
judgements must be ones that tend to lead to truth in the sense that such a disposition
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exists, whether or not it is masked. It may well be true that dispositions exist, even when 
masked. However, my point is not that the existence of preventers is necessarily 
incompatible with the something having a given disposition. Rather, my point is that 
there is nothing about the aims of something that entails any tendencies, be they 
frequencies of something happening, or related dispositions. The aim of judgement may 
well be compatible with rational belief-forming methods tending to lead to truth, but such 
an aim does not support such a conclusion. These considerations presuppose the Special 
Truth-Conduciveness Thesis; they do motivate it, which is Peacocke’s intention.
Another way of illuminating the issue of whether or not rational ways of coming 
to make judgements must be ones that tend to lead to truth is to consider the case of 
induction. One might wonder: does the rationality of inductive inference depend on its 
being truth-conducive? This is far from obvious, and the traditional problem of induction 
shows just how difficult it is to convincingly justify that claim that induction is truth- 
conducive. But that is not to say that induction has nothing to do with truth. Even 
pragmatists tend to hold that induction exhibits a truth-connection, which is what in part 
supports the rationality of inductive inference.
For example, Reichenbach and his followers hold that one cannot prove 
inductively or deductively that induction will always, or even sometimes, lead to truth.71 
But they think that they can show that i f  there is any method of belief formation that leads 
to truth, and ultimately knowledge, induction will do so. That is, induction will succeed 
if any method will, so it is rational to have confidence in induction and its results.
71 For Richenbach’s original pragmatist response to the problem o f induction, see Reichenbach (1938) 
chapter 5, and Reichenbach (1949) chapter 11.
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The argument is very roughly that even though we cannot establish a priori the 
thesis that nature is uniform (which, following Hume, we might assume is a necessary 
suppressed premise of all inductive arguments), we can nevertheless examine that thesis 
and discover the following: if nature is uniform and induction is used, it will be 
successful; if nature is not uniform and induction is used, it will fail. However, if a 
method other than induction is used and nature is uniform, either success or failure is 
possible. But importantly, if a method other than induction is used and nature is not 
uniform, it must fail as well. (See Salmon, 1974, p.85-6 for presentation of this 
argument) This is because if the method did work, it would generate uniformity to which 
induction itself could be applied. So if that non-inductive method succeeds, then 
induction succeeds also. In short, “We have, therefore, everything to gain and nothing to 
lose by using induction. If induction fails, no other method could possibly succeed.” 
(Salmon, 1974, p. 86)
Of course, pragmatic approaches to the problem of induction are not without their
• . 72critics. But what is important here is that induction is often thought of as a paradigm of 
rational inference (somewhat paradoxically, given the difficulty of justifying induction), 
and yet there is no assurance that induction is truth-conducive. Yet even by pragmatist 
lights induction exhibits a truth-connection, albeit a lesser property than the one Peacocke 
advocates. This reinforces that it is not obvious that rationality or justification must be 
characterized in terms of truth-conduciveness as Peacocke maintains in his Special Truth- 
Conduciveness Thesis.
Peacocke goes on to offer three other motivations for his conception of the truth- 
connection in terms of truth-conduciveness. The first is an argument that a pure
72 See for example Lenz (1974).
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conceptual role theory of rationality is inadequate to account for the fact that judgement 
aims at truth. (Peacocke, 2004, p. 15) It is not clear that conceptual role accounts are not 
sufficient; but even if they are inadequate, it is not obvious that there is not another way 
of handling the fact that belief aims at truth. Below I present arguments against the truth- 
connection being characterized in terms of truth-conduciveness, so if one is facing the 
problem of the aim of belief, one needs another solution than the one Peacocke is 
advocating here.
The second is a claim that one cannot rule out spurious meanings unless one relies 
on considerations having to do with reference, semantic value and truth. (Ibid., p. 17)
The third is an argument to the effect that we cannot explain truth and reference in 
terms of reasons and entitlement. Rather, it must be the other way around. (Ibid., p. 21) 
Without developing these arguments further and evaluating them individually, 
one can easily see that they do not motivate an account of the truth-connection in terms of 
truth-conduciveness. The considerations Peacocke gives in support o f the principle, as he 
says, implicate “a role for a substantial notion of truth and reference in the explication of 
rationality.” (Ibid.) (emphasis added) That much may well be true. That is, perhaps we 
must “allude” to truth and reference to elucidate rationality, pace pure conceptual role 
theorists. But alluding to truth and giving it a substantial role in a theory of rationality is 
not equivalent to that role being one of truth-conduciveness (even in its conditional 
form). So the question remains; what motivates thinking of the truth-connection in terms 
of truth-conduciveness and reliability, especially given the firm and deeply-rooted 
intuitions I defended in connection with the New Evil Demon problem in Chapter 3 that 
count against such a conception? I conclude that there is no such motivation. The only
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constraint here is that there must be a truth connection if the justification in question is 
genuinely epistemic. But other than the connection not being one of actual truth- 
conduciveness, the exact nature of the connection is still an open question.
What if, despite what I have argued above, there is some motivation for positing 
that the connection between justified belief and truth is one of truth-conduciveness? In 
that case, after providing the motivation, in order to defend the Special Truth- 
Conduciveness Thesis in a way compatible with what I am calling Peacocke’s 
Intemalism, one would have to do two things: first, one would have to show that we are 
entitled to believe that we are in a non-demon world; second, one would have to show 
that in non-demon worlds the transitions are likely to result in true judgements. This is 
exactly what Peacocke attempts. I take these attempts as evidence that he thinks that 
such arguments are necessary for his Special Truth-Conducive Thesis to hold, since by 
his own admission, reliability on its own is insufficient for entitlement. If he did not 
think such arguments were necessary for this purpose, it would be a mystery why he 
modifies the principle in terms of truth-conduciveness only in worlds in which we are 
entitled to believe that we inhabit, and then go on to offer such arguments.
I will now show that Peacocke’s account sets a burden that he is unable to meet, 
and in fact, the burden may be impossible to meet. This results in its being inconclusive 
whether or not any of our beliefs are justified. As such, Peacocke’s account must be 
rejected, which in turn further reinforces the conclusions of Chapter 3 that truth- 
conduciveness (actual, and now, conditional) is not the correct account of the truth- 
connection.
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4.4. Peacocke’s A priori Arguments Against Scepticism:
Peacocke offers two arguments to the best explanation that aim to refute 
scepticism and establish the reliability of sense perception, respectively. The arguments 
are closely related, and in fact share their first two premises. It is perhaps best, therefore, 
to see the second argument as an elaboration of the first. Peacocke’s argument that we 
are entitled to believe that we are in a non-sceptical world can be summarised as follows:
1) Experiences with content are com plex. (Peacocke, 2004, p. 86-7)
2) A complex phenomenon is more likely to have a com plexity-reducing explanation than 
an explanation that does not reduce com plexity or no explanation at all. (Ibid., p. 83; 95)
3) Sceptical explanations o f  our content-bearing experiences do not reduce com plexity. 
(Ibid., p. 90-1)
4) Our standard explanations o f  those experiences do reduce com plexity. (Ibid.)
Therefore, we are entitled to believe that we are in a standard, non-sceptical world.
Much in the argument hangs both on the notion of complexity as well as the complexity- 
reduction principle expressed in premise 2. As Peacocke uses the term, complex 
phenomena are ones that seem improbable but in fact have an explanation of why they 
occur, for example, like the structure of a snowflake. (For examples of complexity in his 
sense, see Peacocke, 2004, p. 75-86) Something is an instance of complexity when the 
range of exemplified properties is narrow compared to the range of all possible 
properties. To take Peacocke’s example of a snowflake, it exhibits a complex structure, 
since of all the possible ways it could have been, it exhibits six-fold symmetry, rather 
than any other shape. Perceptual experience is similarly complex in this sense, since a 
perceptual experience exemplifies only a narrow range of possible properties that it could 
have otherwise had.
Premise 2 supposedly embodies a kind of complexity-reduction principle. Peacocke 
officially formulates the principle as follows:
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Complexity Reduction Principle: Other things equal, g o o d
explanations o f  com plex phenomena explain the more com plex  
phenomena in terms o f  the less com plex; they reduce 
com plexity. (Peacocke, 2004, p. 83) (em phasis added)
This principle, which just states a necessary condition of good explanations, is 
immediately followed by the metaphysical principle that I paraphrased in Premise 2:
Qualified Principle o f  Sufficient Reason: Other things equal, it 
is more probab le  that a com plex phenom enon has a com plexity- 
reducing explanation than that it has no explanation, or that it has 
one that does not reduce com plexity. (Ibid.) (em phasis added)
Peacocke takes both of these principles to be knowable a priori. He tells us that the 
thought behind these principles is that it is more likely that things come about in easier 
ways, and that for the most part, it is more rational to believe that things come about in 
these ways. Peacocke repeatedly emphasizes throughout his discussion that the notion of 
probability he is interested in is an objective, mind-independent matter.
The third and fourth premises of the argument hold that sceptical arguments are 
not complexity reducing, and so should be rejected in favour of standard natural selection 
explanations as the cause of our perceptual experiences. According to Peacocke, a 
complexity-reducing explanation is one where the phenomenon appealed to has less 
complexity than the phenomenon to be explained. The problem with sceptical 
hypotheses is that they allegedly reproduce or multiply the complexity, not reduce it. 
Typical sceptical scenarios are filled with unexplained explainers, such as issues 
concerning the intentions of the evil demon, or why and how random events can give rise 
to our perceptual experiences. So, given the need to explain our perceptual experience, 
and given the alleged inadequacy of sceptical scenarios, combined with a qualified 
version of the principle of sufficient reason, Peacocke concludes by inference to the best
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(complexity-reducing) explanation that we are entitled to believe that we are in a 
standard, non-sceptical world.
Before evaluating this argument, I will briefly outline Peacocke’s second anti- 
sceptical argument, since it shares the same problems as his first. The second argument 
is designed to establish that transitions from perceptual experience to perceptual belief 
are likely to result in true judgements in non-sceptical worlds. This conclusion aims to 
elaborate the conclusion of the first argument by showing that not only are we entitled to 
believe that we are in non-sceptical world, but that the perceptual beliefs we form are 
usually true. Peacocke’s argument for the reliability o f sense perception can be 
summarized as follows:
1) Perceptual experiences are com plex. (Peacocke, 2004 , p. 86-7)
2) A  com plex phenomenon is more likely to have a com plexity-reducing explanation than 
an explanation that does not reduce com plexity or no explanation at all. (Ibid., p. 83; 95)
3) A natural selection explanation o f  the occurrence o f  perceptual experiences is 
complexity-reducing. (Ibid., p. 87-8; 98)
4) It is not clear that any other explanation is com plexity-reducing. (Ibid.)
5) Therefore, a natural selection explanation o f  the occurrence o f  perceptual experiences is 
probably true, (from 2, 3, and 4)
6) A natural selection explanation entails that those experiences are usually veridical.
Therefore, transitions from those experiences to content-endorsing judgem ents usually result in 
true judgem ents. In other words, transitions from perceptual experience to perceptual b e lie f are 
truth-conducive.
Premises 1 and 2 are the same as Peacocke’s first formulation of the anti-sceptical 
argument. I will grant premises 3 and 4 for the sake o f argument. While premise 6 has 
been questioned, I will not address it here. The most problematic premise is one shared 
by both formulations of the argument: premise 2, the complexity-reducing premise. 
What does seem both a priori and true is the Complexity Reduction Principle that states
73 The main argument that questions if evolution (without G od’s help) necessarily selects for truth- 
conducive cognitive faculties is Plantinga’s so-called ‘Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism’. For an 
expression o f this argument, and a collection o f essays critically evaluating it, see Beilby (2002).
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that all else being equal, good explanations of complex phenomena explain the more 
complex phenomena in terms of the less complex. This is a truth about what makes for 
good explanation. Notice that this is not necessarily the same thing as a true explanation. 
A good explanation may have moral, aesthetic or pragmatic virtues. Peacocke surely 
recognizes this, which explains his appeal to his Qualified Principle of Sufficient Reason.
Recall that this principle is cast in terms of truth, not in terms of what makes for a 
good explanation. It states that, all else being equal, it is more probable that a complex 
phenomenon has a complexity-reducing explanation than that it has no explanation, or 
that it has one that does not reduce complexity. It is this principle that is required for 
Peacocke’s argument to hold. Peacocke claims that this principle is a priori. It is not 
analytic, so presumably it is intended as a synthetic a priori truth. Unfortunately, 
however, it is just not clear if this principle is true, so at best it is inconclusive if the 
argument is sound.
To see why this is so, consider again the six-step reconstruction of Peacocke’s 
argument above. The overall strategy is as follows: we know, as common sense assures 
us, that many of our explanations are true. Taking Peacocke’s examples, we know that 
natural selection is the correct explanation of biological evolution, including the 
evolution and proper functioning of our perceptual faculties. We also take ourselves to 
know why snowflakes form as they do; to add a further example, we know why certain 
treatments cure some diseases rather than others. Peacocke then notes that what is 
common between these true explanations is that they are complexity-reducing in his 
sense. So from explanations known to be true on one hand, and a disposition to believe 
that these explanations are complexity reducing on the other, Peacocke reasons that there
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is a (justified) presumption to believe that complexity reduction connects with truth. 
What Peacocke is arguing for is a presumption (albeit a defeasible one) that complexity 
reduction is a sign of truth. Therefore, providing a single counter-example of a correct 
explanation that increases or reproduces complexity will not count against such a 
presumption.
However, the first problem with the Qualified Principle of Sufficient Reason and 
the use of complexity-reduction is that we cannot know a priori the correctness o f the 
explanations we take ourselves to know that Peacocke appeals to. Take the explanations 
that we know to be true that Peacocke cites as data for the basis of his inference to the 
best explanation that these (true) explanations are non-accidentally complexity-reducing: 
natural selection in biology, and the six-fold symmetry of snowflakes. These things are 
both true, and known to be true (common sense tells us), but they are NOT  known a 
priori. To be sure, these are paradigms o f success in the empirical sciences, not 
discoveries that could have been made from the armchair. Accordingly, it is difficult to 
see how Peacocke can gain a priori support for his principle on this manifestly a 
posteriori basis.
A second concern is whether we are entitled to take as known the data that 
Peacocke does in this context. Take the perceptual experience referred to in premise 1, 
for example. Whose perceptual experiences is Peacocke talking about? His own, or the 
experiences of others as well? If he is including other’s experiences too, is he entitled to 
presuppose the existence of other minds at this stage o f the argument? If he is only 
talking about his own experiences, then maybe the correct explanation of them is not one
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in terms of natural selection. How does he know that he has been around to test the value 
of experiences?
Common sense does assure us that we know that, for example, minds other than 
our own exist, or that our best evolutionary theory is (at least approximately) true. This is 
not problematic in an everyday context, or in scientific practice. However, here Peacocke 
is mounting arguments for the reliability of sense perception, and against the possibility 
of being a brain in vat -  in short, Peacocke is offering abductive arguments against 
scepticism. Since the falsity of scepticism is what he intends to prove we are justified in 
believing, he cannot presuppose the falsity of scepticism by taking it that we know the 
explanations he appeals to are true, e.g. that there have been millions of years of 
evolution, without begging the question.
The third problem is that the Qualified Principle of Sufficient Reason is intended
in terms of objective, metaphysical probability, but the kind of possibility that Peacocke
draws on when trying to gamer intuitive support for the principle is epistemic probability.
It is certainly true that we prefer complexity-reducing explanations, but why is it
supposed to be true that such explanations are likely to exist? What Peacocke tends to
say in support of this are things like the following:
A good theory must not only explain the occurrence o f  
experiences; it should also explain w ithout extrem e im probability  
and without pushing the question back w hy there is the 
instantiation o f  just that com plex network o f  relations involved  
in those experiences having the contents they do. (Peacocke,
2004, p. 97) (emphasis added)
The question is, if the kind of improbability is not epistemic, how do we judge a priori if 
the explanation given is improbable or not? Improbable relative to what? How could we 
know such a thing? And even if complexity-reduction is ever satisfied, how can we ever
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tell that it is the simplest explanation (and not just one of the simplest explanations)? It is 
of course easy to tell what seems simple and more complex to us, but the question here is 
justifying the judgement that a given explanation is in fac t the simplest one.
One possible answer (that would need development and defense) is that 
conceivability, which is an epistemic notion, is somehow a guide to metaphysical 
possibility. But even if this is true, is it really inconceivable that a complex phenomenon 
has no explanation, or if it does, it cannot be as complex, (or even more so), than that 
which it explains? While perhaps unsatisfying, on the face of it there does not seem to be 
anything inconceivable here, and hence by hypothesis, there is no impossibility. If this is 
not a reason to think that Peacocke’s principle is true, and his stated defense is 
inadequate, can we find another explanation for why he is misled into thinking that he 
knows the Qualified Principle of Sufficient Reason a priori?
The best explanation of why Peacocke unjustifiably thinks that the Qualified 
Principle o f Sufficient Reason is necessarily true is that he thinks it follows from a related 
but distinct genuine a priori truth. Peacocke asserts: “That it is rational to hold that 
things have come about in a way in which they are more likely to have come about seems 
to be an a priori principle.” (Peacocke, 2004, p. 83) The implication seems to be that it 
is a rational thing to believe precisely because it is true (perhaps in virtue of meaning 
alone, no less; or at least knowable a priori if the claim is synthetic) that it is more likely 
that things come about in easier, rather than in more improbable or difficult ways. The 
difficulty is that one ought to be agnostic about what is an easy way for something to 
come about, given that we are concerned with objective, metaphysical possibilities. This 
is compounded by the fact that when considering the reliability of sense perception and
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the possibility that we may be brains in a vat, we have no idea what the initial conditions 
are, which renders impossible judgements (let alone a priori judgements) about the ease 
in which things can objectively come about. Further, the point remains that while it is of 
course easy to tell what seems like the simplest explanation, the difficult question here is 
justifying the judgement that a given explanation is in fac t the simplest one.
In short, the problem with Peacocke’s arguments is that it is simply not 
convincing that we can know a priori that the simple is the sign of the true. But even if it 
was known a priori, difficulties remain in the application of the principle. Without this 
key premise that complexity reduction is a reason to think something is true, Peacocke 
cannot show that we are entitled to believe that we are in a non-sceptical world. Without 
this key premise, by Peacocke’s own admission, he cannot show  that the transitions we 
make are truth-conducive, which in turn undermines his first principle of rationalism in 
that Peacocke makes our being entitled dependent on being able to show that such 
transitions are likely to result in truth. Without this principle, Peacocke has no 
explanatory basis for perceptual entitlement, and no account of the truth connection. 
Worse, since Peacocke’s Intemalism makes being justified dependent on being able to 
positively show a priori that we are in a non-sceptical world, and since he fails to 
establish this conclusion, he fails to account for the fact that certain beliefs of ours are 
obviously justified.
In light of the inconclusiveness of Peacocke’s arguments, where do we stand? 
Since Peacocke’s Intemalism is incompatible with showing that the conditional reliability 
truth-connection holds, at best we are left with the de facto  conditional reliability of our 
belief-forming processes. But given the falsity o f extemalism, such a relation is
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insufficient for justification. But is de facto  reliability nevertheless necessary for 
justification? On the one hand, it does not seem to be possible to prove that conditional 
reliability is not present whenever epistemic justification is. On the other, that is not 
required for our purposes here, which is to explore the plausibility o f endorsing the claim 
that a necessary condition of being justified is the availability, a priori, o f a sound 
argument that positively establishes that we are in a ‘normal’ world (what I have been 
calling ‘Peacocke’s Intemalism’). But no such argument is available and we are 
nevertheless justified; therefore, satisfying such a condition cannot be a necessary 
condition for justification obtaining.
To clarify this, consider a world, CR, where a subject S’s beliefs would have been 
reliable, had an evil demon not ensured that they are mostly false. Intuitively, such a 
world is one where the subject’s belief-forming mechanisms are conditionally reliable. 
Now consider a world, CR*, which is subjectively accessible to S in all the same ways as 
CR, but we stipulate that S’s belief-forming mechanisms are NOT conditionally reliable, 
i.e. had the demon not ensured that S’s beliefs are mostly false, they still would have not 
been mostly true. Is a world like CR* possible? It does not seem as if it is. Given that 
the subject is aware of all the same things in both worlds, if a way of forming a belief is 
conditionally reliable in one world, it must be conditionally reliable in the other.
For example, being conscious of a visual experience as of having hands prima 
facie  justifies a belief that one has hands. It is possible that a demon could ensure that 
forming a belief that one has hands on a basis of that kind of experience might be highly 
unreliable. But if no demon intervenes, one might surely insist that forming a belief in 
this way is reliable. Accordingly, forming beliefs in this way is conditionally reliable,
one might maintain. But how could there be a world where experiences o f having hands 
are accessible to the subject, but that forming beliefs about whether or not one has hands 
on that basis would not likely result in true beliefs, even if the world was normal? Such a 
world seems impossible.
However, the preceding considerations were raised from a third-person, not a 
first-person perspective, which is key to kind of epistemic intemalism we are discussing. 
From the first-person, reflective perspective, we cannot access, prove, or show a priori 
that we are justified in believing that the conditional reliability relation holds, or that we 
are in non-sceptical worlds. So while things may be normal, or conditional reliability 
may be present when we are justified in believing as we do, if  we had to have a sound a 
priori argument available to show this as a necessary condition of being justified, then we 
would lack epistemic justification for most (if not all) o f our beliefs. But given that we 
are justified in believing many of the things we do, satisfying such a condition must not 
be necessary for epistemic justification. This of course presupposes that we are justified 
in much of what we believe. But this is permissible in this context because I am not 
arguing against scepticism, but rather, am aiming to elucidate the nature of epistemic 
justification itself. (For more on presupposing ‘Particularism’ as a methodological 
constraint throughout this thesis, see the Introduction)
A final set of complications arise that count against accepting conditional 
reliability as a necessary condition on epistemic justification. Essential to approaches 
like Goldman’s and Peacocke’s is the notion o f a normal world, as well as reliability. 
While throughout this chapter I have been charitably proceeding as if these are 
serviceable notions, it is not clear that either of these notions can be made precise enough
to be of any use. To be sure, Goldman’s description of what constitutes a ‘normal’ world 
must be false. Recall Goldman’s claim:
We have a large set o f  common beliefs about the actual world: 
general beliefs about the sorts o f  objects, events, and changes 
that occur in it. We have beliefs about the kinds o f  things that, 
realistically, can and do happen. Our beliefs on this score 
generate what I shall call the set o f  norm al w orlds. These are 
worlds consistent with our gen eral beliefs about the actual 
world, (original emphasis) (Goldman, 1986, p. 107)
So what fixes the normal worlds is our shared set of common general beliefs about the 
world. But what if these beliefs were wild, crazy, and unfounded? For example, what if 
we are considering general beliefs about the world held by primitive people, the 
uneducated, the insane, and even between different cultural groups? These general 
beliefs obviously vary widely. Why should we care that a belief would be true in those 
worlds? At best, perhaps beliefs that would be true in those worlds would be blamelessly 
held, depending on how those beliefs were formed and maintained, but blameless belief 
is not the same thing as justified belief.74
Also, if the beliefs defining normal worlds are quite general, then there will be a 
whole set of worlds under that description and there will be no guarantee that our belief 
forming methods will be reliable in all o f them. This is because it is just not clear how 
much should be included in defining a normal world. For example, most people do not 
have beliefs about whether or not lighting conditions are normal, nor do most people 
have views about the incidence of hallucination, illusion, etc. So there is no guarantee 
that in so-called normal worlds our belief forming methods are likely to be reliable. As 
such, it is hard to see how an appeal to perceived ‘normality’ will help in assuring truth-
74 See 5.3. For a further defense of this claim, see Pryor (2001).
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conduciveness (even conditionally). There is a more to ‘normal’ worlds than those that 
are picked out by beliefs that a given group of people might happen to hold.
Further problems arise if the beliefs that define the normal worlds are too general. 
If the beliefs are too general, they may pick out an infinite number of worlds. The 
problem with this is two-fold: first, it is unrealistically demanding necessary condition of 
being justified that the subject be reliable in an infinite number of worlds; second, it 
would be impossible to judge whether the subject actually is ever justified, since we do 
not have the ability to judge what would be true of an infinite number of different 
possibilia. Intuitively, whatever else is true of ‘normal worlds’, there is not an infinite 
number of them. Also, if the beliefs that define normal worlds are very general, it is 
likely that at least some of these beliefs will be inconsistent. If they are inconsistent, then 
there will be no world where they are all true. In effect, some of the ‘normal worlds’ as 
defined will be impossible worlds, and as such it undermines the idea that belief is 
justified only if it is true in ‘normal worlds’, since there may be no such worlds.
Peacocke might be thought to be more convincing on this score since he holds 
that the requirement that the transition be truth-conducive in a distinctively rational way 
is to hold not in the actual world, or in a ‘normal’ world as Goldman defines it, but “only 
in worlds of a kind which one has a prima facie , defeasible entitlement to believe one is 
in.” (Peacocke, 2004, p. 13) The essential difference here is that one must be entitled or 
justified  in believing that the world is normal. But other than saying that by definition 
‘normal’ worlds are non-sceptical worlds, it is difficult to say anything much more 
informative than that. As a first attempt, one might think a normal world is one whose 
existence is mind-independent, which obeys causal laws, and which is filled with material
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objects, persons and other animals. But o f course different philosophers have denied 
each of these things. Naturally, the fact that philosophers disagree does not show that no 
one is justified in believing certain things about the world rather than others, but it does 
complicate matters by making it sometimes difficult to tell what a ‘normal’ world is, 
because it is sometimes difficult to tell what one is justified in believing, in part due to 
the possible defeating effects of one’s awareness of the disagreement of one’s epistemic
75peers.
But a more serious objection here is that Peacocke’s account makes it nearly 
impossible to determine which are the relevant worlds in which truth-conduciveness is 
supposed to hold. Unlike ‘actual’ world reliabilism where it is clear which world 
reliability is meant to hold in, namely the world the subject occupies, Peacocke makes 
relevant all the worlds in which one has prima fac ie , defeasible entitlement to believe one 
is in. But prima facie  defeasible entitlement is very easy to come by. For example, on 
many accounts of testimony, merely having someone tell me that p  gives me some prima 
facie  justification to believe that /?76, in which case it seems that nearly every world view 
I have ever been told about becomes relevant on Peacocke’s account. It therefore 
becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to keep track of which worlds’ conditional 
reliability is supposed to hold in, and so it is difficult to make sound judgements 
concerning whether or not justification is present.
75 Might principles like Sensitivity or Safety be used as ways o f handling conditional reliability and in 
defining normal worlds? So for example, perhaps a normal world is one in which one’s beliefs are Safe? A 
difficulty here is that both Safety and Sensitivity are externalist principles, and so it is difficult to see how 
they could be used to vindicate either Peacocke’s Intemalism  or kinds of intemalism that embrace the 
Awareness Condition. For more on these epistemic principles, see footnote 58 and 83.
76 For a detailed defense o f a non-reductive account o f testimony, see Coady (1992).
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So far I have been raising concerns about the question of where (in which worlds) 
one must be reliable if one is to have justified beliefs. But there remains the question of 
what must be reliable.77 I have been speaking throughout this chapter of ‘belief-forming 
processes’ and ‘belief-forming mechanisms’ as what must be conditionally reliable. A 
token method or way of forming beliefs that results in true belief is of a more general type 
of method or way of forming beliefs that can be more or less reliable. However, which 
types of methods are the relevant ones here? This has become known as the ‘generality
7 8problem’ for reliabilism. A process type can be individuated more or less finely, with 
the associated reliability varying widely. For example, when I form a belief about what 
time it is on the basis of what my watch says, which method am I using whose reliability 
is to be assessed? Is it perception or visual perception or visual perception in good 
lighting or visual perception in good lighting when sober, etc. etc.? Some of these 
methods are far more reliable than others, and yet it seems difficult (if not impossible) to 
non-arbitrarily say which method is the one whose reliability is relevant to whether or not 
epistemic justification obtains.
If intemalism required the availability a priori o f arguments concerning reliability 
in normal worlds as part of what is necessary for distinctively rational truth-conducive 
transitions as Peacocke maintains, then the Generality Problem seems to be a problem 
that needs to be solved. However, since the problem seems either unsolvable or too 
difficult to address in a non-trivial and informative way, then this counts further in favour
77 Scott Sturgeon is a philosopher who distinguishes what he calls the Reliability-Where problem from the 
Reliability-of-What problem that arise for Process Reliabilism. For a discussion of these problems, see 
Sturgeon (2000), p. 96.
78 See Conee and Feldman (1998) for the development o f this objection against Process Reliabilism.
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of not employing the notion of reliability as a necessary condition on justification 
obtaining, on pain of unacceptable scepticism.
In summary, without being able to positively show that we are in non-sceptical 
worlds, we are at best aware of a conditional reason to think that our beliefs are true -  a 
condition that we are not justified in believing is met. And assuming that being able (at 
least in principle) to demonstrate that truth-conduciveness is necessary for justification, 
we are left with the unacceptable result that our beliefs only may be justified. However, 
given that at least some of our beliefs obviously are justified, we need actual reason to 
think our beliefs are true. But this is not something we can get, given Intemalism (of any 
reasonable form) if truth-conduciveness was indeed necessary for justification.
Therefore, in light of the seemingly insurmountable difficulties associated with 
conceiving of the truth-connection in terms of truth-conduciveness in either actual or 
conditional form, I suggest we reject Peacocke’s account and look elsewhere for an 
account of the relation between justified belief and truth. I will propose an alternative 
account of the Truth-Connection in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
A  P o s i t i v e  A c c o u n t  o f  t h e  T r u t h  C o n n e c t i o n  o r  W h a t  M a k e s  J u s t i f i c a t i o n  
E p i s t e m i c  (a n d  Is J u s t i f i c a t i o n  D i s t i n c t  F r o m  K n o w l e d g e )?
5.1. Introduction:
Epistemic justification is different from other kinds of justification. Moral, 
aesthetic and pragmatic justification (if there are such things), seem to essentially relate 
to goodness, beauty and usefulness, respectively. What individuates epistemic 
justification, from the other types, is some connection to truth. So far we have seen what 
this connection is not: in Chapter 3 I showed that justification need not be actually truth- 
conducive. In Chapter 4 I argued further that, given epistemic intemalism of any 
reasonable form, the truth-connection cannot even be one of truth-conduciveness in a 
conditional mode. In this chapter I will argue that the connection between justification 
and truth is conceptual.
By a conceptual connection I mean that, in virtue of the concepts involved, there 
are entailments between the concepts, and that grasping a concept is sufficient to grasp 
concepts that are conceptually connected to it. For example, there are conceptual 
connections between the concept bachelor and the concepts unmarried and man. There 
are entailments between being a bachelor and being an unmarried man —being a bachelor 
is sufficient for being an unmarried man; likewise, being an unmarried man is necessary 
for being a bachelor. Furthermore, grasping the concept bachelor is sufficient to 
appreciate these entailments a priori.
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Similarly, I will argue that in virtue of the concepts themselves, epistemic 
justification and truth are conceptually connected. That is, certain entailments hold 
between the concepts of epistemic justification and truth, and that grasping the concept of 
epistemic justification is sufficient to appreciate these entailments a priori.
Specifically, I will argue that epistemic justification is epistemic because it turns 
on evidence; evidence in turn is epistemic because it is conceptually linked with truth. 
That is, it is not possible to competently employ the concept of evidence without 
appreciating that it counts in favour of the truth of that which it is evidence for, just as 
one cannot competently employ the concept of bachelorhood without appreciating that it 
applies to all and only unmarried men. Epistemic justification, therefore, is conceptually
7 9linked with the truth (via evidence), which is what makes it distinctively epistemic.
Before elucidating these connections, I will motivate and defend the idea that 
being justified is a kind of epistemic success or accomplishment. I will then proceed to 
argue that being epistemically justified is a kind of epistemic standing distinct from 
knowledge, before returning to the conceptual connections between justification and 
truth.
79 Again, my primary focus in this work is the justification o f perceptual belief, but in the future I hope to 
extend this account to other areas o f epistemic justification, such as memory and beliefs justified a priori.
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5.2. On Epistemic Ends/Goals:
It has long been suggested that ‘belief aims at truth’, although there has been
80much disagreement as to how exactly this metaphorical slogan is to be understood. 
One might think that since belief aims at truth, and epistemic justification is a property of 
beliefs that is also truth-connected, perhaps they ‘aim’ at truth in similar ways. So one 
might think that the nature of the connection between epistemic justification and truth can 
be elucidated once the notion of ‘aim’ is understood.
For example, it has recently been suggested that the ‘aim’ of belief is to be 
understood in functional terms, which while still not entirely clear in itself, is perhaps 
intuitively somewhat clearer in this context, given that talk of ‘function’ is not 
metaphorical. Intuitively, something’s function is what it is suited or designed for, or 
even more simply, what it does.
Tyler Burge suggests that by reflecting on the nature of a perceptual system, “it 
[...] is obvious that it is known a priori that the central representational function o f a 
perceptual system is to perceive. This function is a priori associated with a
o 1
representational function (to represent veridically).” (Ibid. p. 508) The “fundamental 
representational good”, according to Burge, is “truth”. (Burge, 2003, p. 506) Because 
Burge holds that the function of a representational system is to represent veridically, he 
holds that the function of a system of beliefs is to represent truth, since they are
80 Bernard Williams first coined the phrase that ‘belief aims at truth’ (1973). See Velleman (2000) and 
Wedgewood (2002) for interpretations and defenses of this claim. Owens (2003) argues that belief has no 
aim.
81 Alexander Bird is another philosopher who contends that the ‘aim’ of belief is to be understood in terms 
of function. Although he does not argue for this claim or explain how he knows it, presumably he 
disagrees with Burge that it can be known a priori as he claims that cognitive faculties have essential 
functions in the way that bodily organs do. See Bird (2007). This is because what function an organ has is 
surely not knowable a priori. 1 take it that, for example, the heart’s function of pumping blood was an 
empirical discovery, not something knowable from the armchair.
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representational states that in part comprise that system. Burge reinforces this point in 
the following way, “Understanding what a belief is suffices a priori to warrant the view 
that such a system has a function to represent truths. Beliefs aim at truth, and are 
defective in a certain way if they are not true.” (Burge, 2003, p. 509)
However, ordinary usage may count against speaking of beliefs as ‘defective’ if 
they are false. We do talk of measuring instruments, such as thermometers, as defective 
if they give false readings. But we do not call the readings themselves defective, but 
merely false or incorrect. Similarly, perhaps perceptual belief-forming mechanisms aim 
at truth in the sense that it is their function to represent truths, and are defective if they 
result in false beliefs. The beliefs themselves, while not defective, are false or incorrect. 
If so, Burge may have the materials to explain the metaphor of the aim of belief in terms 
of function. I interpret his claim that ‘belief aims at truth’ as meaning that beliefs are 
individuated by the facts that their function  is to represent truths, and that the state 
presents itself as “committal” in a certain way. (Ibid., p. 524) That is, a belief is a mental 
state whose function is to represent its content as actual, as opposed to merely neutrally 
or hypothetically.
Much more needs to be said about the aim of belief, but suppose one grants that it 
is to be understood in terms of function, and that the function of belief is to represent 
truths, so that beliefs are individuated from other mental states as ones that are essentially 
truth-directed. Is the function of epistemic justification to be spelled out in terms of truth 
as well? I will argue that even granting assumptions about the function of belief, there 
must be a difference in the aim of epistemic justification over belief, since, somewhat 
paradoxically, there is nothing inherently epistemic in a truth aim as such. It is easy to
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overestimate how much epistemic import arises from belief having a truth-related 
function, even though truth has some essential connection to justification. From the 
assumption that the function of belief is truth, it does not follow that the function of 
epistemic justification is truth, even though belief is the state of which justification is a 
property. As we will see, this is because epistemic justification does not just turn on 
merely what is believed, but rather, how , or as we might more naturally say, why it is 
believed.
To see why this is so, consider a suggestion Richard Feldman makes about the 
essence of an epistemological duty: “Epistemological duties are duties that one must 
carry out in order to be successful from an intellectual (or epistemological) perspective.” 
(Feldman, 2002, p. 376) Whether or not there are epistemic duties, the same basic point 
seems true of epistemic norms. Norms govern how something should operate. Epistemic 
norms, therefore, are standards for the proper functioning of the epistemic system. If  this 
is correct, then by identifying epistemic success, as well as what it requires, we will 
thereby uncover what epistemic norms are, as well as what makes them uniquely 
epistemic.
On a teleological account, success is measured relative to goals. In the case of 
epistemology, therefore, epistemic success is a matter of achieving the epistemic goal(s). 
(Feldman, 2002, p. 377) I intend to show that maximal success consists not of simply 
achieving the relevant goals, but in achieving them in the right kind of way. Much 
depends on identifying the correct epistemic goal(s). The standard epistemic goal is the 
one that William Alston puts as follows, viz., “the aim [of] maximizing truth and 
minimizing falsity in a large body of beliefs.” (Alston, 1989a, p. 83) The rationale for
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this specific goal is not entirely clear, and I also raised a general difficulty for goals that 
involved maximizing two competing elements in chapter 1.2. If it is true that belief aims 
at truth, then perhaps there is the goal of believing truly for each belief that one holds. 
But this is a different goal from one of maximizing truth and minimizing falsehood in a 
large body of beliefs. If one aimed at believing truly for each belief one held (because 
belief aims at truth), and happened to form a large number of beliefs that were mostly 
beliefs, then one would thereby come to achieve the latter goal, but not by aiming at it.
Whatever the rationale for the standard truth-maximizing goal (if there is one), 
even assuming that the general problem regarding decidability I raised in chapter 1 can be 
solved, I agree with Feldman that this goal is inappropriate as the epistemic goal in that it 
gives the counter-intuitive result that one can obtain epistemic success if one stumbles 
upon truth by dumb luck. (Feldman, 2002, p. 378) For example, one might adopt a true 
belief because of one’s own efforts, as a result of reflecting carefully, the weighing of 
reasons, or exercising their perceptual faculties with excellence. By contrast, someone 
might adopt that same belief as a result of guesswork, wishful thinking, stubbornness, 
bias, etc. The “truth-goal” alone does not have the resources to account for why only the 
first subject’s beliefs are epistemically better than the second.
Likewise, it follows from this goal that a person fails epistemically if  she believes 
falsely, even if she used perfectly reasonable, reliable (albeit fallible) belief-forming 
methods. (Feldman, 2002, p. 378) As I showed in Chapters 3 and 4, this is false. These 
considerations show that the epistemic goal needs to reflect that epistemic success is not 
just a matter of what is believed, but why it is believed, as I alluded to above. This will 
ensure that satisfying the epistemic goal is an accomplishment, a genuine achievement on
the subject’s part, and not just something that can be arrived at by sheer fluke by 
stumbling upon truth.
82A second proposal might then be that the epistemic goal is to have knowledge. 
From this goal, therefore, one would attain epistemic success if one has knowledge. This 
goal is certainly an improvement over the truth goal, since it keeps what is appealing 
about the truth goal while ruling out its weaknesses. This is so for two reasons: 1) since 
knowledge is factive, the knowledge goal includes the truth goal, since one cannot know 
that p  without p  being true. So whatever appeal the truth goal has is incorporated in the 
knowledge goal. 2) The knowledge goal rules out what is undesirable about the truth 
goal, namely that one could discover it through sheer accident and dumb luck. 
Knowledge excludes the possibility that the truth of what is believed is entirely 
accidental.83 Knowledge also meets the desideratum that emerged above, namely, that 
what is crucial is why the proposition is believed, thereby ensuring that satisfying the
82 For example, Williamson writes: “Knowledge sets the standard o f appropriateness for belief... Mere 
believing is a kind of botched knowing. In short, belief aims at knowledge (not just truth).” (Williamson, 
2000, p. 47)
83 While I take it that it is a platitude that knowledge excludes certain kinds o f luck, e.g. it is because of the 
presence of too much of the relevant kind o f luck that one fails to know in a Gettier case, knowledge is 
compatible with other sorts o f luck. For example, I can know that the meeting is at 5pm tonight by reading 
a posted sign that I just luckily happen to pass. If I had not taken the path I did, I would not have seen the 
sign, and so would not have known about the meeting. So in a sense, it is pure luck that I believed as I did. 
Such luck, however, is compatible with knowledge.
While the problem of epistemic luck is a difficult one, the solution will no doubt require relativization to 
the method used in forming the belief in question. For example, one might hold a Safety principle which 
states roughly that a necessary condition on knowing that p  is that one’s belief could not have been easily 
false while using the same (or very similar) belief forming method.
So one does not know that one sees a bam based on its looking like a bam if the bam is situated in a field 
of visually indiscriminable fake bams. This is because in very nearby worlds in which one believes that 
one sees a bam because one seems to see a bam, one’s belief is false (because one is looking at a fake). 
Here it is mere luck (of the relevant kind) that one’s belief is true, and so it does not constitute knowledge.
By contrast, one knows that the meeting is at 5pm based on reading a sign to that effect since there is no 
nearby world where one reads a sign about what time the meeting is and that belief is false. It may be luck 
that one saw the sign one did, but there is no luck between forming a belief based on what the sign says and 
the truth of that belief. In short, intuitively knowledge is compatible with certain kinds o f luck, and 
incompatible with others.
Of course problems remain, including how to non-trivially individuate belief-forming methods. 
For more on the issue of epistemic luck, see Pritchard (2005). For a defense o f the unorthodox thesis that 
there can be ‘lucky’ knowledge (i.e. a denial o f the anti-luck platitude), see Hetherington (2001).
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epistemic goal is an accomplishment. So far, the knowledge goal looks like an appealing 
way of characterizing epistemic success.
Knowledge is admittedly a kind of epistemic success, but it is not the only kind. 
To see that it is not, consider cases where everything is going as well as it could as far as 
the subject is concerned, but what is believed is false. It may turn out that the subject 
believes that p, is justified in believing that p  and bases his belief on those grounds (in a 
way that is not ‘Gettiered’), but that since the world is, so to speak, not cooperating, p  is 
false (say because a sceptical scenario obtains). Here, the subject is doing everything she 
ought to be doing, and one would know that p  if things were as they appear, but since 
they are not, she fails to know. What goes awry, however, is something beyond the 
subject’s control and powers of perception. It seems that since the only factor that is 
different in the two cases between where the subject knows and where she does not know 
has nothing to do with the subject (but rather, just whether or not p  is true — which is 
entirely up to the world, so to speak), then whether the subject actually knows cannot be 
the only thing that constitutes epistemic success. Being justified is also a kind of 
epistemic success. What it is to be justified is o f course an open question, a question that 
this thesis attempts in part to answer.
By analogy, consider a practical case o f a medical doctor writing a prescription 
for an ill patient. Under what circumstances is such an action justified? To be sure, 
whether or not the prescribed drugs actually cure the patient is irrelevant to whether the 
doctor’s action was justified. We think that what matters is whether the doctor was 
reasonable in thinking that her actions would help the patient. Being justified is also a
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kind of practical success distinct from the kind of success that would have arisen had the 
agent’s intended outcome been realized.
To further reinforce the point that epistemic success need not consist only in 
having knowledge, consider a further point Richard Feldman makes. He points out that 
with regard to some propositions, that sometimes one should suspend judgment on their 
truth, say for example when one has no evidence for or against them. (Feldman, 2002, p. 
378) But by suspending judgment one thereby fails to know. But surely this is the 
correct thing, the epistemically successful thing, to do. As I noted in Chapter 1, the 
suspension of judgment is an attitude that is apt for epistemic justification as well. 
Accordingly, the goal whose achievement defines epistemic success need not be only the 
attainment of knowledge. The attainment of justification is also a state of epistemic 
success. Again, it is a separate question of what is required to reach that success state.
In light of the these kinds of considerations, Feldman characterizes 
epistemological success in terms of “having reasonable or justified cognitive attitudes.” 
(Feldman, 2002, p. 379) The advantage of this characterization of epistemic success over 
its rivals is that, unlike the truth-goal, it makes success something the subject can rightly 
take credit for, that is, the subject is the author o f his success. Unlike the knowledge 
goal, however, satisfying the justification goal is something that can be met entirely by 
factors the subject is accountable for, unlike the actual truth of the belief, which is up to 
the world. However, it is not clear how this kind of success is uniquely epistemological 
as it stands. One’s belief that, despite being new to golf, one will beat one’s much more 
experienced competitor in the competition, may be the reasonable or justified cognitive 
attitude to increase the likelihood of winning the game. Such a belief, if justified, is
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surely pragmatically justified, although not epistemically justified. As I will argue 
below, some connection with truth still needs to be drawn to ensure the justification is 
epistemic; but as we have seen, the connection with truth is not a straightforward one.
Before doing so, however, I will further defend my claim in this section that being 
epistemically justified is a kind of epistemic success distinct from knowledge. I have 
been maintaining here, and throughout this thesis, that epistemic justification is distinct 
from knowledge. However, if recent work by Jonathan Sutton is correct, this is
84mistaken. Sutton argues for a surprising and unorthodox thesis, namely: justification is 
knowledge. He claims that there is no concept of epistemic justification distinct from 
knowledge. I will critically evaluate Sutton’s position, ultimately concluding that he fails 
to establish his bold thesis. I will then return to the question of what makes justification 
epistemic in the remainder of this chapter.
84 See Sutton (2005), as well as his full-length monograph, Sutton (2007).
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5.3. Is Justification Nothing M ore, and Nothing Less, Than Knowledge?
In recent work, Jonathan Sutton argues for a surprising and unorthodox thesis, 
namely: justification is knowledge (Sutton, 2005; 2007). That is, a subject is justified in 
believing that p  iff he knows that p. Sutton further claims that there is no concept of 
epistemic justification distinct from knowledge. Since knowledge is factive, a 
consequence of Sutton’s view is that there are no false justified beliefs, since only truths 
can be known. In this section I will summarise and critically evaluate Sutton’s arguments 
for this controversial view. Following Sutton, I will begin by outlining two types of 
beliefs that do not constitute knowledge but that seem to be justified. I will then survey 
the concepts of justification he discusses and his identification of two of them with 
knowledge. At that point I will be in a position to consider Sutton’s four arguments for 
his position that justification is knowledge, concluding that Sutton fails to establish his 
bold thesis.
Two Kinds of (Allegedly) Justified But Unknown Belief:
1. The Unknown Unknown: Gettier cases and Justified False Belief
The first kind of (allegedly) justified but unknown belief that Sutton considers is 
what he calls an ‘Unknown Unknown’ belief: these are those in which the subject is 
ignorant of his ignorance. Justified False Beliefs and Gettier cases are the paradigm 
instances o f such beliefs. An example of a justified false belief might be one like my 
belief that there is a dog on the lawn on the basis of its looking to me like there is a dog 
on the lawn, its sounding to me like there is a dog on the lawn, Stephen’s testimony that 
there’s a dog on the lawn, etc., but in fact there is no dog on the lawn, but rather a
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cleverly disguised sheep. On other hand, a Gettier case is minimally an instance of 
justified , true, belief, where the subject fails to know what is believed. Gettier cases arise 
when there is too much epistemic luck around.
Here is a version of a standard Gettier case: A1 stares out into a field of fake 
bams, visually indiscriminable from the real thing. In the centre of this field deep in fake 
barn country is a real bam. Suppose A1 looks at the real bam amidst the fakes and 
believes, that is a ham. Here A1 believes it is a bam, it is true it is a barn, and since he 
has overwhelming evidence it is a bam (it plainly looks like a bam!), intuitively he is 
justified  in believing that it is a bam. However, does A1 know it is a barn? Surely not. 
There is too much luck around. His belief could have very easily been false. Had he 
glanced at any of the other numerous bams in the field and formed the same belief, he 
would have believed falsely. It is just sheer luck (in the relevant sense) that his belief is
85true. The standard lesson of such cases is that knowledge is incompatible with such 
luck. A corollary of such cases is that despite not knowing the proposition in question 
(e.g. that is a bam), surely the subject is justified  in believing as he does.
A consequence of Sutton’s proposal is that Gettier cases are impossible. There 
will still be cases where a subject fails to know a proposition because there is too much 
luck around, but these will not be cases of justified , tme beliefs that fail to be knowledge; 
hence, there will be no Gettier cases since these just are cases of justified, tme, belief that 
are not knowledge.
Sutton agrees that it is the presence of too much veritic luck that prevents a 
subject like A1 from having knowledge. (Sutton, 2005, p. 361) He goes on to say that the 
reason we are inclined to call such cases instances of justified belief is because the 
85 See Pritchard (2005) for a discussion of the kinds o f luck (in)compatible with knowledge.
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subject would have knowledge if it had not been for his bad luck (e.g. if he had not been 
in fake barn country, he would have known that there was a barn in front of him). Sutton 
thinks that this shows that justification is parasitic on the concept of knowledge. As he
says, “Justification in the relevant sense is perhaps a disjunctive concept -  it is
86knowledge or would-be knowledge.” (Ibid.) A charitable reading of Sutton here 
construes him as saying what is called justification in Gettier cases is a disjunctive 
concept.
2. The Known Unknown
As the label suggests, Known Unknown beliefs are ones where the subject is often 
in a position to know that he does not know the proposition in question. Nevertheless, it 
is often taken that such propositions are justifiably believed. Sutton’s two examples of 
this kind of allegedly justified belief are: i) justified beliefs formed on merely 
probabilistic grounds, such as “I believe that my ticket won’t win the lottery” when one 
holds a single ticket in a fair lottery consisting of perhaps a million tickets; and ii) 
justified beliefs formed as inferences to the best explanation, such as “I believe that 
evolution is the best theory based on the available evidence.”
Sutton goes on to argue that victims of Gettier cases, those who form beliefs only 
upon probabilistic grounds, and those who hold beliefs that are inferences to the best 
explanation that fall short of knowledge, all have beliefs that share the same defect: 
beliefs formed in those circumstances, or in those ways, are all unjustified. Their beliefs
86 Alexander Bird argues that justification is ‘would-be’ knowledge. For details see Bird (2007).
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are unjustified precisely because they are not knowledge. How then is Sutton thinking of
87justification? Sutton considers five candidates.
Five Concepts of Justification:
i) Warrant: Warrant is Alvin Plantinga’s term of art for whatever makes the difference 
between true belief and knowledge.88 As Sutton points out, this usage assumes that there 
is such a thing as Warrant that can be captured by a reductive analysis, and it assumes 
that Warrant does not entail truth.
Whatever merits a concept of Warrant might have as an epistemic concept in its 
own right, I suggest that we look elsewhere for a concept of epistemic justification. I 
suggest that it is perhaps most useful to think of justification as a candidate for Warrant, 
a candidate that is disqualified once we appreciate the force of the Gettier problem. 
Justification cannot be Warrant since justification does not mark the difference between 
true belief and knowledge -  justified, true, belief that fails to amount to knowledge 
abounds in the form of Gettier cases. As Sutton implies with his paradigms of justified 
belief that falls short of knowledge, what people are interested in when they are interested 
in justification, is what is present in Gettier cases. What is present in Gettier cases, 
however, is not Warrant.
87 Why does Sutton consider these five conceptions of justification, rather than Reliablist or other 
paradigmatically externalist conceptions of epistemic justification? He does not say. In fairness to Sutton, 
the conceptions of justification he does discuss have all been influential and central ways o f thinking of 
epistemic justification in contemporary analytic epistemology (see, for example, Alston 1989a). In any 
case, I will show that his argument fails.
88 See 1.1. for further discussion of Warrant and its relation to other epistemic concepts.
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ii) Justification As Blamelessness:
Sutton holds that being blameless in believing something is one thing, and being 
epistemically justified in believing it is another.89 He claims that certain epistemic 
problems have been generated by failing to recognize this fact. For example, Alvin 
Goldman and others have been worried about cases of cultural isolation or otherwise 
benighted societies where the subjects use highly unreliable and bizarre belief-forming 
procedures and thereby form false beliefs, but do so blamelessly (after all, it is not their 
fault they bom when and where they were).90 Apparently some have been tempted to 
claim that such subjects are nevertheless justified.
I think it is correct to hold that justification and blamelessness are not identical. 
For instance, being blameless is surely not sufficient for epistemic justification. A subject 
in a pre-scientific society surely cannot be blamed for believing that he can divine future 
events by reading sheep entrails; but he is not justified in so believing. However, one 
might plausibly hold that being blameless is necessary for being epistemically justified. 
That is, if  one is to be properly blamed for believing as one does, plausibly such
89 We might be thought to be entering murky waters here since it is not entirely clear what blame is. It may 
be true that we do not have a satisfactory analysis o f the concept o f blameworthiness, but we can proceed 
intuitively, since we seem to have no trouble judging instances of things that are to be rightly praised or 
blamed. That is, we know instances of blameworthiness when we see it.
One salient feature o f blame is that it is closely associated with the notion of responsibility. One cannot 
be blamed for something unless one can be held responsible for it. Responsibility, in turn, seems closely 
linked to the notion o f voluntary control. One cannot be held responsible for an action, for example, if it 
was not voluntarily performed. If this is right, then a notion of epistemic blameworthiness may well 
presuppose doxastic voluntarism, and as such, its viability as a concept o f epistemic justification may well 
turn on the extent to which, if at all, our beliefs are subject to voluntary control. For recent discussions of 
doxastic voluntarism, see for example: Ginet (2001); Feldman (2001); Audi (2001).
The issue o f voluntary control seems to be one that differentiates deontological concepts of epistemic 
justification from justification as blamelessness. For example, one may have a duty or obligation to repay 
one’s mortgage, and one violates that duty by not repaying it. However, this does not entail that one is to 
be blamed for not making one’s payments. Perhaps one non-culpably lost one’s job due to a financial 
recession. This example also highlights that evaluations o f praise and blame require an element of 
voluntary control, e.g. one is not to be blamed for not discharging one’s financial obligations precisely 
because one is unable, through no fault o f one’s own, to meet them.
90 For example, see Goldman (1992b).
202
circumstances defeat what one would otherwise be justified in believing. On such an 
account, being blameless is an enabling condition that allows for the possibility of one’s 
belief being justified. But to be sure, justification and blamelessness are distinct.
A second (pseudo?) problem that Sutton holds is generated by failing to 
appreciate that blamelessness does not amount to epistemic justification is the so-called 
New Evil Demon problem (see Chapter 3 for further discussion of the New Evil Demon). 
Sutton under-describes the problem and wrongly concludes that it only arises given 
mistaken views about justification and blameworthiness.
As Sutton describes the New Evil Demon problem (NED, hereafter), “On many 
versions of reliabilism, a thinker globally deceived by an evil demon or who is a brain in 
a vat will have very few beliefs that are justified since they are not arrived at by the 
relevant kind of reliable process.” (Sutton, 2005, p. 369) It is correct that advocates of 
the NED case do say that the victims of the demon world are justified in holding many of 
their beliefs. But this is not because they are blameless in believing as they do. They 
may well also be blameless; or, indeed, many of the beliefs they hold may be ones that 
they can be rightly blamed for holding, e.g. beliefs held in the face of sufficient 
counterevidence.
The reason the victims of the NED case are justified, it is maintained, is because 
reliability is not necessary for justification. On this view, if  the demon victim’s 
counterpart in the non-demon world is justified in holding a particular belief, then so is 
his deceived twin. ‘Internally’ (which I take to mean that of which they are consciously 
aware; see chapters 2 and 3) identical duplicates are justificationally identical. What the 
NED case shows is reliability, or other ‘external’ factors, are not necessary for
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justification. It does not, pace Sutton, specifically show anything about the relationship 
(if any) between blameworthiness and epistemic justification. It merely shows 
‘sameness’ of justification between a subject and, for example, her recently envatted 
counterpart. It is held that both will have has many justified and unjustified beliefs as the 
other, and each will be as praiseworthy and as blameworthy as the other.
So while there may be interesting links between praise and blame, and 
justification (as I said above, perhaps blamelessness is necessary but not sufficient for 
justification), I suggest we follow Sutton in setting blamelessness aside as a candidate for 
justification, while at the same time noting that, contrary to what he says, one can reject 
justification-as-blamelessness while having said nothing about the New Evil Demon 
problem since it is a separate issue.
iii) The Deontological Conception:
A deontological conception of justification ties justification to epistemic duties, 
obligations and permissions. In order to finely delineate different concepts of epistemic 
justification, the deontological concept of justification is to be kept distinct from the issue 
of praise/blame. Sutton’s thesis about deontological justification is that it is not distinct 
from knowledge: a belief is deontologically justified iff it is knowledge. Sutton writes, “I 
claim that we human beings have a negative epistemic obligation: one ought not believe 
that p  unless one knows that p, for any proposition /?.” (Sutton, 2005, p. 364) I will 
consider Sutton arguments that deontological justification is knowledge below.
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iv) The Evaluative Conception:
Sutton identifies this sense of justification with knowledge also. A belief is 
justified in the evaluative sense if it is a “good thing from the epistemic point of view”.91 
Being good from the epistemic point of view, as I have been stressing, is usually thought 
to have something to do with truth. As I have said, the qualifier ‘epistemic’ and some 
connection to truth is needed to individuate epistemic justification from other sorts of 
justification, such as pragmatic, moral, or aesthetic. Sutton claims the following about 
evaluative justification: “I claim that what is justified in the evaluative sense is 
knowledge -  it is knowledge that is the supremely good thing from an epistemic point of 
view and, unlike perhaps truth, it is epistemic enough to justification.” (Sutton, 2005, 
p. 365) By ‘being epistemic enough’ Sutton is addressing the issue I discussed above 
about truth as an end not having much epistemic import in and of itself.
Regarding the issue of intemalism/extemalism, Sutton notes that his theory is 
strictly speaking neutral. However, since justification is knowledge on Sutton’s view, it 
is as internal/external as knowledge is. In effect, this amounts to embracing a kind of 
extemalism though since no one (that I know of, anyway) holds a purely internalist 
theory of knowledge. External factors, such as whether or not what is believed is true, or 
how many fake bams are around for example, will in part determine whether or not a 
subject knows. So Sutton is committed to the position that external factors are necessary 
for a subject to know, but need not think that such factors are sujficient, e.g. he can deny 
that Bonjour’s clairvoyant knows the President’s whereabouts, but Sutton is committed to 
holding that the victim of the New Evil Demon fails to have justified beliefs since he fails 
to have knowledge.
91 Alston characterizes justification in this way as one its four basic features in Alston (1989a).
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Intemalism (understood here as the view that ‘external’ factors are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for justification), whether of a Mentalist sort or as one that 
embraces the Awareness Requirement, has a chance of being plausible only insofar as 
justification is distinct from knowledge. An upshot of Sutton’s view is that if he is 
correct about justification being knowledge, then many traditional forms of intemalism 
are false, including the version I am defending in this thesis.
v) Justification as Reasonableness: Sutton Concedes Too Much?
The final concept of justification that Sutton considers is spelt out in terms of 
reasonableness. Sutton thinks that ordinary usage counts in favour of applying the word 
“justified” primarily to actions, and applying the word “reasonable” to beliefs whenever 
and wherever philosophers talk of epistemic justification. We commonly do talk of 
reasonable but false belief, or the subjects of Gettier cases believing reasonably. So if 
justification is a matter of reasonableness, it is false that justification is knowledge (since 
one cannot know falsehoods, and one fails to know in a Gettier case).
Why then, one might ask, is justification not to be understood in terms of
reasonableness? Sutton’s argument is shaky here. He claims that justification is
primarily meant to be a property of beliefs, whereas reasonableness is supposed to apply
primarily to people, and only derivatively apply to beliefs. Sutton writes,
A b e lie f is reasonable in the circum stances in w hich it is held i f  a 
reasonable person w ould or could  hold  it in those circum stances.
[ ...]  The notion  o f  a reasonable  p erso n  is understood in term s o f  
know ledge; he is one w hose belief-form ing  faculties and habits 
(e.g. inferential habits) are such as to deliver know ledge when 
conditions are right. (Sutton, 2005 , p. 373)
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Given this account, people can have reasonable but unjustified beliefs when they lack 
knowledge (say, when they are victims of a Gettier case, or when they believe something 
false on the basis of good evidence), and reasonableness is not equated with 
blamelessness (remember the cases of cultural isolation). Sutton intends these 
concessions to make his view more palatable. However, even reasonable people can 
have some unreasonable beliefs, unless they are perfectly reasonable, so it is false that a 
belief is reasonable if a reasonable person would hold it, unless we are talking about 
perfectly reasonable people.
But in making these concessions, one cannot help but wonder if Sutton concedes 
too much. Has he in effect conceded that there is a concept of epistemic justification 
distinct from knowledge? He is right that there is a property that is distinct from mere 
blamelessness that people’s beliefs can enjoy even when those beliefs are false. This 
property, even if not identical with reasonableness, is certainly one enjoyed when the 
subject is being reasonable. Why is not this property, which is not identical with 
knowledge, justification! Sutton’s primary reason for denying this is that justification is 
“supposed to” be primarily a property of beliefs, and reasonableness, while it surely 
applies to beliefs, is supposed to primarily be a property of persons. But then again, it 
seems that ‘reasonable people’ could be defined as people whose beliefs are by and large 
reasonable, and ‘perfectly reasonable people’ are those whose beliefs are reasonable 
without exception, so reasonableness applies primarily to beliefs and derivatively to 
persons.
But what if some philosophers have simply misunderstood the sense in which 
justification attaches to beliefs? That is, it would surely be objectionable if a theory
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allowed that justification were not a property of beliefs in any sense92, but is it really that 
objectionable if it applies to beliefs in a derivative rather than primary sense?
In a broadly Moorean spirit, what are we more sure of: i) that justification applies 
to beliefs in a primary, rather than derivative way; or ii) that there are no justified false 
beliefs — that there is no concept of epistemic justification distinct from knowledge? The 
truth of i) seems far less obvious than the falsity of ii). Therefore if the truth of ii) is 
implied by the truth of i), the first claim should be rejected, or at least not presupposed as 
Sutton does.
On the model of justification I am considering, a belief is justified if in the 
circumstances in which it is held a reasonable person would or could hold it in those 
circumstances. I take it that it is an open question how the notion of a reasonable person 
is understood. Perhaps Sutton is right: a reasonable person is to be understood in terms 
of knowledge; he is one whose belief-forming faculties and habits are such as to deliver 
knowledge when conditions are right. But even if  this is right and justification must be 
understood in terms of knowledge, it does not follow that justification simply is 
knowledge, which is his primary thesis. Sutton is arguing for that bold thesis, not the 
weaker one that Timothy Williamson defends that it is ‘knowledge first’, the primitive in
93terms of which all other epistemic notions are understood.
On the other hand, perhaps the notion of a reasonable person is to be understood 
independently of knowledge, e.g. a reasonable person is one who proportions her beliefs 
to the evidence (whether that delivers knowledge or not). In that case, reasonableness 
would be an independent epistemic goal from knowledge and so be a distinct form of
92 See 1.1. where I note that justification being a property belief is the first o f its four basic features.
93 For a defense o f this thesis, see Williamson (2000).
208
evaluative justification. And if there is an obligation to believe reasonably distinct from 
the obligation to believe only if one knows (e.g. one might have the obligation to believe 
only if one’s belief fits the available evidence), reasonableness would be a distinct form 
of deontological justification. In making the concessions he does in acknowledging a 
notion of epistemic reasonableness distinct from knowledge (in at least the sense of 
reasonableness not being identical with knowledge, even if it is not more conceptually 
fundamental than it), Sutton casts doubt on the thesis that epistemic justification is 
materially equivalent to knowledge before even giving his arguments for it.
With a discussion of epistemic justification now in place, we can turn to Sutton’s 
arguments that identify it with knowledge.
The Arguments:
i) The Assertion Argument:
Following Williamson, Sutton accepts the Knowledge Rule of Assertion: one 
must assert that p  only if  one knows that p. Sutton argues that the connection between 
warranted assertability and knowledge is mysterious unless there is the same connection 
between justification and knowledge. That is, “one must: believe p  only if  one knows p , 
[is] a norm that is as constitutive o f belief as Williamson’s knowledge rule is for 
assertion.” (Sutton, 2005, p. 374)
However, if  sound, this first argument shows that the standards governing 
assertion need to be the same as those governing belief. This in itself is not surprising if 
the rules governing assertion are simply the ‘external’ counterparts of rules governing 
belief. It is a further question what norm(s) do govern assertion. In other words, the
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cogency of this argument depends in turn on the cogency of arguments for the knowledge 
rule.
Sutton embraces Williamson’s three arguments for the knowledge rule of 
assertion. Williamson’s arguments are as follows:
1) The knowledge rule is allegedly needed to explain what goes wrong in (quasi-) 
Moorean paradox. The hypothesis is that the reason it is improper to assert “/? and 
I don’t know that p ” is because by asserting p  one implies that one knows it, 
which is then denied in the second conjunct, which is contradictory. (See 
Williamson, 2000, p. 253-5)
2) It is claimed that the knowledge rule is needed to explain the unacceptability of 
assertions that one will lose in Lottery Paradox cases. It is allegedly improper to 
assert that one’s ticket will lose the lottery, no matter how likely that fact is. The 
best explanation of the source of this impropriety, it is suggested, is that one does 
not know that one will lose the lottery solely on the basis of its being highly 
improbable. (See Williamson, 2000, p. 249-252)
3) The final argument for the knowledge rule is, as Sutton says, “simply the 
appropriateness of challenges and rebukes to assertions such as ‘How do you 
know?’ and ‘You don’t know that!” ’ The fact that appropriate challenges to 
assertions involve questioning the asserter’s knowledge provides some evidence 
of the correctness of the Knowledge Rule. (See Williamson, 2000, p. 249-252)
As I said, this argument for the thesis that justification is knowledge presupposes the 
correctness of the Knowledge Rule of Assertion. If some other principle better explains
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the phenomena of assertion than the knowledge rule, this argument fails to go through. I 
will consider such a principle below.
ii) The Lottery Argument:
The Lottery Paradox can be formulated in terms of knowledge or justified belief. 
The idea is that if one can know or be justified in believing that that one’s ticket will lose 
the lottery, then, given other intuitive assumptions, one is led to paradox. Following 
Dana Nelkin, Sutton formulates the paradox(es) as follows:
The K now ledge Paradox
1. Jim  know s that his ticket tl  will lose.
2. I f  Jim  know s that his ticket t l  will lose, then he know s tha t t2 w ill lose, he know s that t3 
will lo se ...a n d  he know s that t l , 000 ,000  w ill lose.
So,
3. Jim  know s that t l  w ill lo se ...an d  Jim  know s that t l , 000 ,000  w ill lose. (1,2)
4. Jim  know s that either t l  will not lo se ...o r  11,000,000 w ill no t lose.
5. P ropositions o f  the fo llow ing form com prise  an inconsisten t set: (a) p i .. .(n) pn, (n+1) not 
p i  o r ...n o t pn.
So,
6. Jim  know s p ropositions that form  an inconsisten t set. (3 ,4 ,5)
7. It is not possib le  to know  propositions that form  an in consisten t set.
So,
8. (1), (2), (4), (5), or (7) is false. (Sutton , 2005 , p. 378)
The Justification Paradox shares all the above premises, except that they are cast in terms 
of ‘justification to believe’ rather than knowledge. (See Sutton, 2005, p. 378-9)
Again following Nelkin, Sutton argues that the first premise of the paradoxes is 
the one that must be rejected, i.e. one does not know or justifiably believe that one’s 
ticket is a loser. Sutton departs from Nelkin in his explanation of why the first premise of 
the justification paradox should be rejected. He maintains that the best explanation of 
why the first premise of the justification version of the paradox needs to be rejected is 
because justification is knowledge; so once we see that the knowledge premise must be
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rejected in one version of the paradox, we must reject what is in fact the identical, though 
disguised, premise in the second paradox.
A presupposition that Sutton shares with Nelkin is that we need one unified 
solution to apply to both paradoxes. Simply put, they in effect argue that since premise 1 
should be denied in the knowledge case, i.e. it is allegedly obvious that one does not 
know that one’s ticket will lose the lottery, the first premise of the justification version of 
the paradox must be rejected also, i.e. contrary to one’s intuitive judgement to the 
contrary, one’s belief that one will lose the lottery is unjustified. If one rejects this 
intuitive premise, then one must explain why our intuitions lead us astray. But one might 
wonder, why accept the presupposition that the Lottery Paradoxes need a unified 
solution?
Sutton claims that, “it is a clear desideratum of a solution to one version [of the
lottery paradox] that it can be applied to the other.” (Sutton, 2005, p. 379) It is not clear
why there would be such a desideratum, especially since as Sutton admits, the knowledge
version of the lottery paradox is not even a paradox! As Sutton says,
D enying prem ise 1 [that one know s that one w ill lose the lottery] 
seem s to be by far the best strategy w ith respect to the 
know ledge paradox , and N elk in  advocates denying  1* [that one 
is ju stified  in believ ing  that one w ill lose the lottery] on that 
basis. Indeed, it is not rem otely  un in tu itive  to deny 1; the 
know ledge version  o f  the paradox  is not really  a paradox  at all, 
bu t sim ply  an unsound argum ent. (Sutton , 2005, p. 380)
Given this, why think that a non-paradox and a paradox deserve the same treatment 
independently of thinking that justification = knowledge? As Sutton says, “The 
identification of justification and knowledge receives support from the fact that it enables 
a parallel diagnosis of the knowledge paradox and the justification paradox.” (Ibid.) But 
once we see that there is no reason to accept such a presupposition, and there is reason
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against accepting it, i.e. it entails that one must deny the common sense view that one is 
justified in believing that one’s ticket will lose the lottery, Sutton’s argument that 
justification = knowledge is undercut.
Hi) The Modesty Argument:
The third argument Sutton gives for the thesis that justification is knowledge is 
what he calls the Modesty Argument. If sound, this argument is supposed to establish 
that there are not any known unknown justified beliefs, e.g. justified beliefs formed on 
merely probabilistic grounds or justified beliefs that are inferences to the best 
explanation.
Sutton argues that we are often overconfident by categorically believing 
propositions that our evidence merely supports as probable. For example, even if one 
cannot know or be justified in believing that one’s ticket will lose the lottery, one can 
know or justifiably believe that one’s ticket will probably lose. Sutton writes, “One gains 
nothing -  no motive for rational action, and no benefits thereof -  from believing 
immodestly that one will lose the lottery that one does not gain from believing modestly 
that one will very likely lose the lottery.” (Sutton, 2005, p. 383) But since we cannot and 
should not be maximally modest in our beliefs, what marks the difference between an 
improper and proper level of commitment to a given proposition? Sutton’s answer, of 
course, is that knowledge makes the difference between rational and irrational belief 
formation. (Ibid.)
We can all agree that our beliefs should be as modest as necessary without being 
under confident in what we believe. It is just unclear why the relevant normative
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standard here is knowledge. Take an example Sutton offers that is supposed to illustrate 
why we should not be maximally modest in our beliefs. “Never believe that one has lost 
the lottery, simply that it is very likely that one did, even when one watched the draw 
take place and knows that one lost.” (Sutton, 2005, p. 383) Sutton makes similar 
remarks about believing a theory that is supported by an inference to the best explanation 
and beliefs based on perceptual experience.
If these examples show anything, they seem to show that beliefs formed on 
merely probabilistic grounds or by inferences to the best explanation are insufficient (and 
in some case unnecessary) for positive epistemic status to obtain. In Sutton’s example, 
one’s belief that one will lose the lottery is not based on its low probability of winning, 
but rather on one’s witnessing the draw and seeing that one lost, indicating that one’s 
former grounds were insufficient for the beliefs  being properly held. But is it really 
knowledge here that governs whether this belief is rationally formed?
I suggest not. Compare two cases. First, suppose one witnesses the draw and 
hears the announcer call out someone else’s number. It is true that one’s ticket has lost; 
in the absence of defeaters, plausibly one knows on this basis that one’s ticket did not 
win. Suppose again that one witnesses the draw and hears the announcer read out a ticket 
number other than one’s own as the winner. As it happens, the dyslexic announcer read 
one’s number backwards; one has won the lottery but does not know it yet. Before the 
result is sorted out, does one justifiably believe that one has lost the lottery on the basis of 
the announcement? Surely one does. One has exactly the same evidence as one does in 
the first case. But one fails to know in the latter case since what one believes is false. 
Since one can justifiably believe without knowing, Sutton’s thesis is false.
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What Sutton highlights in the Modesty Argument is not that knowledge governs 
rationally confident belief formation, but a kind of scepticism for certain kinds of beliefs 
based on certain kinds of grounds, as well as the fact that we need to be careful not to be 
overconfident in what we believe given our grounds. Substituting ‘justification’ for 
‘knowledge’ in this section gets the same results for rational belief formation even if we
stipulate that what is believed is false, showing that we can have justification without
knowledge, which falsifies Sutton’s thesis.
iv) The Posterior Evaluation Argument:
Take this claim from Sutton:
I f  a b e lie f  that p  is one that w ould  be ju s tif ied  w ere one to form
it, and it is in o n e ’s interest to  have a b e lie f  in w hether or not p ,
and one is capable o f  fo rm ing  such a belief, then , in som e 
intuitive sense, one should  believe  that p ,  a lthough  that ‘sh o u ld ’ 
is not purely a ‘sh o u ld ’ o f  ep istem ic ob ligation . It is ra ther a 
‘shou ld ’ generated by prudentia l considera tions o f  self-in terest 
in teracting  w ith the ep istem ic goals that determ ine an evaluative 
notion  o f  ju stifica tion . (Sutton, 2005 , p. 384)
Sutton claims that if we substitute ‘would be justified’ with ‘would constitute knowledge’ 
then the above claim is clearly true. His thesis is that this claim is not true if any other 
epistemic concept other than knowledge is inserted in its place. I will show that this 
thesis is false.
This thesis is argued for by means of a variation on the original Gettier case. In 
Sutton’s case one has the desire to drive a Ford and will receive an incentive for doing so. 
One has lots of evidence that one’s colleague owns a Ford, but this evidence is 
misleading. However, one does have another colleague who owns a Ford, so if one 
formed the belief that a colleague owns a Ford, one would have a justified true belief that
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would fail to be knowledge. However, one fails to take notice of one’s evidence, and so 
fails to form any beliefs about who might own what car.
Suppose also, Sutton continues, that one later comes to appreciate the 
implications of one’s earlier evidence, but also learns that the evidence was misleading, 
so that if one had formed a belief on its basis, one would have formed a true belief that 
would have been ‘Gettiered’, so to speak. Sutton now asks, “Is there an intuitive sense in 
which one will now judge that one should then have formed the belief that one had a 
colleague who owned a Ford -  an allegedly justified true belief?” (Sutton, 2007, p. 58) 
Sutton says it is clear that there is, and he is right about one particular sense in which one 
should have formed the belief. One should have then formed the belief because one 
would have gotten the incentive. And it is true that that same non-epistemic sense in 
which one should have formed the belief is present in a version of the case where one 
forms the belief about the colleague’s Ford in the absence of any evidence whatsoever. A 
true belief not based on any evidence at all would have equally gotten the incentive. 
However, only in the misleading evidence case, and not the absence o f evidence case, is 
there an additional sense to the one that Sutton acknowledges in which one should have 
formed the belief, viz., that was the well-evidenced belief to form.
Sutton thinks that there is a ‘partially epistemic’ sense of a ‘should’ that arises
only in a case where the original evidence was not misleading and so the subject would
have gained knowledge. In such a case, Sutton comments as follows:
E valuating  o n e ’s form er cogn itive situation  after the fact, is there 
an in tu itive sense in w hich one should  have form ed the b e lie f 
apart from  the consideration  that it w ould have been true? I 
contend  there is: one should  have know n that one has a colleague 
w ho ow ned a Ford, and th is is to say, that in the case at hand, 
that one let o n ese lf dow n doxastically  speaking in a way that
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goes beyond having  m erely failed  to form  a true belief. (Sutton,
2007, p. 59)
I agree that in this case there is a sense that one should have formed the true 
belief, but it is the same partially epistemic sense present in the misleading evidence case. 
One failed to appreciate one’s evidence and proportion one’s belief to it. In the 
misleading evidence case, one should have believed that one’s colleague has a Ford, and 
one lets oneself down doxastically by failing to proportion one’s belief to the evidence. 
So contrary to what Sutton says, there is an intuitive sense in which one should have 
formed the belief that one’s colleague has a Ford in the misleading case apart from the 
non-epistemic sense in which believing truly would have been beneficial. The 
intermediate case between knowledge and the merely pragmatic case is the one where 
one should have formed the belief because that is what the evidence supported (even 
though the evidence was misleading). The existence of the intermediate case shows that 
justification is not knowledge.
On the face if it, these considerations also count against knowledge norms of 
belief and hence the Knowledge Rule o f Assertion, since this is a case where one should 
believe that p  even though one does not know that p  — in which case it is false that one 
should believe (assert) only what one knows.
The Main Objection:
Towards the end of his defense, Sutton discusses an objection, that if sound, 
devastates the first three of his arguments, and given that I have provided sufficient 
materials above to undercut his Posterior Evaluation argument, the objection becomes 
even more pressing. The objection is that a weaker norm-governing assertion will do all
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the work that the Knowledge Rule is supposed to. That is, if a weaker norm can handle 
the quasi-Moorean Paradox cases, the Lottery Cases, and the cases that involve 
challenging or rebuking assertions, then the Knowledge Rule is unmotivated. This would 
be devastating for Sutton as the Knowledge Rule is an explicit premise of his assertion 
argument, and his second and third arguments depend on it as well, albeit less directly.
Sutton considers that the best and simplest candidate to possibly replace the 
Knowledge Rule is:
(The J-R ule): O ne m ust: assert p  only if  one has a ju s tif ie d  b e lie f  that p . (Sutton, 2005, p .388)
Sutton thinks that the J-Rule would handle the relevant phenomena that the 
K-Rule is supposed to, plus (and I think this is a virtue of the J-Rule) it implies that 
certain false assertions are warranted. However, Sutton rejects the J-Rule because he 
thinks it falls prey to an anti-complexity argument, as I will explain below. However, 
despite what Sutton claims, it is not clear how the J-Rule accounts for the data that it is 
supposed to.
One might think that a J-Rule handles all the cases it is meant to in the following 
way: first, if someone asserts 'p and I don't know that p \  one might say that that is 
inappropriate since by asserting p  the subject implies he is justified in believing it, but 
then implicitly denies this. However, if justification is distinct from knowledge, then one 
can have justified beliefs that do not amount to knowledge. So to admit one’s ignorance 
is not to say one is not justified. There is no contradiction.
So although the J-Rule makes sense of the incongruence of asserting 'p  and I am not 
justified in believing that p \  it does not account for the tension in asserting 'p and I do not
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know that p \  So it seems that the stronger Knowledge Rule has an advantage over the 
Justification Rule.
But it is important to distinguish two kinds of Moorean data:
1) Assert: 'p but I don 't know  that /?’ (because the sub ject has no justifica tion  to believe that p )
2) Assert: 'p but I don 't know  that p  ’ (even though  the subject has a h ighly ju stified  b e lie f that p)
It is the latter datum that the advocate of the J-Rule must explain, since this is 
where the J-Rule and the K-Rule come apart in what they are able to account for. The J- 
Rule can only accommodate the former datum.
A similar point holds in the challenges cases, i.e. 'How do you know?' and 'You 
don't know that!' In making the challenge, e.g., in a lottery case, the challenger may 
recognize that there is a huge amount of justification for S to believe that p  but still feel 
able to properly challenge the assertion that p  by questioning whether they know that 
which they are asserting. Lottery cases are supposed to be paradigm cases whereby a 
subject’s belief that his ticket will lose is extremely probable and yet he should not assert 
that his ticket will lose. Here we have justification without knowledge, and indeed a case 
where one cannot explain the data with the J-Rule since the J-Rule predicts that one can 
assert that one will lose the lottery. But intuitively this is wrong, since such assertions, 
while justified, are inappropriate nevertheless.
In light of this, it seems that the best and simplest candidate to replace the 
Knowledge Rule and the J-Rule is one that links justification and knowledge:
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(JBK-Rule): One must: assert p  only i f  one has justification to believe that one knows that p  94
Such a principle explains what is wrong in with the quasi-Moorean and Lottery 
cases, as well as why assertions can be challenged by challenging the subject’s 
knowledge. In each case, the subject lacks justification to believe that he knows what he 
is asserting. Unlike the J-Rule, the JBK-Rule can handle all the cases that the K-Rule 
can; but unlike the K-Rule, it allows that subjects are sometimes warranted in asserting 
what they do not know, e.g. in Gettier cases, as well as cases of justified but false belief. 
The JBK-Rule, therefore, shares all the explanatory virtues of both the K-Rule and the J- 
Rule, without sharing their vices.
Why then does Sutton accept the Knowledge Rule over rival rules of assertion, 
such as the JBK-Rule? It is because he accepts a version of Williamson’s complexity 
argument that he thinks that the K-Rule has a presumption in its favour over other rules 
since it provides a simpler account of warranted assertion.
The J-Rule is allegedly more complex than the K-Rule because justification is 
allegedly parasitic on knowledge. Sutton would therefore think that the JBK-Rule is 
more complex than the K-Rule, since it relies on both the concepts of epistemic 
justification and knowledge. Recall from the beginning of this discussion where I noted 
that Sutton says that the reason we are inclined to call Gettier cases instances of justified  
belief is because the subject would have knowledge if  it had not been for his bad luck 
(e.g. if the subject had not been in fake bam country, he would have known that he was 
looking at a bam). As Sutton says, “Justification in the relevant sense is perhaps a
94 Williamson him self considers and rejects a similar principle, except casts it in terms of ‘rational’ rather 
than justified belief, as well as in terms of doxastic justification (rationality) rather than in terms of 
propositional justification (rationality) as 1 do here. See Williamson (2000) p. 260-63 a discussion o f this 
similar principle as well as other belief-based accounts o f assertion.
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disjunctive concept -  it is knowledge or would-be knowledge.” I suggested above that 
perhaps justification can be spelled out independently of knowledge, e.g. in terms 
essentially tied to evidence and not to knowledge. If such an account can be given, then 
the J-Rule is just as simple as the K-Rule. However, now we see that the best rule of 
assertion, the JBK-Rule, does invoke the notion o f justification, as well as knowledge. 
Perhaps also justification is parasitic on knowledge. What then follows the thesis that 
justification ju st is knowledge?
If knowledge is the primitive in terms of which all other epistemic concepts must 
be understood, does that count decisively in favour o f the K-Rule? O f course not. A 
complexity argument is not a definitive argument for anything. Rather, simplicity 
provides a (defeasible) presumption in favour of one theory over the other. A theory 
needs to have more virtues than mere simplicity, and sometimes therefore, the more 
complex theory is to be preferred over the simpler one. At least one other essential thing 
a philosophical principle must do is deal adequately with the relevant cases.
As Williamson himself notes, “Much of the evidence for the knowledge account 
[or any account of assertion, for that matter] comes from the ordinary practice of 
assertion.” (Williamson, 2000, p. 243) It is for this reason that Williamson endorses the 
K-Rule over the admittedly more simple truth rule of assertion (one must assert p  only if 
p  is true). (Cf. Williamson, 2000, p. 242; 262) The Truth Rule does not explain what is 
wrong with the Lottery cases, or cases where a subject asserts that p  truly but has 
absolutely no evidence that p. So the more complex K-Rule is motivated via these 
considerations. However, our ordinary practice of assertion includes not only the 
Moorean and Lottery cases, but also Gettier cases and cases of justified false belief. If
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possible, therefore, we need a rule of assertion that gives a unified treatment of all these 
cases.
It is here that the JBK-Rule gets support over the K-Rule. The JBK-Rule handles 
all the cases the K-Rule does, plus, it allows for warranted false assertions, something 
very intuitive that the K-Rule prohibits. In short, since the JBK-Rule does what the K- 
Rule is supposed to do, and more, by handling a wider range of cases, it should be 
preferred over the K-Rule, even if it turns out to be true that knowledge is more 
conceptually fundamental than justification.
Without the K-Rule, by Sutton’s own admission, three out of four of his 
arguments for the thesis that justification is knowledge fail. By Sutton’s own admission, 
the best (and single?) reason to accept the K-Rule over weaker principle-governing norms 
of assertion is that it is simpler than its rivals. It is not obvious that it is simpler than 
principles that invoke notions o f justification that are not parasitic on knowledge, e.g. 
justification supervenes on evidence, or justification is a matter of reasonableness 
(understood independently of knowledge). But even if  the K-Rule is simpler than its 
rivals, there is a principled reason to accept the JBK-Rule over the K-Rule, viz., that it is 
intuitive that there is nothing wrong with a false assertion over and above the false belief 
that it expresses. We judge that we can be warranted in making false assertions. In short, 
the JBK-Rule of assertion explains the phenomena that motivate the K-Rule, while better 
handling a wider range o f cases.
Justification is not Warrant in Plantinga’s sense, nor is it mere blamelessness, but 
there do seem to be deontological and evaluative forms of justification that seem to
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amount to a concept of epistemic justification that might be elucidated in terms of 
reasonableness and/or evidence.
As for the Posterior Evaluation argument, I hope to have shown that there is an 
intermediate case between knowledge and the merely pragmatic case. That is one where 
one should have formed a belief because that is what the evidence supported (even 
though the evidence was misleading). The existence of the intermediate case, coupled 
with the arguments above in support of the JBK-Rule over the K-Rule, shows that 
justification is not knowledge.
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5.4. The Conceptual Connections Between Justified Belief and Truth:
As I have argued, one of the ways of achieving epistemic success is by having 
epistemically justified beliefs, and this is kind of epistemic success distinct from those 
beliefs amounting to knowledge. A necessary condition of being epistemically justified, I 
argued in Chapter 2, is that the Awareness Requirement is met. It holds that:
S is ju stified  in believing that p  only if
i) there is som ething, X, that con tribu tes to the ju stific a tio n  o f  S ’s believ ing  that and
ii) For all X that contributes, S is aw are (or po ten tia lly  aw are) o f  X.
In Chapter 2 I defended the second conjunct of the Awareness Requirement. But 
the first conjunct is no less important -  there must actually be something contributing to 
the subject’s justification. When considering contingent empirical propositions about the 
external world, merely being in a conscious state that includes the content that p  is 
insufficient to justify the belief that p. Hoping, wishing and visually imagining that p  
have the content that p , but they do not justify the belief that p. But we think that a 
perceptual experience that p  does justify the belief that p. However, this cannot be purely 
in virtue of its content since p  is not a good reason to think that p  is true — this is the 
paradigm case of objectionable circular reasoning. Furthermore, such an approach would 
make perceptual justification conclusive. If one’s reason to believe that p  were just a 
perceptual experience with the content p , one’s reason would be conclusive since p  
entails p. But this misconstrues the nature o f perceptual experience — experience need 
not be conclusive evidence for belief, because having a (non-factive) perceptual 
experience does not entail the truth of what is represented, and yet such states 
nevertheless yield justification, as careful consideration of cases reveals. For example, a 
brain in a vat is justified in believing that he has hands on the basis of his perceptual
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experience as of hands. (See Chapter 3 for an extended defense of this claim) Therefore, 
over and above its mere content, there is something special about perceptual experience 
that makes it justificationally relevant in a way not shared by other propositional states.
What one is aware of when one has a justified belief, among other things, is 
evidence. That is, the norms that govern how a well functioning epistemic system 
operates dictate that the subject should have well-evidenced belief that satisfies the 
Awareness Condition. My contention is that epistemic justification is epistemic because 
in such cases the subject has reason to think her belief is true. Well-evidenced belief is 
similarly epistemic because in such cases the subject has reason to think that what she 
believes is true. The question that arises then is the following: why is evidence reason to 
think that what is believed on its basis is true?
The answer to this question is entailed by conceptual truths captured by the 
following principles:
Truth-C onnection\ N ecessarily , fo r a b e lie f  to be ep istem ically  ju stified  by a consideration , that 
consideration  m ust count (to som e degree) in favour o f  that b e lie f  being true.
E vidence : N ecessarily , ev idence is that w hich {prim a fa c ie )  ju s tif ie s  belief.
If only things that count in favour of truth justify belief, and evidence is that which 
justifies belief, then it follows that evidence counts in favour of the truth of what is 
believed. Evidence must be truth-connected since we confidently judge that belief can be 
justified on its basis; epistemic justification is epistemic because it is truth-connected in 
virtue o f being based on evidence.
The truth o f these principles can be shown by reflecting on our epistemic practice. 
For example, imagine that I believe that am supposed to attend a party tonight at 7:00, 
and base my belief respecting the starting time of the party on the information printed on
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the invitation. Surely my belief is justified. Suppose further that the host of the party 
rings me and tells me that the party will actually start at 9:00, and I believe him. Again, 
obviously this belief is justified. What justifies me in my first belief is my reading the 
invitation. What justifies me in my second belief about the party starting time is a piece 
of testimony I received from the host. In each case, visual perception and testimony, the 
sources justify me in believing as I do because these are considerations that count in 
favour of the truth of the proposition in question. It does not matter if what I read is 
useful to me, or convenient, or pleasing -  only truth-related considerations make an 
epistemic difference. We would judge that I was epistemically unjustified if I maintained 
my belief that the party was at 7:00 after receiving the host’s call on the grounds that
believing the party was at 9:00 would upset me as it conflicted with a previous
engagement. The best explanation o f these judgements is that only considerations that 
count in favour of truth can make an epistemic difference.
In support of the principle that evidence is that which justifies belief, consider
again our epistemic practice. The fact that it is incoherent to claim to be interested in
whether or not a belief is (epistemically) justified, but not to be concerned with what (if 
any) evidence supports it, supports the claim that evidence is that which justifies belief. 
Considering the example above o f the party’s starting time, it is telling that there can be 
no change in what one is justified in believing without a change in evidence (again, see 
chapters 2, 3 and 4). This suggests it is evidence that fixes what one is justified in 
believing. Further support for this can be found by noting what a defeater defeats. In the 
case of my belief that the party starts at 7:00, the justification for this belief is defeated by 
learning something that rebuts what I read on my invitation. A justified belief is defeated
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by undercutting or rebutting the evidence that it is based on, which implies that it is the 
evidence that justifies belief.
In short, if only things that count in favour of truth justify belief, and evidence is 
that which justifies belief, then it follows that evidence counts in favour of the truth of 
what is believed, which gives us the resources to explain what makes epistemic 
justification distinctly epistemic. Consider cases o f perceptual belief generally. In such 
cases, the subject is justified by basing her belief on evidence of which she is aware 
(conscious perceptual experience). Being aware o f such evidence is reason to think that 
what she believes is true, which is what constitutes the truth-connection, and thereby 
makes the practice epistemic. Evidence is reason to think that what is believed is true 
because belief can be justified on that basis, and only truth-connected things can justify 
belief.
So what is it about perceptual experience, rather than other states, that counts 
towards a belief sharing the same content being true? The difference is this. Given that 
for a belief to be justified by a consideration, it must count (to some degree) in favour of 
that belief being true, and given that evidence is that which justifies belief, it is clear that 
perceptual experience is evidence for perceptual belief. As such, it counts towards a 
beliefs being true, whereas hoping, wishing and visual imagining do not, as these latter 
states are not evidence, which is obvious from the fact that belief cannot be justified on 
their basis. If we had reasons to think that these latter states did  count towards what they 
present as being true, they would be evidence, and as such, justificationally relevant.
Also, perceptual experience necessarily represents its content assertively, rather 
than neutrally or hypothetically as other propositional states do. A state that presents
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itself neutrally or hypothetically cannot be a perceptual experience, and we would not 
take it as such. We would take them as imaginings or hopings, or some other state. As 
conscious subjects we are aware that perceptual states present themselves to us as truth- 
connected -  they purport to say how the world is. We also know that they are truth- 
connected since they can serve as evidence for perceptual belief -  again, they have the 
status of evidence, in part, because perceptual belief can be justified on their basis.
Peacocke similarly notes in passing that perceptual experiences have specifically 
representational content, and not merely intentional content like hoping, wishing and 
visual imagining do, which in part explains how they can contribute to the positive 
epistemic status of beliefs. (Peacocke, 2004, p. 99) While all of these states have 
intentional content in that they are ‘about’ something, the difference between them and 
specifically representational states is this: “In being in a state with representational 
content the subject of the state is thereby under the impression that the world is a certain 
way.” (Ibid.) This is not so in the cases I mention of wishing and imagining. If, 
however, other states did represent their content assertively and we thought that their 
representing things a certain way did count towards their being true, they would be 
justificationally relevant since they would be evidence.
In summary, perceptual experience is justificationally relevant for perceptual 
belief in a way that other propositional states are not. Perceptual experience has a 
conceptual truth-connection in virtue of being evidence that these other states lack, and 
we are aware of this fact because o f the unique way perceptual experience presents itself 
to the subject’s consciousness, and because we judge that beliefs formed on its basis are 
justified. The role of phenomenology here is to allow us to tell, from the first person
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perspective, when we are dealing with truth-connected states (evidence). A truth- 
connected state, like perceptual experience, presents itself in a distinctive way to us in 
consciousness so that we have a way to distinguish it from non-truth connected states, 
which play no justificatory role.
We are now in a position to fully understand what the connections are between 
justified belief and truth. In the case o f the justification of perceptual belief, justification 
supervenes on three things: belief, perceptual experience, and the relation between 
them.95 A first aspect of justification’s truth-connection is that it supervenes on truth- 
connected states. Justification is truth-connected in that the only states relevant to 
whether or not it obtains are conceptually tied to truth in virtue of their being evidence for 
what is believed. We know that such states are evidence for what is believed since belief 
can be justified on their basis, and we also know that only truth-related considerations 
can justify belief. Evidence, therefore, has a conceptual tie with truth. Not only can the 
truth-connection be seen in the generation of justification, but also in its loss. One loses 
justification if a defeater enters in at the level of belief, experience, or the basing relation. 
Recall that a defeater is something that provides one with a reason for ceasing to hold a 
belief, either by rebutting one’s belief by being inconsistent with one’s beliefs, or by 
undermining or undercutting one’s reasons for thinking it true. The concept o f truth is 
essentially connected both to how one acquires justification and to how one loses it.
A second aspect of the connection between justification and truth has specifically 
to do with the function of justification. Recall that, given the fundamentally first- 
personal nature o f such concepts, I have argued that epistemic justification is at least in
95 The necessary relation here must be one of the belief being “based” on the experience. For a discussion 
o f the basing relation, see 1.3.
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part a matter of possessing reasons, reasons to which the subject can appeal in wondering 
if her beliefs are true. (See chapter 1 and 2) The function of justification is to act as an 
indicator to the subject of reasons to think that what they believe is true in the form of 
evidence. One o f the reasons we care about having justified beliefs is that we care about 
having beliefs that we take to be supported by good reasons, which are good because they 
count in favour o f truth. If justification did not serve this truth-related function, it is 
unclear why we would care about justification or having epistemically justified beliefs.
As I argued above, a well functioning epistemic system is one that includes the 
subject having justified beliefs. The standards that govern whether or not epistemic 
justification obtain require that the subject have well-evidenced belief that meets the 
awareness condition I defended in Chapter 2.96
The reason that some norms, like evidential norms such as if one is a state in 
which it appears to one that p, then believe that p  (in the absence of defeaters), rather than 
others, like if one has a perceptual experience as of /?, then believe that q (where q is 
some arbitrary proposition), is that we take ourselves to have good reason to think that 
some, but not all, putative norms are truth-connected. The only ones that are truth- 
connected are the evidential ones, which must be so, given what evidence is. An 
experience that p  is evidence for the belief that p  because (in the absence o f defeaters), 
such a belief can be justified on that basis. This is different from believing q (where q is 
some arbitrary proposition) on the basis of an experience p, since q cannot be justified on
96 By ‘norm s’ o f justification here I just mean standards, the meeting o f which constitute a b e lie fs  being 
epistemically justified. It does not seem that, in general, norms can only be applied if one believes that 
conditions are fulfilled, on pain of infinite regress. Rather, I have been attempting to make explicit 
conditions, the meeting o f which, are necessary for epistemic justification to obtain. As most competent 
users o f the relevant concepts that characterize our epistemic practice do not have beliefs about them (e.g. 
beliefs about the nature o f epistemic justification), we must therefore implicitly grasp these concepts and 
standards and conduct ourselves in accordance with them. We can o f course aim to make these concepts 
and standards explicit through philosophical reflection.
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that basis, p  is not evidence for q\ if it were, then q would be justified (in the absence of 
defeaters) if properly based on p.
A pragmatic defense can also be given to vindicate evidential norms such as if 
one is a state in which it appears to one that p , then believe that p  (in the absence of 
defeaters), rather than believe that q on that basis (where q is some arbitrary proposition). 
Suppose that we allow that perceptual experiences as of p  justify belief. Which belief(s) 
does it justify? Surely the answer is either nothing at all, or p. We judge it absurd to 
suggest that the experience justifies the subject in believing q, for some arbitrary q. So 
the choice is between believing nothing and the content represented in experience. But if 
the subject is not justified in believing anything then scepticism is true; but commonsense 
assures us that such radical scepticism is false. So if the subject is to engage in theory 
construction of any kind and think anything at all he must believe that p  if he experiences 
that p  (at least provisionally). Here the subject has good practical reasons to do 
cognitively whatever is necessary to engage in cognitive development of any sort.
A related aspect of the connection between justification and truth is that there is a 
very close connection between the property o f justification and the process of 
justification, the latter of which is manifestly truth-directed. Robert Audi calls this the 
Process-Property Integration Thesis. (Audi, 1993b, p. 305) Roughly, the idea is that 
justification is the property o f a belief that, when citing its justifiers can, “at least in 
principle, both show that it is justified and (conceptually) constitute justifying it.” (Ibid.) 
The aim (or function) of the process o f justification is to show or provide reasons to think 
that what is believed is true. This is done by appealing to evidence (which, as a 
conceptual matter, is that which justifies belief). As Audi rightly notes, that is why it is
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improper to claim to be interested in justifying belief but not be concerned with whether 
or not the belief is true. (Ibid., p. 319) The property of justification is truth-connected, 
therefore, in virtue of the closely associated process of justifying belief, which has truth 
as its intrinsic end.
Noting the close conceptual connection between the property and the process of 
justification, however, is not to confuse the property o f justification with the activity or 
process of justification. These are related, but they are distinct. I have been suggesting 
that the Awareness Requirement demands that being aware of one’s grounds is necessary 
for having justification. That is not to say that showing one’s justification is constitutive 
of having justification. One might be tempted to think so, because in many cases when 
one is aware o f something, one is often able to prove or show it. When the property of 
justification obtains, since one is aware of it, one is often able to express what one is 
aware of in conversation and form beliefs about it. Those utterances and beliefs are not 
what is doing the justifying, however; they are mere expressions o f it.
When one has justification, it is necessary that one is aware of the beliefs 
grounds, which is minimally to appreciate the existence, relevance and adequacy of one’s 
grounds (see chapter 2). Again, it is not the process o f justification that makes one 
justified. If, however, one is unable to engage in the activity o f justifying, it may be 
relevant as to why one cannot. If one cannot show or prove one’s justification, even to 
oneself, because one is not aware of one’s grounds, then one is not justified.
A final issue needs to be addressed. While not suffering from blatant premise 
circularity, one might object that my account o f epistemic justification’s truth- connection 
in terms of evidence with its conceptual tie to truth, which I claim must be so, given the
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nature o f epistemic justification, is still in some sense objectionably circular. If by 
‘circularity’ in this sense one means that one cannot understand what evidence is without 
understanding what epistemic justification is, and vice versa, then this may be true. 
However, I do not think that this form of circularity is necessarily objectionable. It might 
be a problem if I was intending a reductive analysis o f the truth connection (or any 
concept whatsoever) in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, since the point o f a
conceptual reduction is to explain the target concept in terms of others that make no
reference to that target. But that has not been my aim.
My aim here, and throughout this thesis, has been to provide an elucidation of the
concept of epistemic justification. Centrally, I have tried to cast light on a central feature
of justification, namely a necessary condition of its obtaining, that I captured in the
Awareness Requirement (see Chapter 2). In order to achieve a reflective understanding
of the concept of epistemic justification, I have been employing a Strawsonian model of
conceptual ‘analysis’ that aims for connection over reduction. Strawson understands that
contrast as follows:
Let us im agine, instead, the m odel o f  an e laborate  netw ork , a 
system , o f  connected  item s, concepts, such that the function  o f  
each item , each concept, could , from  the ph ilo soph ical po in t o f  
v iew , be properly  understood  only  by grasp ing  its connections 
w ith the o thers, its place in the system  -  perhaps better s till, the 
p ic tu re  o f  a set o f  in terlocking  system s o f  such a kind. I f  this 
becom es our m odel, then there w ill be no reason  to be w orried  if, 
in the process o f  tracing connections from  one po in t to  ano ther 
o f  the netw ork, w e find ourselves re turn ing  to, o r passing  
th rough , our starting-point. W e m ight find, for exam ple, that we 
cou ld  no t fully elucidate the concept o f  k n o w ledge  w ithout 
reference to the concept o f  sense perception ; and that w e could  
no t explain  all the features o f  the concept o f  sense perception  
w ithou t reference to the concept o f  know ledge. B ut th is m ight be 
an unw orry ing  and unsurprising  fact. (S traw son, 1992, p. 19)
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So applying this to the case at hand, given how fundamental these concepts are, it 
need not be worrying and surprising that the concept of epistemic justification cannot be 
elucidated without reference to evidence; and that we cannot explain all the features of 
the concept of evidence, i.e. its conceptual connection to truth, without reference to the 
concept of epistemic justification.
As Strawson notes, that is not to say that certain kinds of circularity are never 
objectionable. Some circles are too small to establish a revealing connection, and we 
judge them as such. (Ibid., p. 20) What I hope to have done here, however, is drawn the 
connections between epistemic justification, evidence, and truth in a way that illuminates 
what makes epistemic justification epistemic.
In summary, I began this chapter by motivating and defending the idea that being 
justified is a kind of epistemic success or accomplishment distinct from knowledge. I 
then turned to the conceptual connections between justification and truth that individuate 
this kind of justification for other sorts.
By a conceptual connection I mean that, in virtue o f the concepts involved, there 
are entailments between the concepts, and that grasping a concept is sufficient to grasp 
concepts that are conceptually connected to it. I argued that in virtue of the concepts 
themselves, epistemic justification and truth are conceptually connected. That is, certain 
entailments hold between the concepts of epistemic justification and truth, and that 
grasping the concept of epistemic justification is sufficient to appreciate these entailments 
a priori.
Specifically, I argued that epistemic justification is epistemic because it turns on 
evidence; evidence in turn is epistemic because it is conceptually linked with truth. That
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is, it is not possible to competently employ the concept of evidence without appreciating 
that it counts in favour of the truth of that which it is evidence for, just as one cannot, for 
example, competently employ the concept of bachelorhood without appreciating that it 
applies to all and only unmarried men. Epistemic justification, therefore, is conceptually 
linked with the truth (via evidence), which is what makes it distinctively epistemic. This 
account of the truth-connection is substantial enough to ensure that the kind of 
justification we are concerned with is genuinely epistemic, while still being consistent 
with the kind of epistemic internalism I am advocating.
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C o n c l u s i o n :
In Chapter 1 I addressed some preliminary issues and defended some fundamental 
distinctions concerning the nature of epistemic justification. For instance, I outlined 
some of the basic features of justification, distinguishing doxastic from propositional 
justification, and considered how best to understand the epistemic basing relation. 
Specifically, I considered what role (if any) causation plays in properly basing a belief on 
a reason. I also considered the structure of justification and argued for the existence of 
immediate justification, that is, the justification that does not come from one’s 
justification to believe other propositions. In effect I defended Foundationalism against 
its rivals (e.g., Coherentism). In addition I also explored ways of construing the 
intemalism/extemalism distinction, and considered to what kinds of epistemic evaluation 
the distinction applies. I concluded the chapter by outlining the egocentric or first person 
perspective and noting the kinds of constraints that such a perspective puts on an 
adequate theory of epistemic justification.
In Chapter 2 I motivated the need for awareness as a necessary condition of 
epistemic justification obtaining. I captured the kind o f awareness justification requires 
with the so-called Awareness Requirement, which is the hallmark of the kind of 
internalism I am defending. The condition can be stated as follows:
A w a ren ess  R equ irem ent:
S ’s is ju s tif ie d  in believ ing  that p  only if
ii) T here  is som eth ing , X, that contribu tes to the ju s tifica tio n  o f  S ’s believ ing  that p\
and
ii) F or all X that contribu tes, S is aw are (or po ten tia lly  aw are) o f  X.
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I argued for this requirement by drawing attention to our considered judgements 
about cases. I considered two kinds o f cases: first, I clarified and drew out the 
implications of cases of clairvoyance and other cases of unusual but reliable cognitive 
faculties. Secondly, I showed that even many of those who claim to reject such 
awareness requirements implicitly appeal to them to motivate their own accounts of 
justification. By considering the arguments for “Mentalism”, I showed that, unless an 
awareness requirement is presupposed, the cases adduced by Mentalists are of no 
intuitive force. In turn, by considering just these cases I tried to establish that the 
awareness requirement is necessary for justification.
In the latter half of Chapter 2 I provided an account of the nature of this 
awareness. In doing so I examined and responded to an argument against the awareness 
requirement that I called Bergmann’s Dilemma. My solution invoked what I call ‘non- 
doxastic strong awareness’ in a way that avoids the regresses that Bergmann advances. 
The overall aim of Chapter 2 was to establish that factors external to the subject’s 
consciousness (such as the reliability of the process that gives rise to the belief in 
question) are not sufficient for justification. Awareness is required.
In Chapter 3 I considered whether external factors are nevertheless necessary for 
justification to obtain. I argued that they are not. This was done by considering the case 
of the New Evil Demon. After having explained this case, I showed how it supports 
Fallibilism and the Awareness Requirement, as well as the claim that the actual reliability 
of the belief-forming mechanism used in a world is not necessary for epistemic 
justification to obtain. I then defended this position against recent influential arguments 
advanced by Timothy Williamson and John McDowell.
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Some connection to truth is what makes a given thing epistemic. In Chapter 4 I 
investigated proposals that conceive of the relation between justified belief and truth as 
one of truth-conduciveness. I argued that, given internalism about justification, either in 
the sense I defend in Chapter 2 involving the Awareness Requirement, or in a weaker 
sense that Christopher Peacocke endorses, the truth-relation cannot be characterized in 
terms of truth-conduciveness or reliability. This is not just to reiterate a conclusion of 
Chapter 3 that justification need not be actually truth-conducive. I argued further that the 
truth-connection cannot even be one of truth-conduciveness in a conditional mode. 
Having dispatched truth-conducive accounts of the truth-connection, I developed a 
positive account of the truth-connection in Chapter 5.
Epistemic justification is different from other kinds o f justification. Moral, 
aesthetic and pragmatic justification (assuming there are such things), seem to relate 
essentially to goodness, beauty and usefulness, respectively. What individuates epistemic 
justification from the other types is some connection to truth. Thus far we had seen what 
this connection is not: in Chapter 3 I argued that justification need not be actually truth- 
conducive. In Chapter 4 I argued further that the truth-connection cannot even be one of 
truth-conduciveness in a conditional mode.
In Chapter 5 I argued against recent work that assimilates justification to 
knowledge, as well as for a positive account o f the truth connection. As to the former 
issue, I defended the orthodoxy that they are distinct epistemic statuses; as to the latter, I 
argued that the connection between justification and truth is conceptual. That is, 
epistemic justification is epistemic because it turns on evidence; evidence is epistemic 
because it is conceptually linked with truth. Epistemic justification, therefore, is
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conceptually linked with the truth (via evidence), which is what makes it distinctively 
epistemic. This account of the truth-connection is substantial enough to ensure that the 
kind of justification we are concerned with is genuinely epistemic, while still being 
consistent with the kind of epistemic Internalism I am advocating.
Throughout this thesis I presupposed Particularism as a methodological constraint 
on approaching the theory of epistemic justification. That is, given that I share an 
intuitive idea of what we are justified in believing, I sought to give an account of what all 
the intuitive particular cases of justification have in common that make them instances of 
justification, rather than something else. To that end I argued for the indispensability o f 
conscious awareness to epistemic justification.
With a clearer answer to the meta-epistemological question of what is 
fundamental about epistemic justification, I am now in a position to do some applied 
epistemology, viz., to consider what, if anything, we are justified in believing, and to ask 
how such justification is possible. Now that I have a better idea of what we are looking 
for, I can start to search for it, and explain its possibility. In the future I intend to extend 
the account developed here of the justification of perceptual belief to other potentially 
problematic areas, such as memory, testimony, and the a priori. In each case I intend to 
offer a response that explains how a type of justification is possible that is neither 
externalist, nor concessive to the sceptic, in a way that is consistent with epistemic 
internalism and the awareness condition.
In short, this thesis is an explanation and defense of an internalist theory of 
epistemic justification. The central claim of the thesis is that something is “internal” in 
this sense only if it is, or can easily be, the object o f the agent’s conscious awareness. I
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have argued throughout that conscious awareness is a necessary condition of epistemic 
justification obtaining, and that factors external to consciousness play no justificatory 
role.
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